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INTRODUCTION

The equal protection clause, with its social and analytic complexities, has stirred courts and commentators perhaps more than any
other constitutional provision. Conventional wisdom now holds
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that the two-tiered equal protection test 1 provides opaque analysis
and mechanical results. 2 Different remedies have been proposed.
Some commentators attempt to supply a governing, substantive principle for equal protection adjudication.3 Others, notably Professor
Gunther,4 have advocated strengthening the rational basis test by requiring substantial factual support for a classification and by subjecting the classificatory means to greater scrutiny. 5 However, this
second approach has been profoundly shaken by the criticism, expressed in an influential student note, 6 that any means-end rationality requirement can be tautologically satisfied.7 Consequently, in
many eyes, equal protection lacks both a governing principle and a
sound method of argument.
This Note proposes to restore means-end analysis to legal respectability through a comprehensive integrated approach to purpose, misfit, and balancing. The search for a rational basis is
meaningless if there are no constraints on the kind of purpose which
may justify a classification.8 Therefore, this Note initially explores
ways in which a court can more rigorously scrutinize statutory purpose. The next significant question is how a court should evaluate
the degree of coincidence between the class picked out by the law
and the class which would be picked out if the law were to achieve
its goals. Such "misfit" analysis is underdeveloped, largely because
the liberality of the "purpose" requirement often renders it unnecessary. A major part of this Note analyzes misfit (or as it is commonly
described, overinclusion and underinclusion).
After a legitimate equal protection purpose has been identified
and the misfit it creates analyzed, the classification must be subjected
to a balancing test. This Note describes the dynamics of that balance, especially the role of misfit and the relevance of reasonable
alternatives. The difference between the substantive due process
and equal protection rationality tests is also explained.
I. A helpful general exposition of the test can be found in .Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1076-132 (1969) [hereinafter cited as .Developments].
2. See Gunther, 'I7re Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search ofEvolving .Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Mode/for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Nowak, Realigning the Standards ofReview lintier the Equal Protection Guaran•
tee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Class(lications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974); Wilkinson,
'I7re Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional
Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975); Karst, 'I7re Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal
Citizenship lintier the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977).
4. Gunther, supra note 2.
5. See Nowak, supra note 3, at 1094; Simson, A Methodfar Analyzing .Discriminatory Effects lintier the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663, 665-66 (1977).
6. Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
7. For another expression of this view, see Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 654-63 (1975).
8. See Note, supra note 6.

1978]

Equal Protection

773

No simple formula can resolve equal protection claims, and this
Note does not suggest one. Nor is this Note, properly speaking, an
apology for closer scrutiny. Rather, it attempts to describe a mode
of argument which should be used in equal protection cases, a
framework general enough9 to accommodate a broad range of substantive views about the material values which should guide equal
protection analysis.
The argument in this Note is long and complex, and by its nature
impossible to summarize in a neat phrase such as "rational basis,"
"purpose capable of withstanding analysis," 10 or "means-focused
scrutiny." 11 Nevertheless, a general exposition of the model may be
helpful. Much of the following outline may be somewhat obscure at
this stage, but it should serve as a useful point of reference whenever
the reader is unsure of the argument's direction.
Part I.A introduces the main themes of the equal protection
clause. Equal protection proscribes both "hostile" and "unfair" discriminations. A hostile discrimination is a law which is intended to
burden or benefit a group because of an obviously irrelevant characteristic and which produces stigma. This Note deals exclusively with
unfair discriminations, namely, laws whose consequences are unjust
in light of the characteristics of the classes created and of the purposes of the law. These two different prohibitions respond to different kinds of injustice and require separate analysis. Thus, the
prohibition against "unfairness" does not require a court to examine
legislative motive, but to evaluate the effect of a law on the interests
of those classified.
The fairness of a law can be judged, as a first approximation, by
asking whether the class picked out adequately matches the class
that should have been picked out, given the law's purpose (or, to use
the current expression, by whether "misfit" is small enough). Some
constraints on "purpose" are necessary, however, if the law's rationality is to be judged. Otherwise the means-picking out class A-is
always rationally (but tautologically) related to the "end"-picking
out class A.
Part Ill's discussion ~f purpose demonstrates that misfit analysis
is feasible despite the tautology objection. To refute that objection,
we must distinguish between goals which are legitimate, impermissible, or neither. A legitimate goal, as specially defined in this Note,
is one which so clearly differs in kind from the most nearly comparable goal that the legislature is entirely free to pursue it. That is, the
9. The Note's analysis does not extend to the problems of unconstitutional motivation and
the nature of the classifying trait (Le., the problem of "suspect" classes), for reasons suggested
in Part I.A iefra.
10. Nowak, supra note 3, at 1094.
11. Gunther, supra note 2, at 20-24.

774

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 76:771

state need not justify such a goal in terms of its rational relationship
to some further end. Every classification should be judged according to a legitimate goal, and not simply a possibly legitimate goal.
This constraint does much to avoid the tautology trap, for the state
must ordinarily justify a law by a somewhat general purpose, not by
a narrow, tautological interest in burdening those whom the law in
fact burdens. In a few cases, however, which we may call "self-justifying" classifications, the tautological justification suffices.
Impermissible goals are those goals which cannot be invoked at
all to justify a law, however "rationally" they are served in any given
case. It is difficult to establish clear standards for "illegitimacy," but
for several reasons later noted, this difficulty may not seriously jeopardize equal protection review. The last, catch-all category comprises
those goals which may be invoked only tentatively to justify a law.
Even if they are quite "rationally" served in a given case, they do not
conclusively establish the fairness of the law, since they might not be
rationally related to any purpose which is clearly legitimate.
Once a legitimate purpose has been isolated, we can meaningfully analyze the "misfit" (that is, overinclusion and underinclusion)
created with respect to that purpose. Part IV describes in some detail
the requirements of misfit analysis, since courts and commentators
have badly neglected this topic. The most basic equal protection
requirement is the minimum rationality constraint, namely, that the
burdened (or benefitted) class pose a higher social harm (or need), be
less costly to apply the burden (or benefit) to, or have less of an interest in avoiding the burden (or obtaining the benefit) than a class not
picked out for special treatment. These comparisons refer to the average (not the aggregate) harm or cost or interest for each class. In
other words, this weakest rationality constraint prohibits the state
from striking at a large part of the harm, unless, in that part, the
harm is more acute.
Properly understood, this constraint helps dispel several misconceptions about misfit analysis. By emphasizing differential harm, it
avoids the popular illusion that the absolute amount of misfit is the
measure of a law's irrationality. The constraint also illustrates that
administrative convenience is a basic factor in the analysis of any
law, not just another goal which the state may or may not be pursuing. In the sex discrimination cases especially, the Court has improperly distinguished between presumptions whose "only"
justification is administrative cost and those which are "rational."
This distinction is false because an imperfect but reasonable generalization can be described either as "rationally" distinguishing classes
of unequal average harm, or as distinguishing classes of unequal cost
but equivalent harm, for it is simply more expensive to "find" the
harmful individuals in the class posing a lower average 'harm.
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The elements of the minimum rationality constraint merit further
discussion, since they are also the factors ultimately balanced in a
"closer scrutiny" test. Harm can be described as continuous, intermediate or discrete. 12 However, the intermediate characterization,
that only those meeting a threshold level of harm deserve a burden,
can be an artificial device for evading misfit review. Cost can be
separated into (1) the cost of identifying to whom the burden shall
apply and (2) the cost of applying the burden. 13 The discussion will
indicate that even the second type of cost has equal protection relevance, despite initial appearances to the contrary; and that "individualized hearings" are not, again despite appearances, the costly but
"perfectly rational" solution to classificatory inaccuracy. Finally,
the burdened and the unburdened will sometimes have a different
personal interest in avoiding the burden. 14 Of course, the personal
interest most often has equal protection significance simply because
a law differentially infringes it, not because different classes value it
differently.
A major failing of contemporary misfit analysis is its inability to
explain the difference between the rationality requirements of substantive due process and equal protection. Part IV.C.l demonstrates
that due process analyzes the overbreadth, i e., overinclusiveness, of
a law, while equal protection analyzes the degree to which the burdened and unburdened differ in posing a harm. The two methods
are independent of each other-a due process overbreadth violation
is not necessarily an equal protection violation, and vice versa-but
they may sometimes be profitably read together to invalidate a law
which does not quite violate either test. (Procedural due process also
involves some "misfit" analysis of classificatory accuracy, and can be
integrated with substantive due process/equal protection in a generalized test.)
The distinction between substantive due process and equal protection suggests an answer to the question whether overinclusion and
underinclusion should be analyzed differently by a court. 15 That answer is a complicated "yes." Neither overinclusion nor underinclusion is directly relevant to equal protection. Each is indirectly relevant insofar as it affects the size of the differential in harm that the
classes of the burdened and the unburdened threaten. Overinclusion
is, however, directly relevant to substantive due process analysis, and
therefore we might say that courts should be somewhat more tolerant of underinclusion than of overinclusion. (This tolerance is a
12.
13.
14.
15.

See
See
See
See

Part IV.B.l infra.
Part IV.B.2 infra.
Part IV.B.3 infra.
Part IV.C.2 infra.
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sounder formulation of the view that the state may attack "part of a
harm.")
The previous analysis is valid whether overinclusion and underinclusion are defined with respect to an affirmative burden or with
respect to the "burden" of denying a benefit-with one important
exception. Unlike equal protection, due process cannot treat benefits and burdens uniformly, because denial of a state benefit in which
the plaintiff does not yet have a property interest is not a "deprivation of. . . property" under the due process clause. But this lack of
uniformity is remedied somewhat by the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine. That doctrine seems to be essentially a mild substantive
due process (rather than equal protection) test and does not seem to
require that the plaintiff have an actual property interest in the benefit which an irrebuttable presumption has denied him.
The last topic under misfit analysis asks how a court should evaluate laws with multiple goals. 16 When the state classifies persons
who more acutely pose each of the multiple harms, the analysis is
simple: a court compares the burdened class with the class which
poses multiple harms and evaluates misfit in the usual way. But in
other cases, a court must justify its decision to burden those posing
multiple harms and not those threatening only one of the harms,
since otherwise the law would violate the minimum rationality constraint. A court might reason that the possession of one harm implies a higher degree of another; that pursuit of one goal inevitably
aids or inhibits pursuit of a second; that a single legitimate purpose
can be inferred from the several purposes; or that the classification is
part of a general policy of attacking one of the harms.
Misfit analysis is impossible when a court cannot reasonably ascertain the rough dimensions of the "purpose" class, i.e., those whom
the law should have picked out given its purpose. 17 Two broad categories of goals are inevitably arbitrary in this sense and thus are exceptions to misfit analysis. First, some goals have inherently
imprecise standards (e.g., aesthetic and moral judgments). Second,
some goals are "neutral," for they are indifferent to who is picked
out; the only purpose is to burden or benefit a limited class of persons indistinguishable from a larger class (e.g., lotteries, or attempts
to reduce total program cost). Analysis of neutral goals is somewhat
complex. Such goals are most sustainable if they further a substantive purpose (other than the mere numerical diminution of a larger
class) which would not be served by rationally excluding some members of the class. (An example is a bona fide social experiment.)
Absent such a purpose, the state usually must employ a rational criterion of exclusion and must proportionally diminish a benefit or
16. See Part IV.D iefra.
17. See Part V iefra.
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burden which is not discrete. If the state may pursue a neutral goal,
it should use as random a process as is practical to reduce the class,
especially if the deprivation imposed is significant or the classificatory trait would stigmatize those classified.
Once a court has identified a legitimate purpose and evaluated
the misfit it creates, it should subject the law to a balancing test. 18
Unfortunately, the present tripartite equal protection test's characterization of balancing is sketchy and possibly misleading. The
court should initially ponder whether the differential in harm between the burdened and the unburdened is great enough to justify
the differential treatment in light of the significance of the personal
and governmental interests, the severity of the burden, and the extent to which the governmental interest is served. A court might be
able to decide this question immediately if the law is obviously either
prima facie fair or unfair. If the law is not at one of those extremes,
then the court should proceed to examine "reasonable," less re. strictive alternatives, where reasonableness is judged according to
the prima facie fairness of the I.aw, the social costs of the alternative,
and how much less restrictive the alternative is. In some cases, even
perfect or near-perfect means-end fit will not preserve a law, if the
personal interest infringed is so important that only an unusually
strong state interest can justify it. However, this more radical balancing approach should be used cautiously, for it often approximates
the substantive due process test.
Due process balancing is similar in some respects to equal protection balancing. It weighs the same elements as equal protection, but
is seeking to justify overbreadth, a different kind of inequality than
the differential harm which equal protection seeks to justify. Again,
the court makes a prima facie judgment about overbreadth and examines less restrictive alternatives if the overbreadth is neither obviously fair nor obviously unfair. Due process more often entails the
more radical form of balancing in which perfect fit is not enough,
and misfit analysis is generally less important under due process
than under equal protection.
A.

The Function of the Equal Protection Clause

Any analysis of the equal protection clause makes assumptions
' about that clause's proper function. This section reports several uncontroversial but not unimportant assumptions which underlie the
Note's analysis.
·
One traditional view of the predominant theme of the equal protection clause is that it protects "discrete and insular minorities" 19
18. See Part VI infra.
19. This phrase first appeared in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938).
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from oppression in the political process. 20 But this view fails to explain why some losers in that process deserve judicial protection and
others do not. Logically the courts should intervene whenever an
important relevant interest has not been voiced in the legislative
process, whether or not that interest can be ascribed to an "insular
minority." Surely courts cannot and should not fill all the lacunae
of the legislative process.
A court enforcing the equal protection guarantee is not a surrogate legislator. It should however shield people (usually, though not
invariably, members of minority groups) from hostile discriminations and discriminations which treat them unfairly. 21 This dual
protection does not require the courts to re-evaluate the costs and
benefits already evaluated by the legislature. It does require courts
to decide whether hostility motivated discriminatory treatment of a
group and whether a class has been treated unfairly in light of its
characteristics and the purpos·es of the law. Judicial interest-balancing is legitimate only insofar as it helps answer these questions.
While these questions are difficult, courts in equal protection analysis need not balance as often or as thoroughly as is implied by the
traditional argument that the judiciary should bolster the political
strength of minorities.
The notions of "hostility" and ''unfairness" deserve comment.
"Hostile discrimination" describes a law which would not have been
passed but for the legislature's desire to help or hurt a class of persons because that class possesses an obviously irrelevant characteristic. 22 For example, we "suspect" that racial classifications are
hostile discriminations because our national experience teaches that
they are probably motivated solely by a desire to penalize people on
the basis of their skin color, a characteristic generally irrelevant to
legitimate legislative purposes.23
20. See Ely, The Constitutionality ofReverse Racial J)iscrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723
(1974). Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977), offers a
sophisticated criticism of this traditional view. As Sandalow notes, the view that minorities
merit special judicial solicitude is not confined to cases interpreting the equal protection
clause. (United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), itself was a due process
case.)
21. "Hostile" discriminations are analyzed by the Court under the rubric of "suspect"
traits. "Unfair'' discriminations include classifications burdening "fundamental interests" or
lacking a "rational basis." The hostile/unfair distinction, while useful, does not precisely describe the Court's practice. See generally text at note 27 in.fro.
22. This definition ignores several difficult questions. Does "obviously irrelevant" mean
irrelevant to any legitimate purpose (in any context), or simply irrelevant to any conceivable
purpose of the challenged law? Must the legislators know that the characteristic is obviously
irrelevant (i.e., is it a defense that they believe blacks, women, or illegitimates are inferior or
unqualified)? How obvious must the irrelevancy be? If a characteristic may be relevant, and if
the legislators intend to burden those possessing it regardless of its relevance, is the discrimination "hostile''? Assume, for example, that a legislature requires women (but not men) to prove
their fitness for physically taxing jobs simply to discourage women from unseemly, masculine
tasks. Does the fact that the requirement is a barely rational generalization about relative
fitness mean the discrimination is not hostile?

23. Race may be a relevant characteristic but still be a forbidden legislative criterion sim-
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If the irrelevant characteristic appears on the face of the statute,
the illicit motivation can perhaps be presumed, although the presumption can be rebutted, especially if the facial use of the characteristic is not stigmatizing. A classification by race will almost
invariably fail because of the stigma such classifications create and
sustain. 24 A classification by sex will more commonly be upheld,
partly because sex is not so often "obviously irrelevant" as race, and
partly because classification by gender is thought less stigmatic.25
Where hostility cannot be read on the face of the law, an examination oflegislative motivation may be required. Stigma will again be
relevant. Divining the legislative motive will, of course, be more
difficult.
"Unfair" discrimination need not result from hostile legislative
motivation. It arises when the characteristics of a statutorily created
class are insufficiently related to the purposes of the law. Such discrimination constitutes the conceptually difficult portion of equal
protection analysis. Determining whether discrimination is hostile
requires proving legislative intent, to be sure, but once we identify
classifications which are "suspect"-i.e., probably irrelevant to legitimate state ends-the legal standard is straightforward. Identifying
unfair discrimination, on the other hand, necessitates a complex
analysis of the legitimacy of state ends, the relevance of a classification to those ends, and the significance of the amount of "misfit"
ply because it stigmatizes. Consider Professor Brest's example of an employer who preferred
whites to blacks because blacks had a higher absenteeism rate: even if all other rules for predicting absenteeism were less accurate than a racial criterion, such a criterion would certainly
be invalidated. See Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword· In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. I, 6 (1976); Posner, The Defunis Case and the
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 21.
The constitutionality of reverse discrimination in some circumstances, see Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2738, 2766 (1978) (opinions of Powell & Brennan, JJ.),
may seem to contradict the statement in the text. However, upon analysis, the contradiction
disappears. Race is "relevant" to compensating minorities for past discrimination; it is a separate question whether this purpose is legitimate. Although the "rationality" of a statute is not
conclusive, there may be reasons (including the significance of stigma) for being more "suspicious" of a rational classification disadvantaging blacks than of a rational classification disadvantaging whites. See 98 S. Ct. at 2783-85 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
24. Affirmative action programs, as was remarked in note 23 supra, may be consistent with
the stigmatic effects analysis. That analysis does, however, provide some support for a constitutional preference for "goals" rather than "quotas," since whites might find goals less stigmatizing. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct 2733, 2751 n.34 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
25. Significant stigmatic harm might be a prerequisite to a finding of "hostile" discrimination. Consider, for example, United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973), in which the Supreme Court conceded that the probable purpose of the statute (to deny
food stamps to "hippies") was illegitimate, yet invalidated the law on a different ground. The
Court may have believed the stigmatic harm was not great, since "hippies" are not a traditionally disfavored minority. (Of course, one may dispute the correctness of such reasoning,
which implies that if a class is only temporarily disfavored, it is not suspect.)
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between the classification and the ends in light of the personal interests impaired and the governmental interests furthered by the statute. Most laws are at worst "unfair"-they classify people
according to characteristics which are not obviously irrelevant to legislative ends. This Note presents a framework for analyzing the fairness of statutes; it addresses only indirectly the problem of hostile
discrimination. 26
To summarize, the equal protection clause performs two important functions: it prohibits hostile discrimination and unfair discrimination. The former prohibition essentially concerns stigmatic
effects, though it may also guarantee purity of motive for its own
sake.27 The prohibition against unfairness is less concerned with
motive or stigma and more concerned with classificatory inaccuracy
and with the law's impact on the interests of those it classifies.
These two functions of equal protection are not, of course, mutually exclusive. Classifications by gender exemplify laws whose validity is judged under both standards. Indeed, most sex
classifications which have been found unconstitutional would probably withstand scrutiny under either standard alone, but stigma and
classificatory inaccuracy together justify their invalidation.28 In
general, any classification which barely satisfies the fairness test developed in subsequent sections might nevertheless violate the equal
protection clause if it contains enough indicia of hostile discrimination. Because the prohibitions against hostile and unfair discriminations serve distinct policies, however, one cannot simply add stigma
or any other feature of hostile discrimination to the equal protection
balance later described in this Note.
B.

Introduction to Mi.git Analysis

Under one formulation of equal protection fairness, a legislative
classification "must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
26. For an illuminating discussion, see Brest, supra note 23. Useful general discussions of
legislative motive include Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of llnconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95; Eisenberg, J)isproportionate Impact and
Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 36 (1977); Ely, Legisla•
tive and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 19 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
21. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341,
358 (1949).
28. For an early analysis suggesting that the Supreme Court evaluates both (what I have
called) hostility and unfairness, see Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion ofHuman Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 95 (1966): "The
(new equal protection] decisions appear to rest upon two largely subjective judgments . • • •
One element is the relative invidiousness of the particular differentiation • . . • The second
element is the relative importance of the subject with respect to which equality is sought••••"
J)evelopments, supra note l, at 1120-21, suggests that the Court's judgment is determined by
the interaction of these two elements.
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persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 29 As this
suggests, equal protection requires courts to identify the criterion of
similarity:30 with respect to what common feature must people be
treated equally?31 In the context of the equal protection clause, the
relevant feature is the purpose of the law.32 More precisely, two
individuals must be treated equally if they share some quality and if
the purpose33 of the law is to benefit or burden individuals who possess that quality.34 For example, a trespassing law which applied
only to the left-handed would probably violate equal protection, for
right-handed as well as left-handed trespassers violate owners' property rights, and it is the law's apparent purpose to prevent that harm.
Legislative classifications simplify the process of determining
whether individuals possess this relevant quality or feature by stipulating that an easily identifiable trait shall be the criterion for apply29. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). This formulation of the test
is less deferential to the state than some other formulations. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (equal protection "is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective"). This Note will argue, however,
that if the rational basis test is to have any application, some analysis of the "substantiality" of
the means-end relationship is necessary. The Royster test is employed in the text to anticipate
this analysis. Concededly, that test begs the question at this early stage of the argument.
30. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27. In addition, see Benn, Equality, Moral and
Social, III ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (1967); Sandalow, supra note 7, at 654-63.
31. The requirement is usually stated as demanding similar treatment for the similarly
situated, which implies that somewhat unequal treatment might suffice. This is misleading,
for if we could determine easily which individuals are the same with respect to the attribute
that the law is intended to burden or benefit, then those individuals should be treated equally.
If, however, "similar treatment" means treatment in proportion to possession of the relevant
trait, the "similar'' formulation states the requirement properly.
Courts that use the "similar" formulation probably mean to suggest that the legislature
need not create mathematically precise classifications. However, it would be more accurate to
say that those who are in the same position with respect to the purpose of a law should be
treated equally, but that the necessity of line-drawing and the impossibility of precisely identifying the "purpose" class justify some imprecision.
See Bedau, Egalitarianism and the Idea ofEquality, in EQUALITY 3 (Pennock & Chapman
eds. 1967).
32. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27,
at 346. JJut see text at and following notes 75-77 infra for discussion of the claim that the
fundamental interest branch of active equal protection review substitutes "exercise of a fundamental interest" for "the purpose of the law'' as the criterion of similarity.
33. This is not to say, however, that a simple desire to discriminate is a permissible purpose. See Part III.A.2 infra.
34. The principle that the similarly situated must be treated equally entails the corollary
that the differently situated must be treated differently (unless, of course, they are similarly
situated in some other respect that would justify the same treatment). If A and JJ are differently situated, then by definition A has some quality which JJ lacks by virtue of which he
deserves to be benefitted (or burdened). But it is improper also to benefit JJ, who lacks the
quality and thus does not deserve the benefit. Of course JJ might deserve the benefit by virtue
of some other quality.
This corollary is not merely of intellectual interest. If a statute applies to all persons but
should only apply to a few, those unfairly included cannot point to another class, the "unclassified," to whom they are similarly situated. The corollary principle is simply- the doctrine of
due process overbreadth. A fuller discussion of the difference between the equal protection
"principle" and its due process "corollary" is postponed until Part IV.C.l _infra.
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ing the burden or benefit. In the classic formulation of Tussman and
tenBroek,35 we may define class T as consisting of all individuals
possessing the legislatively declared trait, and class M as consisting
of all individuals possessing the mischief which the law seeks to
eliminate.36 As thus defined, M is the class of those similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. Under this formulation,
the essential question for analysis of equal protection rationality or
"misfit" is whether the classes M and T sufficiently coincide.
Assume, for example, that a statute conditions the privilege of
driving upon passing a driving test. The mischief aimed at is dangerous driving, and the trait identified is failure to pass the test. The
"fit" between M and T is doubly imperfect. First, some dangerous
drivers will pass the test-thus, the class T is "underinclusive," for it
does not include all members of M. Second, some safe drivers will
fail the test-thus, T is also "overinclusive," for it includes persons
who are not members of M.37
The Court has developed several measures of how much statutory misfit will be tolerated. Under even the most tolerant standard,
a classification must at least yield "some" fit. Thus, ifM and T have
no members in common-i.e., if no one who fails the test is a dangerous driver-then the classification must be rejected as completely
irrational. On the other hand, the rational basis standard does not
demand "perfect rationality"-i.e., that T and M be equivalent and
thus that all and only dangerous drivers fail the test. Consequently,
if the misfit is not too great, the classification created by the driving
test statute would probably be sustained. 38
Since misfit measures the extent to which M and T do not coincide, misfit analysis is unnecessary when they coincide perfectly. Of
course, M and T can be made to coincide by defining T in terms of
M or defining M in terms of T. Neither device, however, is usually
acceptable. If the legislature used the first device and simply provided that dangerous drivers be denied licenses, we would still be left
35. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27, at 346-48.
36. "Mischief'' is used by Tussman and tenBroek. They did not coin an analogous term
for the quality by virtue of which a person deserves a benefit rather than a burden, other than
to note that the "purpose of a law may be either the elimination of a public 'mischief' or the
achievement of some positive public good." Id at 346. This Note uses the term "need" for
this quality of deserving a benefit, even though the term is somewhat misleading insofar as it
suggests that only deprivations, and not other personal "merits" such as excellence and importance to the economy, deserve benefits.
37. The following terminology may be helpful. "Properly included" will refer to the class
that should be burdened or benefitted and that in fact is burdened or benefitted- i.e., the
intersection of M and T: (MOT). "Improperly included" means overincluded: ('vMOT).
"Improperly excluded" means underincluded: (MO 'v T). "Properly excluded" means correctly
excluded from the burden or benefit ('v MO 'v T).
38. This statement is a gross oversimplification, as the remainder of this Note illustrates.
But it is true that courts generally accept "small" amounts of misfit and that such misfit is often
justifiable (though assuredly not simply because it is small). See text at notes 183-85 i'!fra.
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to devise a method of determining who is dangerous. If the legislature granted an administrator the authority to identify dangerous
drivers, we would have an ascertainable class T-the class of individuals adjudged dangerous by the administrator-but no assurance
of a perfect fit. Of course, the more clearly the standards for the
administrator's decision are specified, the more closely they resemble
a legislative classification based simply on the possession of certain
traits, and we are back where we started. In short, insofar as this
device produces perfect fit, it entirely undercuts the purpose of legislative classifications--=-namely, to simplify the process of identifying
those who deserve the benefit or burden.
Perfect fit may also be achieved by defining M in terms of T. A
court might define the law's purpose as denying licenses to individuals who fail driving tests, not as keeping dangerous drivers off the
road. One is inclined to ask why such a purpose should be given
credence; the answer must be that such individuals are likely to be
dangerous drivers. This method of eliminating misfit seems transparently improper, but it does show that without an independent
constraint on judicial definitions of statutory purpose, any standard
for classificatory accuracy can be tautologically satisfied. Fortunately, as we will see, such a constraint exists. 39
The foregoing discussion of misfit is greatly simplified. For instance, we shall see that it is fundamentally misconceived to treat
misfit analysis as simply a question of the degree to which the "purpose" and "trait" classes (M and T) coincide. Rather, the proper focus is the difference in the degree to which classes T and"' T pose the
harm, where "'T is the class of persons lacking the classificatory trait.
Let us complete this introduction to misfit analysis by glancing at
the typical mode of argument in equal protection cases. Ordinarily,
the plaintiff complains that he is burdened even though his situation
is similar to that of others who are not burdened.40 Instead of asking whether the asserted misfit is justifiable, courts usually respond
by finding a respect in which plaintiff is differently situated from
those allegedly similarly situated. Where the plaintiff claims to belong to a class with a low enough level of harm that the purpose of
the law does not require imposition of the statutory burden, the court
usually finds that the plaintiff belongs to another relevant class with
respect to which it is proper to impose the burden. Of course, in
finding "another relevant class," the court has simply interpreted the
purpose of the classification in a manner unfavorable to the plaintiff.
An example will illustrate this process. In McGinnis v. Royster,41
39. See Part III.A.I iefra.
40. Alternatively, the plaintiff may complain that he is not benefitted even though his situation is similar to that of others who are benefitted.
41. 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
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a state statute granted "good time" credit against prison sentences in
proportion to the amount of time the prisoner had been incarcerated
since sentencing. Although time served before sentencing was
credited to the sentence imposed, it was not included in the computation of good time.42 Thus, a defendant unable to make bail ultimately served longer than a bailed defendant (since the former could
not receive good time credit for pretrial incarceration). The pretrial
inmates who challenged the statute implicitly claimed that its purpose was to award credit based on time served, that with respect to
this purpose, they resembled inmates who had made bail, and that
therefore they also deserved credit according to total time served.43
The Supreme Court rejected this equal protection challenge by
interpreting the statute's purpose44 as giving credit for incarceration
time during which rehabilitative programs were offered.45 Since
jails are less likely than prisons to offer such programs, the Court
reasoned, it was rational to treat prisoners who had spent pretrial
time in jail differently than persons incarcerated only in a prison.
Note that the Court did not justify the original classification by
adopting the plaintiffs' interpretation of the statute's purpose and accepting that misfit as tolerable. Rather, the Court defined the purpose so as to explain the difference in treatment of which the
plaintiffs had complained.
The Court's analysis in McGinnis highlights a significant distinction between "specific" and "general" ways of justifying misfit. By a
"specific justification" a court may explain away the misfit entirely
as to the complaining party. Thus, if the party complains that he
has been improperly overincluded (with respect to a burden) or underincluded (with respect to a benefit), the court may identify a legitimate purpose as to which this specific party is properly classified. In
McGinnis, for example, the Court "specifically" justified the differ42. The actual credit system was somewhat more complex. For example, the credit could
be forfeited for "bad conduct" or for violation of prison rules, and in no case could the credit
win release from prison before a year. "Good time" earned affected the minimum and maximum parole dates somewhat differently, and pretrial time was credited in computing the latter.
410 U.S. at 264-68.
The plaintiffs also complained that the statute's pretrial-time exclusion was not applied to
county penitentiary inmates (nonfelons with less than one-year sentences). The Court rejected
this equal protection complaint on the ground that these inmates might have required "quantitatively and qualitatively less rehabilitation" than felons. 410 U.S. at 274.
43. More precisely, the plaintiffs complained that the classification discriminated against
those unable to afford or to qualify for bail. 410 U.S. at 265,268. That is, since pretrial jail
time was credited to the sentence imposed, a bailed defendant differed from a jailed defendant
only in that he acquired more good-time credit.
44. The Court was careful to note that this was only one of the purposes of the statute and
that equal protection analysis does not require that the statute be rationally related only to a
"primary" purpose. 410 U.S. at 275-77.
45. The Court added that state prison officials could not observe and evaluate the performance of a jail inmate. 410 U.S. at 273.
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ential treatment of the plaintiffs by identifying one purpose of the
statute as crediting time served where rehabilitative programs were
offered.
The second alternative available to a court faced with misfit is to
justify it "generally." In a "general" justification of misfit, the court
concedes that the complaining party has been burdened without possessing the corresponding need, but the court finds grounds which
justify the misfit. In McGinnis, for example, the plaintiffs might
have responded to the Court by arguing that they did make rehabilitative progress in jail and therefore were improperly denied the benefit of good time credit. The Court might have replied by generally
justifying the misfit: jail inmates are less likely to achieve such progress than prison inmates (who are offered special programs), and it
is unreasonable to require the state to evaluate each prisoner's progress, even if such an inquiry would show that the plaint!ffs had
progressed.
Unlike a general justification, which leaves misfit unexplained, a
specific justification seems simply to eliminate misfit. This appearance is deceiving, however. Although a specific justification asserts
a purpose with respect to which the complainant is properly included, it may create misfit as to other individuals. Specific justifications may offer an intuitively satisfying reason for burdening or
not benefitting the complainant before the court, but the misfit they
create still must be justified "generally." Otherwise the state could
invariably justify its laws simply by finding any purpose rationally
furthered by burdening the immediate plaintiff. For example, suppose that all the plaintiffs in McGinnis had threatened witnesses.
The statute surely could not have been justified by the state's interest
in denying good time credit to those who have obstructed justice; the
plaintiffs would have been almost the only pretrial inmates properly
included with respect to that interest. The requirements for general
justifications of misfit are discussed in detail later.46 Nevertheless, it
should be emphasized here that a court's use of a specific rather than
general justification should be irrelevant to the success of an equal
protection claim.47 Whether misfit can be specifically justified, that
is, whether the plaintiff" deserves the benefit or exemption, should be
irrelevant because even if he does not, the plaintiff should have both
standing to raise the equal protection claim and a right to a remedy
if he succeeds on the merits. The following discussion will explain
46. See Part N infra.
47. The state may not justify its treatment of a class by reference to its "proper" treatment
of only a part of that class; by the same token, however, the state need not "properly" treat all
members of a class to justify distinguishing that class from another. In both the former case
(special justification) and the latter case (general justification), a class differential must be explained.
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why equal protection standing and remedy doctrines have this fortunate consequence.
Equal protection standing doctrine seems to produce some curious results. Why can a confessed thief complain of discriminatory
enforcement of the criminal laws?48 Why can a widower who admittedly cannot prove he was dependent on his deceased spouse successfully demand benefits when an obvious purpose of the law was to
distribute benefits according to dependency? 49 The answer, in each
case, is that the plaintiff suffered legal injury simply in being treated
differently than others who are similarly situated. Discrimination
claims involve more than an individual's relationship to the government; they involve the fairness of disparate treatment of classes of
individuals.50 The essence of an equal protection claim is not that
the plaintiff "deserves" a benefit, but rather that he belongs to a class
that is situated similarly and therefore should be treated similarly to
the benefitted class.
This "relative desert" analysis allows plaintiffs to avoid issues of
standing in equal protection cases. If, for example, the law benefits
members of class B but not of class A, plaintiffs who belong to class
A will allege that they are relevantly similar to the members of B. 51
Plaintiffs will then assert that whatever reasons the state had for benefitting members of B must also logically require benefitting members of A; all are, by hypothesis, equally deserving. Because
plaintiffs need not argue that they should be benefitted though they
are undeserving, courts invariably confront a claim which on its face
confers standing. 52
48. See generally Co=ent, The Right lo Nondiscriminatory Eeforcemenl of Stale Penal
Laws, 61 CoLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1961).
49. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
50. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974): "'Due process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals
in the same situation may be treated. 'Equal protection,' on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably
indistinguishable."
51. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). Leon Goldfarb claimed that he should
receive benefits because he was as deserving as women who could not prove dependency, not
because he was as undeserving.
52. In Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959), the Supreme Court seemed to
hold that an equal protection claimant has standing even where state law requires that the
discrimination, if proved, be "equalized" by extending the burden to others rather than by
exempting the plaintiff from the burden. The plaintiff, a resident taxpayer seeking reduction of
a tax on his stored merchandise, argued that similar property of nonresidents was exempted in
violation of the equal protection clause. The state court had held that only the legislature
could extend the exemption to plaintiff and that it was unnecessary to consider the constitutional claim, since plaintiff's property would be taxable regardless of the merits of his claim.
The Supreme Court disagreed and reached the merits, reasoning that since the state court had
not invalidated the exemption, it was i=aterial that plaintiff's claim would be fruitless if the
exemption had been stricken. (On the merits, the Supreme Court denied the claim.)
The Court's holding in Bowers is somewhat ambiguous. If indeed the state court had no
power to remedy the alleged discrimination by extending the exemption to plaintiff, then why
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Only when devising a remedy for an equal protection violation
do courts directly confront the dilemma of protecting the "guilty" or
benefitting the undeserving. Even here, courts may try to avoid the
embarrassment of such a result by concluding that the legislature
intended to benefit or excuse the class to which the plaintiff belongs,
as well as the class actually benefitted. But such statutory interpretation must often be dishonest. The Court awarded benefits to Leon
Goldfarb not because Congress intended that all surviving spouses
be benefitted, for it surely did not, but because automatically granting benefits to widows but not widowers was unfair. 53 Although
Congress intended to benefit dependent surviving spouses (and believed that widows are usually dependent while widowers are not),
the Court properly granted benefits to Leon Goldfarb even though
he was not dependent. Had it refused to do so, the Court could have
avoided protecting the equal protection rights of the undeserving,
but it would have denied Goldfarb adequate relief.
Of course, the legislature ultimately can remedy the discrimination in either direction; the presumption in Goldfarb that only widows are dependent can either be eliminated or extended to both
widows and widowers. But a stingy judicial remedy would thwart the
purposes of the equal protection clause by removing the incentive for
bringing claims and by effectively making some claims nonjusticiable. Although the claimant must take his chances that the legislature will ultimately resolve the inequality to his detriment, he should
not have to take that chance in court. 54
should it have to address the merits? Perhaps the Court believed that the plaintiff would have
been satisfied even with the "remedy" of eliminating the exemption for nonresidents. Read
more broadly, Bowers may suggest that a state court must provide an effective remedy for
equal protection violations and cannot simply leave the issue to the state legislature. See
Iowa-Des Moines Natl. Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931). In any event, Bowers does
suggest a liberal approach to standing in equal protection cases.
53. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 216-17 (1977) (plurality opinion).
54. It should be noted that most courts and co=entators disagree with this position and
argue instead for a case-by-case determination of the wisdom of extending rather than eliminating a presumption. See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 56 n.14 (1977); Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7, 17-18 (1975); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542-43 (1942); Arp v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 407-11, 563 P.2d 849, 856-58, 138 Cal. Rptr. 293,
300-02 (1977); Note, Extension versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial
Alternative, 12 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 115 (1975); .Developments, supra note I, at I 136-37.
The issue is admittedly complex: the decision to extend benefits may drastically affect state
budgets (see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and companion cases); courts are
naturally reluctant to "rewrite" legislation; and additional federalism concerns are implicated
when a federal court devises a remedy for a state law equal protection violation. Nevertheless,
it is important to preserve incentives for bringing equal protection challenges whether plaintiff
is burdened or benefitted, deserving or undeserving. Courts might accomplish this by at least
granting a prevailingplainttffthe relief he requests, even if wholesale extension of a benefit (or
of an exemption from a burden) would require legislative action. This approach produces
some unfairness itself, however, and seems unworkable for class actions. Alternatively, courts
might delay relief until the legislature has had a reasonable time to react to the finding of an
equal protection violation.
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This introduction to misfit analysis has done little more than explain terms and describe how the misfit issue arises in equal protection litigation. This Note next examines existing techniques of
evaluating misfit, that is, of determining when misfit violates equal
protection.

11.

EXISTING APPROACHES TO MISFIT

Before propounding a method of evaluating misfit, this Note will
study the Supreme Court's current treatment of misfit. While that
treatment has been doctrinally murky, generalizations can be derived from it by scrutinizing the standards the Court purports to apply. The first part of this section discusses the traditional "rational
basis" test. The remaining subsections investigate the relationship
of misfit to two kinds of "closer scrutiny": fundamental interests and
irrebuttable presumptions. Principles from these areas will be
tapped for precedent for a more sensitive equal protection scrutiny
than the traditional rational basis test provides.
A. Rational Basis Test
The Supreme Court has recognized that the rational basis test
demands an analysis of misfit, but it has not enunciated clearly its
standards for finding misfit justifiable. None of the three broad
standards which the Court's decisions suggest is unqualifiedly adequate.
In a frequently cited passage, the Court reasoned that a classification does not offend the equal protection guarantee "merely because
it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality."55 To the extent that this first standard
merely emphasizes the inevitable imprecision of legislative lines it is
unobjectionable. However, it may also imply that a little inequality
is always tolerable. Such an unqualified statement is inaccurate. 56
Slight inequalities should be allowed if it is too costly to remedy the
misfit by identifying the members of the overincluded and underincluded classes. However, better reasons for permitting the inequality must be given than the fiat assertion that the misfit is too slight to
require judicial scrutiny. A complaint that it was unfair for the government to accept Spiro Agnew's nolo contendere plea is not sufficiently answered by the response that since almost all other tax
55. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See Metropolis Theatre
Co. v. Chicago,.228 .U.S. 61, 69-70:(1913)'(''The problems of government are practical ones and
may justify, if they do not require, rough acco=odations-illogical it may be, and unscientific"); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914) ("abstract sy=etry" not required);
Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499,501 (1931) (''the machinery of government would not
work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints").
56. See Part IV.A infra.
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evaders are found guilty and punished, the government's policy is
largely "accurate" in punishing the guilty.
The Court frequently justifies misfit by a second standard,
namely, that the legislature may strike where the harm is most
acute. 57 Unlike the first standard, the second purports tojust!fy misfit, or at least underinclusiveness. For example, the state could reasonably keep only the most dangerous drivers off the road. Thus,
although a safe driver who fails the driving test may not be comforted to learn that legislative lines are inevitably imprecise, a very
dangerous driver who fails the test might be convinced that the classificatory scheme is reasonable even though it does not screen out the
marginally dangerous. However, the degree of harm standard is an
incomplete test of classificatory inaccuracy; it is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition of adequacy of fit.
Thus, peifect fit is not achieved just because the average harm in
the burdened class exceeds by the slightest degree that in the class
not burdened. A classification that picks out all and only harmful
individuals is surely more "rational"-that is, it produces less misfit-than one that selects a class only marginally more "harmful"
than the unburdened class and containing many harmless individuals. For example, a regulation requiring policemen to retire who individually have been found unable to perform their tasks causes less
misfit than one requiring all policemen to retire at the age of fifty. 58
Some cases might satisfy the degree of harm standard yet still violate
equal protection because of the ease with which the overincluded or
underincluded could be properly treated. For example, no court
would condone a criminal statute exempting redheaded persons on
the ground that T (criminals without red hair) has a higher average
harm than 'vT (non-criminals plus criminals with red hair). Of
course, a "degree of harm" justification can be helpful, for if it is not
possible inexpensively to identify similarly situated subclasses, the
level of misfit might be permissible. Nevertheless, it cannot be conclusively presumed that misfit is justifiable merely because the average harm in the burdened class exceeds the average in the
nonburdened class.
Under the Court's third misfit justification, the legislature may
remedy parts of the mischief:59 it may address problems "one step
57. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Minnesota v. Probate Court,
309 U.S. 270, 275 (1940); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915).
58. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), which upheld
mandatory retirement. Marshall's dissent correctly states that individualized review is more
rational than a flat rule, but of course that fact alone should not invalidate the rule, for the cost
of precision might justify a less precise rule. See Part IV.B.2 i,!fra.
59. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
486-87 (1970) ("the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between
attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all"); Williamson v. Lee
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (''The legislature may select one phase of one field and
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at a time"60 and "need not run the risk of losing an entire remedial
scheme simply because it failed, through inadvertence or otherwise,
to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked." 61
This standard is by far the most troublesome of the three, since it
appears to sanction completely irrational distinctions. A state which
denied licenses to left-handed drivers to reduce auto pollution62
would, after all, be proceeding "one step at a time." Almost any
equal protection challenge would fail if this standard were adopted
without qualification,63 for any classification which confers a benefit
or burden only on some of the similarly situated could be described
as a legislature's partial remedy. As we shall see, the justification
may be acceptable where the classification is inevitably arbitrary-for example, where genuine phase-in problems exist or where
burdens or benefits are distributed as part of a bona-fide social experiment.64 Nevertheless, by failing to distinguish these special
cases the Court offers an analysis which, taken seriously, would eviscerate the rational basis test. 65
Despite the availability of these three putative misfit justifications, the Court has in some cases found that classifications failed to
apply a remedy there, neglecting the others"); Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S.
157, 160-61 (1912) ("If a class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the fourteenth amendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise
and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law").
60. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
61. McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). See Queenside
Hills Realty Co. v. Sax!, 328 U.S. 80, 84 (1946) (a legislature "need not take account of new
and hypothetical inequalities that may come into existence as time passes or as conditions
change").
62. The example is from Posner, supra note 23, at 29 n.56. Posner cites it as one of the few
nonracial classifications so "palpably inconsistent" with equal protection as to be invalid. But
there is a disturbing similarity between his example and other arbitrary classifications which
the Court has upheld. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the Court upheld against an
equal protection challenge California's exclusion of pregnancy from the definition of "disability" in its mandatory employee-funded disability program. The Court reasoned that the state
need not insure against all risks of employment disability and that women were not discriminated against because "[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and women are not."
417 U.S. at 495-97. But to say that all risks common to both groups are covered is not to say
that a classification is rational which covers all gender-specific risks of men yet fails to cover all
such risks for women.
Of course, there might be other ways to explain Geduldig-for example, treating pregnancy
as a special kind of disability meriting exclusion, or viewing the discrimination as serving the
goal of having identifiable groups such as men and women receive benefits proportional to
their contributions. (Apparently women are more "expensive" than men even without pregnancy coverage, 417 U.S. at 497 n.21.)
63. A few classifications would not pass judicial review even under this standard, e.g.,
those drawn on explicit racial or ethnic lines or motivated by racial animus. No court would
sustain a law denying licenses to blacks to reduce auto pollution. But any classification that is
now judged under the rational basis test and not the compelling state interest test could be
upheld under this "one step at a time" standard.
64. See Part V infra.
65. On a subtler interpretation, this test is valid. See text accompanying note 284 infra.
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meet the rational basis test. Justice Marshall,66 Professor Gunther,67
and several other commentators68 have recognized that a tacit balancing test has been used in these cases. But because the test is tacit,
clear standards for gauging the significance of misfit cannot be directly derived from the cases. Consequently, these cases will not be
separately examined, although many of them will be discussed by
way of illustration throughout this Note. It is instructive, however,
to investigate two doctrines by which the Court explicitly subjects
classification to "closer scrutiny" than the rational basis test (as traditionally described) would warrant.

B. Fundamental Interests
In a series of cases, the Court has held that when certain "fundamental interests" (such as the right to vote or to travel) 69 are
d!fferential!y infringed by a classification, the classification must fall
unless it is "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. "70 In effect, the Court decides that, absent such an overriding
state interest, a statute which satisfactorily classifies people with respect to a non-compelling interest must be invalidated if in some
other, more important, respect it treats people unequally.
Equal protection is often substantive due process in disguise, for
in many cases the Court objects not so much to the differential infringement of a fundamental interest as to the fact of the infringement itself.71 In Shapiro v. Thompson, 72 for example, the Court
invalidated a welfare residency statute because it penalized the right
66. See Justice Marshall's dissenting opinions in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317-27 (1976); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. I, 98-1 IO (1973); and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970).
61. See Gunther, supra note 2.
68. See Perry, Constitutional "Fairness'~· Notes on Equal Protection and Due Process, 63
VA. L. REV. 383, 402-03 (1977); Simson, supra note 5, at 668-81.
69. The following interests have been denominated fundamental: the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right of privacy, Carey v. Population Servs. Intl.,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); the right to vote, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); the right to
marry, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); possibly the right to procreate, Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); and possibly the right of fair access to the criminal process,
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See
People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976) (the right to liberty is
an explicit equal protection fundamental interest). Among the "non-fundamental" interests
are the right to an-education, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I
(1973); and the right to housing, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
70. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis original).
11. See Developments, supra note I, at 1131-32; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659-63
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall has noted that the Court's limitation of fundamental interests in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973), to
rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution is open to the objection that violations of such rights could be strictly scrutinized simply because of their constitutional status,
thus rendering the fundamental interest doctrine superfluous. 411 U.S. at 100 n.59.
72. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

792

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 76:771

of welfare recipients to travel. But a more equal infringement of
that right, for instance, one which imposed qualitatively similar disabilities (such as a general residency requirement for employment) on
new residents other than welfare recipients, probably would also be
harshly received by the Court.
Nevertheless, there may well be interests which may be universally, but not differentially, infringed. In such cases the Court, in
effect, heavily weights the individual's interest in not being burdened, and any overinclusion is assigned more "disutility" than it
would ordinarily receive. Thus, in Skinner v. Oklahoma73 the Court
assumed that the state may sterilize all felons and that it may ordinarily draw somewhat arbitrary lines between offenses like larceny and
embezzlement. A state may imprison embezzlers longer than larcenists or vice versa. Nonetheless, the Court found the arbitrariness of
sterilizing larcenists but not embezzlers unacceptable because sterilization implicates the fundamental interest in procreation.74
Moreover, even a classification which produces perfect fit might
be invalid if it infringes a fundamental interest. While this aspect of
the fundament~l interest doctrine may also appear to be disguised
substantive due process, closer analysis reveals that it is not. If a
burden substantially impairs a valuable personal right, then even
though only those who pose the social harm in question are burdened, we are reluctant to burden them and not those who lack the
harm. Therefore, a state may not condition the right to vote on payment of a poll tax,75 even though (1) there is no constitutional right
to vote in state elections and therefore no substantive due process
objection76 and (2) the tax may be rationally related to the state's
interest in an informed electorate.77 A poll tax would be unconstitutional even if it were perfectly rational, picking out all and only the
best informed voters, since the state must produce a compelling
justification for denying to some a fundamental right which is
granted to others. In effect, the Court has stipulated that a state
must, absent a compelling state interest, treat equally those who are
similarly situated with respect to the exercise of a fundamental interest. "Purpose" (the usually permissive criterion of similar situation)
has been replaced by this mandatory criterion.
Unlike the rational basis test, fundamental interest analysis may,
as was suggested above, require even more than a perfect "fit." We
shall see, however, that this surprising requirement can also be sensibly applied under the rational basis test. Misfit should be evaluated
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

316 U.S. 535 (1942).
316 U.S. 540-41.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
383 U.S. at 665.
383 U.S. at 684-85 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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with respect to state interests which are more than trivial compared
to the burdened personal interests: perfect fit with respect to trivial
state interests should not be enough.78
The fundamental interest doctrine also implies a second principle
that can strengthen the rational basis test. Not every infringement
of a fundamental interest does or should invoke "strict scrutiny,"
only those which significantly penalize the exercise of the interest.
Thus, the courts have found that very short residency requirements
do not "penalize" the fundamental right to travel7 9 and that a state's
refusal to provide counsel to indigents for discretionary state appeals
does not "infringe" the fundamental right of access to the courts. 80
These cases might be described as recognizing only a right to a
"meaningful" appeal or only a conditional right to travel. Perhaps
more realistically, they represent attempts by the judiciary to manipulate the rigid fundamental interest categorization to avoid harsh results. Under either reading, the Court implicitly balances personal
and governmental interests. A modified rational basis test should
explicitly incorporate some of the balancing implicit in the fundamental interest doctrine-a trivial state interest should not justify serious infringement of a nearly "fundamental" personal interest.
Thus, more than a weak administrative convenience rationale would
be required for a classification which, by rendering unrelated households ineligible for food stamps, impinges on the personal interest in
free association.81
Although the fundamental interest branch of the strict scrutiny
test, as articulated by the Court, poses unresolved problems, 82 it is
18. See Part VI.B.3 infra.
19. See Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), qffd mem., 401 U.S. 985
(1971).
80. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
81. See United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
82. First, it is quite unclear how a fundamental interest is recognized. Although the Court
has recently declared that only those interests "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution" are fundamental, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I,
33-34 (1973), this declaration fails to explain the cases, see 411 U.S. at 99-100 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), and is better viewed as an indication that the Court is disinclined to expand the list
of fundamental interests.
Second, this mode of analysis sometimes merely weighs misfit more heavily, as in Skinner,
and sometimes demands that any infringement of the burdened class's interest be minimal
regardless of the degree of fit. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966),
discussed in text at notes 75-77 supra. The fundamental interest test as now applied might
imply both procedures in every case. But Skinner suggests otherwise; although it weighed
misfit more heavily, the Court intimated that more rational classifications would be valid, for it
approvingly cited Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), a case that sustained the compulsory
sterilization of institutionalized mental defectives. For further discussion, see Part VI.B.3
infra.
Third, it is unclear how much the misfit (or burden) must be reduced to satisfy the "less
restrictive alternative" test. Indeed, the dual requirement that a classification be "necessary"
to achieve a "compelling" state interest has been criticized as impossibly strict; rational-relation-to-a-compelling-interest and less-restrictive-means-to-a-legitimate-interest tests have been
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consistent with and in part a natural development of the rational
basis test. More importantly, as was suggested above, two elements
of the fundamental interest doctrine-"perfect fit is not enough" and
"implicit balancing"-can be recruited to fortify the rational basis
test, thereby creating a full continuum between the restrained and
active levels of equal protection review. 83
C. Irrebuttab/e Presumptions
A remarkable due process doctrine with equal protection implications has recently surfaced which applies a stricter scrutiny to certain classifications than does the rational basis test. Under the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine, 84 courts implicitly assume that a
legislative classification which grants a benefit to members of T is
intended to benefit another identifiable class T*. 85 Courts then find
it a denial of due process for the legislature to establish a "permanent and irrebuttable presumption" that persons who are not within
T are not within T*, when this presumption is "not necessarily or
universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means" of determining if a person is within T*. 86 The remedy
is not to invalidate the classification, but to allow the complainant to
rebut the presumption and establish his membership in T*, typically
through a hearing. For example, the Court in Stanley v. I//inois 87
held that due process was violated by a statute which presumed that
all unmarried fathers are unqualified to raise their children and
which therefore required the state to take care of such children upon
the mother's death. Even if most unmarried fathers are unqualified,
the Court reasoned, due process requires a hearing on that issue. 88
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine can be viewed as an attempt to remedy the misfit created by a statutory classification which
is too underinclusive with respect to a benefit or too overinclusive
proposed as substitutes. See generally Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972); Singer, Sentencing Men lo
Prison: Conslitulional Aspects ofthe Burden ofProofand the .Doctrine ofthe Least .Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sentencing .Determinations, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 51, 55-58 (1972). For
further discussion, see Part VI infra.
83. See Part VI.A infra.
84. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dept.
of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
85. Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption .Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 81 HARV. L. REV,
1534 (1974).
86. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
87. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
88. In terms ofT and T*, the statute in Stanley defined T as the class consisting of married
parents and unmarried mothers. The Court, apparently defining T* as the class of suitable
parents, required the state to allow unmarried fathers, who, by definition, were not in T, to
demonstrate that they were in fact suitable parents and thus in T*.
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with respect to a burden. If this doctrine states that any overinclusive
or underinclusive classification demands individual hearings despite
administrative cost, its failing is obvious. Almost every classification might be challenged, and without some constraint the doctrine
represents "nothing less than an attack upon the very notion of lawmaking itself." 89 The Court has therefore evidently limit~d90 the
doctrine to classifications in which "basic human liberties' are at
stake,"91 such as the rights to conceive and raise92 one's children and
to exercise freely personal choice in matters of marriage and family
life. 93 As one commentator has suggested, the doctrine offers an intermediate equal protection94 standard for "interests and classifications felt to be too significant or untrustworthy to be reviewed under
the relaxed standard of equal protection scrutiny, but not significant
or untrustworthy enough to qualify for fundamental or suspect status
and the accompanying far more rigorous standard of review." 95
Another feature of these decisions indicates a further limitation
on the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. The Court has applied it
only when a statute clearly purports96 to distribute a benefit or burden according to some identifiable characteristics and yet distributes
the benefit or burden according to a more general characteristic in
order to save costs. But not every classification is a surrogate for
another easily ascertainable class. More commonly the purpose
class is extremely difficult to identify, and membership often would
not be more accurately determined even by individual hearings.
The doctrine is sensible only where "it is possible to specify those
factors which, if proven in a hearing, would disprove a rebuttable
presumption."97
89. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,660 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. Although the reasoning in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), seems implicitly
critical of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, the doctrine may not be dead. One hint of its
vitality is a per curiam decision endorsing the application of Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
Another hint is the opinion of Justice Rehnquist (the most persistent critic of the doctrine) in
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1976), in which he apparently endorses the doctrine in
some circumstances. See also Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. I, 22-24 (1976),
in which the Court evaluated the irrebuttable presumption claim, though it ultimately rejected
it on the merits. Some commentators have argued that the doctrine is still alive or should be
resurrected, e.g., Ackerman, The Conclusive Presumption Sh1!!fle, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 761
(1977); Chase, The Premature Demise of Irrebuttable Presumptions, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 653
(1976).
91. Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975).
92. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
93. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974).
94. Actually, the cases are better described as expressing an intermediate substantive due
process overbreadth standard. See text at note 269 infra.
95. Simson, The Conclusive Presumption Cases: The Search for a Newer Equal Protection
Continues, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 217, 228 (1975).
96. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
97. Weinberger v. Salfi., 422 U.S. 749, 804 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis origi-
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It is often claimed98 that the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is
a disguised form of equal protection. Although this claim has some
validity,99 equal protection will often be more satisfactory for plaintiffs than the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, since even if a plaintiff using the latter doctrine wins, he will only have won the chance
to rebut the presumption. 100 The irrebuttable presumption doctrine,
then, is most useful to plaintiffs when the presumption would not
have failed the rational basis test. But apparently the legislature can
avoid such irrebuttable presumptions simply by deceit. That is,
these classifications are invalidated not because they are not rationally related to any legitimate state interest (for they are), but because
they are not rationally related to the goal which the legislature was
foolish enough to identify, more or less explicitly, in the statute. In
Stanley, for example, the state could have argued that its purpose
was to discourage unmarried fathers from raising children rather
than to ensure the fitness of parents, the purpose apparently inferred
by the Court. Although the new purpose might still fail to justify
the classification, it would present a more difficult constitutional
question than that which the Stanley Court addressed.
nal). The Court in Sa!fi at least gives lip-service to this constraint: "Unlike the statutory
scheme in Vlandis [v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973)), the Social Security Act does not purport to
speak in terms of the bona fides of the parties to a marriage, but then make plainly relevant
evidence of such bona fides inadmissible." 422 U.S. at 772.
98. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFieur, 414 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Note, The Conclusive Presumption .Doctrine: Equal Process or .Due Protection?, 72
MICH. L. REV. 800 (1974).
99. But see note 94 supra.
100. To be precise, plaintiffs will be worse off under an irrebuttable presumption analysis
unless those who are siniilarly situated also have to prove, in an individualized hearing, that
they deserve the benefit in question. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109596 (1978); Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution: '£he Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
1532, 1545-47 (1974); Note, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 79, 102 (1974). For example, in Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Court invalidated the statutory presumption that an unmarried father was unfit to raise his child after the death of the mother. The effect of the invalidation was to require the state to prove unfitness at a hearing under the standards applicable to
married or divorced parents and to unwed mothers. This result would have been reached
under either the due process or the equal protection clause, and the Court held that the statute
violated both clauses. By contrast, if the plaintiff had been successful under an irrebuttable
presumption analysis in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), she would only have gained
the opportunity to rebut the presumption that a marriage within six months of application for
Social Security benefits was entered into collusively; the "presumption," if you will, of noncollusiveness would be retained as to all who married more than six months before applying
for benefits. On the other hand, had she been successful on an equal protection theory, plaintiff would have been entitled to the same reverse "presumption" as the longer-married and
could have recovered benefits without any hearing.
The Court in Sa!fi missed this distinction. It argued that the prophylactic six-month rule is
desirable in part because it "protects large numbers of claimants who satisfy the rule from the
uncertainties and delays of administrative inquiry into the circumstances of their marriages."
422 U.S. at 782. This argument is fallacious, for if plaintiff were to prevail, the presumption of
non-collusiveness could still be retained for persons married earlier than six months before
their spouses' deaths.
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In the typical irrebuttable presumption case, the Court argues as
if it were simply effectuating actual legislative intent by correcting an
inconsistent or obviously irrational classification. This reliance on
actual intent, which also appears in some recent sex discrimination
cases, suggests that the Court will invalidate some laws simply because the legislature did not fully and deliberately consider a goal,
even though that goal would otherwise have justified the cla--ssification. In a later section, 101 this intriguing development will be explored more fully.
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine is not without problems,
the most serious of which is the difficulty of determining whether a
particular statute "purports" to test for ascertainable characteristics
or instead represents a "substantive policy determination that limited resources would not be well spent in making individual determinations.''102 Nevertheless, the doctrine offers a brave new approach
to equal protection problems, allowing the legislature to enact a
loose classification with a provision for hearings through which to
rebut the classificatory presumption or to enact a tighter classification with no provision for hearings. 103
In a larger sense, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is a kind
of less-restrictive-means requirement which strengthens the rational
basis test. The state must explore reasonable alternatives, even if
the alternatives add costs. But, like the fundamental interest approach, an implicit balancing of state and personal interests appears
to explain this departure from the simple rational basis test. Thus,
although a state may deny nonresidents in-state rates for a year simply because of their residence and domiciliary status at the time of
application, 104 it may not do so for four years. 105
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine is a curious amalgam of
equal protection rationality, substantive and procedural due process,
and the least-restrictive-alternative test. At the least, the doctrine
illustrates courts' occasional willingness to soften the rigid two-tiered
equal protection standard through a creative balancing of interests.
The fundamental interest doctrine, of course, evinces a similar willingness. Later sections draw upon balancing notions from these two
doctrines to develop a more comprehensive theory of equal protection balancing. Before analyzing misfit and balancing more closely,
101. Part III.B i,!fra.
102. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 784 (1975).
103. Simson, supra note 95, at 232-33; see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
104. Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), qffd mem., 401 U.S. 985
(1971).
105. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).

798

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 76:771

however, we must discuss how to characterize properly the purpose
with respect to which the classificatory means creates misfit.
Ill.

ANALYZING PURPOSE

Under the traditional rational basis test, the Court analyzes a
classification flexibly: any classification rationally related to a conceivable purpose will be sustained. 106 The Court itself may "conceive" a possible purpose 107 and need not rely on the express
language of the statute or the ingenuity of the state's attorney. And
the purpose chosen by the Court need not be the "primary" purpose, 108 though it must be "legitimate" or "permissible." 109
This flexibility poses the danger that every legislative classification could be trivially justified.no As Justice Rehnquist has
noted, ll t the "purpose" (in the ordinary sense of that word) of a legislature in enacting a bill is to make its language part of the law. 112
This is hyperbole, but it raises a serious point: any burden imposed
on one group can be tautologically justified as furthering the state's
interest in burdening that group. If the congressional purpose in
United States .Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno 113 was simply to
deny food stamps to "hippie communes" (and other unrelated
households), if the states in Shapiro v. Thompson 114 honestly desired
to reserve their welfare funds for residents, then the means-end "fit"
in each case is perfect. But these purposes do not persuade us that
the classifications are permissible. Given the centrality of misfit
analysis in the strengthened rational basis test developed in this
Note, some limit must be placed on the purposes a state may invoke
to justify its discriminations. This section describes two potential
limiting devices: the requirements that a statute's purpose must be
legitimate and that only actual purposes should be considered.
While the propriety of the second constraint is not clear, the first is
106. See l)evelopments, supra note I, at 1078.
107. The Supreme Court has occasionally said that any "conceivable" circumstance or set
of facts would support the reasonableness of the classification. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 191 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). If this expression suggests that a court or legislature
may invent facts that would substantiate a purpose, it is surely objectionable. Probably the
Court only meant to restate the argument that any conceivable purpose may be invoked if
some actual set of facts supports it. But it is vital that the question of factual support be
addressed, if only cursorily, by a court. See Perry, supra note 68; Tussman & tenBroek, supra
note 27, at 367-68.
108. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973).
109. See l)evelopments, supra note I, at 1078; Part III.A.2 infra.
I 10. See Note, supra note 6.
111. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 782 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112. See also Sandalow, supra note 20, at I 183 ("legislatures do not act irrationally").
113. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
I 14. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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consistent with the history and purpose of the equal protection
clause and helps rescue the rational basis test from tautology.
A.

Legitimacy

The requirement of a legitimate purpose is probably the single
most important protection of misfit review. This constraint might be
viewed (wrongly) as encapsulating all other equal protection constraints, if one believed that a statutory end necessarily described a
statutory means. The "end" or purpose of our driving test would
simply be "to put safe drivers, and only safe drivers, on the road, by
means of a driving test, with the degree of precision that that driving
test provides." The question whether the classification satisfies
equal protection then collapses into the question whether the "end"
is legitimate.
However, this view clumsily displaces the crucial questions instead of answering them. A more satisfactory analysis, and the one
generally employed in this Note, distinguishes carefully between
ends and means. The legitimacy of the end must still be investigated, but that inquiry need ask only whether the end is on its face
impermissible, without regard to the means. 115 Only if the end is
not impermissible need the closeness of the fit be examined.
There are three categories of equal protection goals: (1) goals
which are legitimate, in the special sense that courts can simply accept them without further testing their rationality (that is, fit) in
terms of a further goal; (2) goals which are obviously impermissible,
in the sense that they can never justify a classification; and (3) all
other goals, comprising those ends which must be tested both for
rationality in terms of a further end and for the rationality of the
classificatory means.
It bears emphasis that "legitimate" goals, as defined in this Note,
are only a subset of those goals which are not impermissible. Many
goals are neither impermissible nor "legitimate" in this special sense;
as we will see, such goals are only tentative equal protection justifications, unlike "legitimate" goals.
The relationship between these three categories can be summarized by briefly describing how a court should test the legitimacy of
statutory ends preparatory to analyzing misfit. First, it should summarily reject any impermissible goals. Second, it should examine the
remaining goals to determine whether they are legitimate. If they
are not, then the Court should seek a more general, legitimate end to
which each end is closely related. Misfit should be evaluated only
I 15. For reasons that will become apparent, the inquiry will also extend to the question
whether the means-end "purpose" (the desire to achieve the end by those means) itself is obviously legitimate. If so, closeness of "fit" is irrelevant, for the law automatically passes equal
protection review.
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as to the obviously legitimate ends identified by this process. In the
unusual case where the desire to achieve the narrow statutory end by
the statutory means can itself be described as an obviously legitimate
goal, misfit evaluation is unnecessary, for the fit will be perfect and
the classification can be described as "self-justifying."
The discussion of the three categories of goals that follows will
clarify the procedure that courts should use in initiating misfit review
and will explicate the relationship between the categories. The order of presentation departs somewhat from the actual procedure
courts should follow in that obviously illegitimate goals are discussed after obviously legitimate ones.
I. Legitimate Goals

Any means-end analysis of legislation risks two contrasting criticisms. First, as we have seen, the "end" may always be tautologically defined so that the "fit" is perfect. Second, even if we do know
how to start the analysis (if, that is, the first criticism is rejected), how
do we know when to stop? Does a goal Gi, which does not tautologically explain the classification and which the classification adequately fits, satisfy equal protection requirements, or must goal G 1
"fit" a more general goal 0 2? Must this process continue until "fit"
is measured against the most general goal of all, the public welfare
simpliciter? This kind of superrationality requirement is surely unacceptable, yet it is the logical consequence of the means-end approach.
The concept of "legitimate" goals defuses this second criticism.
Misfit analysis may stop at a legitimate goal; 116 the court should examine the adequacy of fit relative to it but to no further goals. Consider, for example, the desire to subsidize farming. To say that this
goal is legitimate is to reject as superfluous those justifications such
as the need to encourage farming, or to stabilize farm prices, or to
ameliorate the lot of farmers. 117 The state need not prove that its
discrimination between farmers and others serves the general welfare, for such a discrimination is legitimate-it is the kind of "dis116. For an excellent discussion of the level of generality at which statutory purpose
should be defined in misfit review, see P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION·
MAK.ING 565-66 (1975).
117. See Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495,512 (1937), sustaining a
state unemployment compensation law against the challenge, inter a/ia, that its exemption of
agricultural employers, charities, and other groups violates equal protection. "A sufficient
answer," the Court reasoned, is "that the state is free to select a particular class as a subject of
taxation" (here, those employing labor in the processes of industrial production and distribution). Id The Court continued: "Reasons for the selections, if desired, readily suggest them•
selves," such as the desire to promote one industry over another. Id But it is significant that
the Court simply asserted these possible reasons, without analyzing their legitimacy or whether
they were substantially served by the law in question.
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criminatory" decision which the legislature is absolutely free to
make.
However, unless "legitimate" is properly defined, this category of
goals threatens to swallow much of equal protection review. In responding to the second criticism of means-end analysis, care must be
taken not to succumb to the first criticism. States might attempt to
defend any challenged goals as legitimate and, by defining these
ends in terms of the statutory means, create the tautology that we
seek to avoid. If courts accepted_ these characterizations uncritically,
no law would violate equal protection. A law disenfranchising
blacks is perfectly tailored to keep blacks from voting, but far from
being legitimate, that purpose is obviously impermissible. Most legislative ends fall into a middle category, neither legitimate nor obviously illegitimate. Thus, the critical question for the courts is how to
identify legitimate goals. Only if the bounds of that category are
identifiable can the courts analyze misfit.
One possible definition is that a discrimination is legitimate if it
can reasonably be assumed to serve the public interest. We may
properly favor farming over industry because plainly satisfactory
justifications consistent with the public interest are so numerous that
the court need not second-guess the legislature. But this definition is
not convincing. Consider, for example, legislative classifications of
crimes. Some "non-criminal" conduct threatens public security and
some "crimes" do not; nevertheless, a court would accept the state's
classifications of crimes within the broadest limits. 118 Had Governor Carey signed the proposed New York law imposing heavier penalties for crimes against the elderly, 119 the law could not have been
successfully challenged on equal protection grounds, yet the "public
interest" served by such a law can be described only tautologically.
Crimes against the elderly are offensive, and the legislature may express this moral judgment by law. No further justification-that the
law promotes "human dignity" or protects the most helpless victims-need be adduced. Any justification for singling out crimes
against the elderly on such grounds is subject to challenge: one might
assert that crimes against small children aggrieve human dignity
"more," or involve weaker victims. Yet we are more certain that the
118. Apparently the only substantive constitutional constraints on defining behavior as
criminal are the prohibition against punishment for mere status, see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); the eighth amendment ban on cruel
and unusual punishments; and proscriptions against interfering with rights protected by the
Bill of Rights (e.g., free speech, privacy). None of these constraints significantly narrows the
extraordinary legislative discretion in defining crimes.
119. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1977, at 1, col. 6. The bill would have set mandatory
prison terms and would have limited plea bargaining for most serious crimes against the elderly and physically disabled. Id at B4, col. 5.
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original legislative judgment is valid than we are that justifcations
are available. 120
The proper definition of legitimate goals has a metaphysical ring:
those legislative purposes that differ in kind, rather than degree,
from any other. Thus, in determining whether a purpose is legitimate, a court must decide that the judgment is permissible and sufficiently different from potentially comparable judgments. Absent a
clear societal consensus, courts must compare the burdened class to
the class assertedly similarly situated. A law which grants drivers'
licenses only to those who pass a driving test is sustainable if it is
rationally related to keeping dangerous drivers off the road, an obviously legitimate purpose. Saying that keeping dangerous drivers off
the road is obviously legitimate simply means that a dangerous
driver cannot criticize the purpose on the ground that there are persons (e.g., criminals) who endanger the public more than he. There
is a difference in kind between pursuing criminals and excluding
dangerous drivers from the highways; thus, differential treatment of
these groups should not be judicially scrutinized.
As a further example, reconsider the statute challenged in
McGinnis. 121 The denial of good-time credit for presentence time
was justified by the absence of rehabilitation programs in jails.
Here, neither the immediate purpose (giving credit only for postsentence time) nor the second purpose (giving credit only when rehabilitation programs were offered) is legitimate. Yet the second
purpose would not satisfactorily explain the distinction if we knew
that rehabilitation programs do not work or that as much rehabilitation actually takes place in the pretrial setting as in prison. 122 Our
very need to ask these further questions suggests that the purpose is
not legitimate. Thus, an even more general, third purpose must be
invoked before misfit review is proper. That purpose, of course, is
crediting incarceration time according to actual rehabilitation-a
purpose, finally, which is legitimate, since it cannot be seriously suggested that the state must justify using rehabilitative progress and
120.

q: L. WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 17e (1969):

"I know that I have never been on the moon." That sounds quite different in the circumstances which actually hold, to the way it would sound if a good many men had been on
the moon, and some perhaps without knowing it. In this case one could give grounds for
this knowledge. . . .
I want to say: my not having been on the moon is as sure a thing for me as any
grounds I ~uld give for it.
121. See text at notes 41-45 supra.
122. But see McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263,271 (1973): "We pass no judgment on the
success or merits of the State's efforts, but note only that at state prisons a serious rehabilitative
program exists." If the Court is simply stressing the difficulty of evaluating rehabilitative
progress, then its unwillingness to pass judgment is reasonable, especially since the legislature
needs freedom to test new schemes, the results of which cannot be predicted, see discussion at
notes 256-61 i'!fra. But if the quoted passage means that the Court would ignore convincing
proof that rehabilitation could not occur in prisons, then its reasoning is unconvincing.
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not, say, blameworthiness or deterrent effect as the criterion for
granting good-time credit.
In sum, the "in kind" criterion requires a court to evaluate misfit
only with respect to legitimate purposes. 123 If a proffered purpose is
not legitimate, another usually more general purpose which is legitimate must be found.
No extended search for a legitimate purpose is required in the
case of the self-justifyll!-g discrimination (one in which granting the
burden or benefit to the statutorily defined class is itself an obviously
legitimate goal). This is simply the tautological justification for misfit rejected earlier. The tautology is acceptable in a limited context,
however, because it sometimes is not possible to explain a distinction
more convincingly than simply to describe the distinction itself.
Where this is the case, and where the purpose of distinguishing between recipients and nonrecipients of a benefit or burden precisely as
indicated on the face of the law is obviously legitimate, the classification is self-justifying. For example, a law imposing the death penalty for murder is self-justifying. The distinctions on the face of the
law between murder and other crimes, and between capital punishment and other penalties, are distinctions in kind. A court would
not be perturbed if rape were punishable only by a life sentence, if
assault only by a suspended sentence, or if heroin sales were not
punishable at all. 124 Other constitutional constraints aside, the facial purpose of the law, punishing a murderer with death, is legitimate.
The role legitimate goals play in misfit analysis should now be
clear. But we still have no simple explanation of when a statutory
purpose is "in kind" and thus reflects a distinction which a court
should not review. 125 Professor Brest has vividly delineated the
123. Evaluations of misfit must often cumulatively evaluate misfit as to several levels of
purpose. That is, if means Tis used to achieve end M, which itself is a means to end M 1, and
only M 1 is legitimate, then we should make a rough estimate of the extent to which T serves M,
discounted to the extent that M fails to serve M 1• In practice, a court need rarely engage in
such subtleties; it will often be enough to judge the extent to which M 1 is served by means T.
124. Courts addressing the constitutionality of criminal prohibitions of the use of marijuana and cocaine often must decide whether the distinction is in kind or in degree. Of
course, they do not describe the issue in these terms. But the success of an equal protection or
due process challenge often depends on whether the court is convinced that marijuana and
cocaine are no more harmful than alcohol. See, e.g., State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d I (Alaska
1978) (cocaine more harmful than marijuana; prohibition of use is constitutional); State v.
Leigh, 46 U.S.L.W. 2425 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1978) (marijuana less harmful than alcohol or tobacco;
prohibition of use is unconstitutional). If a court does not even accept the comparison between marijuana and alcohol as a matter of degree, however, the constitutional claim would
probably fail. There are other minor criminal offenses, such as loitering or disturbing the
peace, which clearly are not comparable to alcohol abuse. The difference is in kind, and
therefore such offenses cannot as easily be challenged on equal protection grounds.
125. Useful discussions other than Professor Brest's (see note I 16 supra) include Ely, supra
note 26, at 1235-49; Note, supra note 6, at 139-51; Sandalow, supra note 7, at 656-61; .Developments, supra note I, at 1081; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27, at 356-61. Most of these
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problem with a hypothetical regulation requiring the installation of
exhaust emission devices on cars:
[A]s one moves to higher levels of generality, the likelihood of finding
rational grounds for distinction increases. But where to stop? How
does one know that cars are to be compared with trucks and buses, and
perhaps with airplanes and factories, but not with cigars, jackhammers,
and pomography? 126

As Brest's example illustrates, somehow we often do know when to
stop. 127 Despite its metaphysical ring, the "in kind/in degree" distinction is one which courts naturally, albeit unconsciously, do employ. However, there may not be objective standards for when to
stop requiringjustifications, 128 and a court probably can only express
intuitive, 129 informed and considered judgment. 130
That this standard is amorphous is not critical, however, for a
purpose which is not legitimate is not necessarily illegitimate. In
simply pose the problem, however. For example, one commentator notes that courts presume
that favoritism toward an industry ultimately benefits the public and reasons that "denominating one industry as more worthy than another does no great violence to egalitarian ideals. . . .
By contrast, a similar judgment made about the worth of individuals would require clear
justification." .Developments, supra note 1, at 1081. But the crucial questions are why our
egalitarian ideals endorse different treatments of these two forms of favoritism, how different
that treatment should be, and even how to decide what kind of favoritism a given classification
embodies (e.g., whether a subsidy to farmers promotes agriculture or is a judgment that certain
individuals, i.e., farmers, are worthier).
126. P. BREST, supra note 116, at 566.
121. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 722-23 (1969), where the allegedly discriminatory distinction seemed so clearly legitimate that the Court was unable even to fit the
problem into an equal protection framework. The defendants had complained that a judge's
imposition of a harsher sentence on retrial created an invidious classification: since convicts
who do not seek new trials cannot have their sentences increased, that risk is imposed only
upon those who succeed in having their original convictions set aside.
128. P. BREST, supra note 116, at 566.
129. Resort to intuition does not necessarily mean that a principle is weak. Professor
Rawls has persuasively said that moral argument should seek a reflective equilibrium between
principles and considered intuitive judgments. Thus, in determining the principles of justice,
we should
see if the principles ... match our considered convictions of justice or extend them in an
acceptable way. We can note wb,ether applying these principles would lead us to make
the same judgments about the basic structure of society which we now make intuitively
and in which we have the greatest confidence; or whether, in cases where our present
judgments are in doubt and given with hesitation, these principles offer a resolution which
we can affirm on reflection.
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19 (1971).
130. The intuitive approach, however, is occasionally unconvincing. For example, in a
concurring opinion famous for its spirited defense of equal protection, Justice Jackson disposed of the merits of the claim with disturbing ease. He agreed with the majority that
merchants could be permitted to advertise on their own trucks but not on the trucks of others,
but he did not accept the majority's rationale that the first class posed a slighter traffic hazard
than the second. According to Justice Jackson, the discrimination was fair "because there is a
real difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to
tolerate action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same
action to be promoted for a price." Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
I 16 (1949). Unfortunately, Justice Jackson did not further define this "real difference," and a
more obviously "real" (i.e., legitimate) explanation would have been more persuasive.
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finding that a purpose is not legitimate, a court is not invalidating
the classification but only requiring that it be subject to misfit review
with respect to some obviously acceptable purpose. Where a further
justification would be instructive the court should therefore hesitate
to conclude that a purpose is legitimate. While a driving test may
serve the laudable purpose of giving licenses to those who pass driving tests, a court should rest its decision in favor of a more obviously
legitimate purpose.
2.

Impermissible Goals

What goal~ may not be pursued at all, whatever the means-end
fit? In addressing this question, the Supreme Court has found impermissible not only objectives forbidden by other clauses of the
Constitution, 131 but also the objectives of disadvantaging any suspect
class 132 as well as those asserting "fundamental interests." 133 The
unadorned desire to discriminate against women, 134 aliens, 135 illegitimates, 136 or "politically unpopular" groups 137 is also unlawful.
However, the Court has not clarified the standard for determining
"impermissibility." The Court's suggestion that discrimination for
its own sake is never legitimate 138 is put in doubt by our analysis of
"legitimate" discriminations. No reasoned basis for defining illegitimate purposes emerges from the Court's decisions.
This Note does not attempt to define precisely "impermissible"
purposes. For several reasons, we need not do so. First, although
some unlawful purposes invalidate the laws which they motivated,
131. See Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (first amendment); Developments, supra note 1, at 1081.
132. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886).
133. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
134. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (rejecting the state's interest in equipping
boys, but not girls, to be family providers); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1.948) (statute denying bartenders' licenses to women other than relatives of a male owner might be invalid if its real purpose were "an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize the:
calling").
135. See Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 605 (1976) (finding "unpersuasive on its face" the state's desire to prevent the uncontrolled influx of Spanish-speaking aliens
into the practice of civil engineering in Puerto Rico-a justification that "amounts to little
more than an assertion that discrimination may be justified by a desire to discriminate").
136. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 & n.3 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. See United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,534 (1973) (although
legislative history suggested a regulation was designed to exclude "hippie communes" from the
food stamp program, equal protection "at the very least mean[s] that a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest"). Bui see Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Texas
may bar members of the military who moved to the state from voting in state election as long
as they remain in the military, for it "could rationally decide to protect state and local politics
against the influences of military voting strength").
138. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 n.8 (1973).
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all such purposes should probably not have this effect. 139 Impermissible purposes in the context of misfit analysis have a limited consequence-they are simply not accepted as justifications by the
reviewing court, and the classification must be justified in terms of
another (legitimate) purpose. Thus, a "liberal" interpretation of impermissible goals will not severely restrict legislative freedom. Currently both the courts and counsel for the state attempt to justify
laws in terms of appealing legitimate goals. 140 The Court defended
a Social Security formula benefitting women more than men as compensating women for past job discrimination 141-a tentatively legitimate, if not "legitimate," goal-and not simply as increasing the
material welfare of women more than the welfare of similarly situated men.
The imprecision of "impermissible" is not crucial for a second,
contrasting reason. Even if impermissibility is conservatively interpreted, that is, if few goals are found impermissible, important constraints remain. A goal which is not unlawful might not be
"legitimate" either, in which case the rationality of the means must
still be tested against a more general legitimate goal.
Finally, insofar as a law stigmatizes, heavily burdens personal
interests, or does not substantially further valuable state interests, it
may not matter whether its purpose is unlawful, for the statute may
fail under the equal protection balancing that follows misfit analysis.142 The relationship of near illegitimacy to this balancing can be
illustrated by examining one element of the balance, the significance
of the state interest. An impermissible interest can be described as
having no significance and thus can be ignored by the court. But a
court more anxious to defer to a legislature can, more palatably, discount the significance of dubiously permissible interests in weighing
the state's side of the equal protection balance.
Although equal protection analysis as described here and as
practiced by the courts allows flexibility in assessing legitimacy, an
impermissible goal should be dispositive of the equal protection
claim in some cases. The courts dislike telling a state that its goal is
unlawful, and they often purport to invalidate a law either because
its purpose was not rationally served or because the state could not
have intended so dubious a purpose. However, the most honest response would often be either to find the purpose impermissible or to
139. See the suggested approach in Eisen~rg, supra note 26, at 134-46.
140. But see Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1976), in which the state court had upheld a
gender discrimination as rationally furthering the co=only held notion that it is "the man's
primary responsibility to provide a home." 421 U.S. at 10 (quoting 30 Utah 2d 315,318, 517
P.2d 1010, 1012 (1974)).
141. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam).
142. See Part VI, especially VI.B.3, infra. For a discussion of the requirement that courts
review only actual purposes, see Part 111.B infra.
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find its validity so slight that it is weighed lightly in an equal protection balance.
A good illustration of the Supreme Court's reluctance to grapple
with the problem of impermissible purposes is Carey v. Population
Services International, 143 which held certain restrictions 144 on access
to contraceptives violative of the first amendment and the due process clause. 145 The state argued that its ban on the sale of contraceptives to minors rationally furthered its goal of discouraging sexual
promiscuity among minors. Members of the Court offered several
responses to this argument. The first response, that the state could
not have meant to "punish" fornication with pregnancy, 146 is a
loaded characterization of the question. 147 The second response,
that the regulation did not actually discourage promiscuity, seems
more plausible. 148 However, as Justice Stevens noted in the third
response, this only suggests that the statute was meant to have a symbolic impact. 149 Stevens summarily dismissed this "propaganda"
interest, yet the value of symbolic impact might be more significant
than he indicated.1so
These responses notably avoid the most obvious and straightforward argument for invalidating the law-that discouraging fornication by the young is an impermissible purpose. 151 This avoidance
technique may be properly conservative jurisprudence, but as ap143. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
144. New York law prohibited any person from selling or distributing contraceptives to
minors under the age of 16, prohibited anyone other than a licensed pharmacist from distributing contraceptives to persons over the age of 16, and prohibited any person from advertising or
displaying contraceptives. 431 U.S. at 681.
145. Although Carey is a due process and not an equal protection case, its discussion of the
legitimacy of state purposes is also applicable to equal protection cases. The Court freely
quoted Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), an equal protection case, in analyzing the
scope of the privacy interest.
146. 431 U.S. at 695.
147. The state's effort to encourage juveniles to be chaste is not necessarily "punitive"
simply because minors may circumvent the regulation with consequent harm to themselves.
One could just as well describe a prohibition on sales of alcohol as punitive because people
will avoid the prohibition by illegally manufacturing impure and dangerous alcohol.
148. 431 U.S. at 695, 702 (White, J., concurring); 431 U.S. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring).
149. 431 U.S. at 715-16 (Stevens, J., concurring).
150. Many of our criminal laws are ineffectual, and many actually encourage other forms
of criminal behavior which "objectively" are as menacing as the prohibited activity. (The
most obvious example is the probable effect of narcotics and gambling laws on the growth and
power of organized crime.) Yet we feel it important that the criminal law express our moral
judgments, however difficult it is to enforce them. True, New York might have contented
itself with a criminal prohibition against sex between minors. But the improbability of a
criminal prosecution for such an offense suggests the utility of the regulation on contraceptive
sales-the unavailability of contraceptives to minors may be a better reminder to the young
that the state condemns their sexual activity.
151. The plurality declined to reach this issue, 431 U.S. at 694 n.17. Two concurring Justices reached it and decided in favor of the end's legitimacy, 431 U.S. at 702-03 (White, J.,
concurring); 431 U.S. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring).·
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plied here it has produced a holding supported by awkward and unconvincing reasoning.
Nevertheless, the Court was correct in invalidating the ban on
sale of contraceptives to minors. As suggested, a better rationale
would have been to deny the legitimacy of the end. Alternatively,
the Court could simply have discounted the state's interest in discouraging promiscuity among the young to the extent that that interest is dubiously legitimate. Under this rationale, all of the
arguments earlier criticized gain force. The plaintiffs' interests in
avoiding pregnancy and disease demand a sounder justification than
a questionably legitimate interest in discouraging their sexual conduct.
A final and fundamental objection can be raised to the underlying premise of legitimacy analysis. Professor Linde has argued that
any "rational basis" test (and a fortiori the approach suggested in
this Note) is premised on "a thoroughly instrumentalist view oflaw.
It not only assumes that a law is always a means to an end, but it also
asserts that law is constitutionally required to be a means to an end,
and a rational means at that." 152 Linde believes that the instrumentalist view is fundamentally misconceived and misleading.
In part, Linde's objection is that lawmakers do not and cannot
act rationally-an instrumentalist approach to legislation is just too
complex and time-consuming. 153 This objection, however, is not
dispositive. Even if the instrumentalist view is not a correct
description of the political process, it does not follow that that view is
an improper method ofjust!ftcation. If legislative decisions could be
predicted perfectly by analyzing what the legislators had for breakfast, a court would nevertheless uphold those decisions if their
content transgressed no constitutional limitation. 154 Judicial review
under the equal protection clause does not assume that the legislature acts instrumentally, just as judicial review of first amendment
claims does not assume that the legislature intends only to establish
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on expressive conduct. The assumption is only that the legislature can pass laws satisfying the rationality standard. Rationality depends not on whether
the legislature was "rationally" motivated, 155 but on the content of
the law. Thus, the court should freely accept even justifications for
the law which do not appear in the legislative record.
152. Linde, ./Jue Process ofLawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 204 (1976). In addition, see
the similar argument in Posner, supra note 23, at 27-28.
153. Linde, supra note 152, at 222-29.
154. Of course, the equal protection guarantee does prohibit laws passed from certain illicit motives. But the present discussion concerns not "hostile" discriminations, only discriminations that are simply "unfair." See discussion accompanying notes 19-27 supra.
155. Linde, supra note 152, at 229-32, would agree with this point.
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Linde's main concern is really more basic. "The duty to defend
the rationality of a decision," he writes, "depends very simply on
whether the policy makers ~re limited to prescribed aims, or whether
they are free to pursue any aim of their own choice." 156 This concern over limiting legislative aims is understandable, but the alternatives are less stark than Linde implies. He would admit that policy
makers cannot pursue any aim they choose, e.g., discrimination
against blacks for its own sake. That courts forbid some aims does
not mean, however, that they "prescribe" the rest, unless that term is
given an unreasonably expansive meaning.
Linde's general point, that equal protection limits legislative
choice, is valid, but we must not lose sight of the nature of those
limitations. The legislature is absolutely free to choose between different goals if they are legitimate, 157 and it is absolutely free to employ any means of achieving a legitimate goal if the means is tailored
closely enough to the end. That is, if the means chosen does not
create too much "misfit" under the balancing test later described,
then the law is valid, even if a more "rational," closer-fitting means
might have been chosen. In short, no equal protection goals are
ever "prescribed" by a court in the usual sense of that term. 158
Equal protection merely proscribes certain goals-those that are illegitimate and those that seek to achieve an end by an inadequately
precise means. 159
This is not to say that the effect of equal protection rationality
requirements on legislative freedom is never a matter of concern.
Indeed, the ultimate choice of the substantive values that are the
referents of equal protection balancing will depend significantly on
one's conception of the institutional relationship between courts and
legislatures. The Supreme Court has ceded the legislature freedom to
pursue economic ends, and it has thus formulated a weak "rationality" requirement for that field. 160 By contrast, the Court has disfavored legislative fle~ibility to experiment with important personal
interests. Insofar as Linde is simply saying that courts should maintain a strong presumption that legislative decisions are rational, his
position is defensible. More radically, however, Linde is also saying
that any rationality requirement unacceptably interferes with the
legislative branch, and this Note disputes that assertion.
156. Id. at 229.
157. See Part III.A.I supra.
158. The fundamental interest approach can come rather close to prescribing certain goals,
however. See Part VI.B.3 infra.
159. We would not want to describe "goals" in this way, for as this Note has already
suggested, it is a clumsy way to analyze equal protection issues. See text at notes 110-15
supra.
160. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam).

810

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 76:771

This discussion of legitimacy of purpose has attacked the contention that equal protection analysis can only ask whether an end is
legitimate. Of course, equal protection misfit analysis and balancing
involve value choices as fundamental as the judgment of an end's
legitimacy. But the choices in misfit analysis and balancing are
more constrained, and more easily adaptable to any particular view
of judicial responsibility in this field. 161 Rescued from tautology,
the rational basis test can be a convincing analytic tool. Following a
discussion of the "actual" purpose problem, that rescue will continue.

B. Finding the Actual Pupose
A second possible constraint on purpose may be emerging in recent cases in which the Supreme Court has declined to consider purposes not actually contemplated by the legislature. The rational
basis test has traditionally not required, and possibly even forbidden,
inquiry into the legislature's "actual" purpose. 162 The Court has accepted any legitimate goal which might sustain the statutory classification. However, traditions change quickly in the equal protection
field, and the Court has become more willing to examine actual legislative purposes, especially in sex discrimination cases. 163 As the
Court declared in Weinberger v. Weise,!feld, "This Court need not in
equal protection cases accept at face value assertions of legislative
purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a
goal of the legislation." 164
The examination of actual legislative purpose is a significant development in equal protection jurisprudence, 165 although its implications are still hazy. 166 Where the actual purpose would not have
justified the classification, but the discarded purpose would have, the
law would be valid if reenacted after an explicit consideration of the
purpose which was originally ignored. 167
Califano v. Goldfarb, 168 for instance, strikingly illustrates this new
161. See text at note 431 infra.
162. See text at notes 106-07 supra.
163. This willingness to examine actual purposes is also evident in irrebuttable presumption cases. See text preceding note IOI supra.
164. 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975).
165. Of course, this approach has no interesting consequences when a purpose which is
discarded as non-actual was not rationally furthered by the classification, see, e.g., Carey v.
Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 694-95 (1977) (plurality opinion); Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628, 634-35 (1974). Even if such a classification had been analyzed according to the
discarded purpose, that purpose would not have justified it.
166. One helpful analysis is L. TRIBE, supra note 100, at 1085-88 (1978).
167. See id at 1086 n.29.
168. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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"activism," 169 for both Justice Brennan's plurality opinion 170 and
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion 171 plainly intimate that the statute might have been upheld had its actual purpose been different. 172
(Indeed, the dissenters and the plurality essentially divided over
what this purpose was.) 173
This way of handling legislative motive is not entirely new, for it
resembles the treatment which numerous scholars 174 have advocated
for racially motivated laws. However, the usual "improper purpose" discussion concerns motives which are rationally furthered by
the law but which are illegitimate (e.g., the intention to disadvantage
blacks), while cases here involve legitimate motives which are not
substantially furthered by the legislative means. The arguments
which would favor a judicial "remand" to the legislature of racially
motivated laws might not apply as forcefully to laws motivated (but
insufficiently justified) by a permissible purpose. Laws in the latter
category are not invalid because of judicial concern about stigma;
they are invalid only because they are unfair. Since the analogy to
impermissibly motivated statutes is imprecise, some other rationale
must explain why a law which would have been fair if designed to
achieve one goal must be invalidated because it was actually
designed to serve another permissible goal which it served "imperfectly."
The rationale might be as follows. Judicial deference to legislative classifications producing unequal treatment rests on the belief
that the populace may validly consent to any adequately general dis169. This might seem less activist than the traditional approach, since it allows a court to
avoid the hard decision to invalidate a law as unfair with respect to any conceivable purpose.
However, if an unconsidered purpose would have justified the law, this approach has a more
severe consequence than traditional equal protection doctrine (which would permit the classification). If an unconsidered purpose would not have justified the law, the two approaches
produce the same result.
This approach is only more conservative if it has the broader effect of validating any law
once it has been reconsidered by the legislature, if its purpose, considered abstractly, seems
insufficient as a justification. In Goldfarb, for example, a frank congressional declaration that
widows should be treated differently than widowers because their "need" for benefits is qualitatively different (the "unconsidered" purpose), and not because of "administrative convenience" (the actual purpose), would automatically validate the law, whatever the misfit. But
under this approach, it is not lack of misfit, but the very process of reconsidering the statute's
fairness, that justifies judicial abstinence. Thus, the original "actual" purpose would also justify the law, regardless of misfit, so long as its fairness had actually been considered. See
Sandalow, supra note 20, at 1185-90. The Court's treatment of purpose in Goldfarb, however,
indicates that the Court is not willing to employ this broader and more conservative approach.
170. 430 U.S. at 214.
171. 430 U.S. at 222 & n.9, 223.
172. In Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam), the Supreme Court upheld
a Social Security benefit scheme that gave favored treatment to women, reasoning that (unlike
the scheme in Goldfarb) the different treatment was a deliberate congressional attempt to compensate women for economic disabilities.
173. 430 U.S. at 229-35.
174. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 26; Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 116.
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tribution of benefits and burdens. 175 If, however, a court identifies
as the purpose of a statute a goal which the legislature did not consider, the usual reasons for deference are lacking, since that goal
could not have been consented to. The argument is not that such a
goal was not the primary end sought by the legislature, but rather
that it did not enter into the general calculus of interests at all, and
hence does not deserve the usual judicial respect.
This activist rationale for confining a court's attention to actual
legislative purposes invites the objection noted earlier 176 that a court
in an equal protection case should not be a surrogate legislature, protecting any loser in the legislative process. But when actual purpose
review is considered in its context this objection can be overcome,
for even if courts should not ensure that all relevant interests are
considered when a law is passed, perhaps courts should intervene
when none of the relevant interests have been considered. In
Goldfarb, for example, if the Court is correct that Congress actually
intended to benefit only persons who were dependent on their deceased spouses, then Congress did not intend to favor widows over
widowers to compensate for past discrimination against women. If
this purpose had been considered, the statute might have been different, for the affected interest groups could have advanced the arguments relevant to this purpose. An explicit consideration of
competing interests might have caused widows to be treated differently than widowers throughout the Social Security Act. Thus, a
court's refusal to justify a law according to an unconsidered purpose
might at least compel the legislature to take a pro forma look at the
fairness of the law. 177
175. The notion that people consent to differential treatment is at best a legal fiction. It is,
nonetheless, a useful fiction, for it explains why courts closely scrutinize classifications that
burden "suspect" groups historically underrepresented in the political process and that infringe certain "fundamental interests" in equal access to that process, such as the right to vote.
See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-28 (1969). See generally IJeve/opments, supra note l, at 1087-103, 1120-32. Of course, not all "fundamental interests" can be
explained by this fiction, e.g., the right of privacy (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)), or
the right to procreate (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
176. See text at notes 19-21 supra.
177. Judicial deference to legislative decisions is often also predicated on the belief that the
legislature is more competent to make judgments in most policy areas. See Carmichael v.
Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495,510 (1937). But if this competence is not exercised
because the legislature has not even considered the purpose, then this rationale for deference is
inapposite.
Another possible argument for this activist approach to "purpose" is that it discourages the
perpetuation of "archaic and overbroad generalizations." For example, Justice Stevens interpreted the challenged statute in Gokffarb as follows:
It is fair to infer that habit, rather than analysis or actual reflection, made it seem
acceptable to equate the terms "widow" and "dependent surviving spouse." That kind of
automatic reflex is far different from either a legislative decision to favor females in order
to compensate for past wrongs, or a legislative decision that the administrative savings
exceed the cost of extending benefits to nondependent widows.
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This argument has some cogency, though the Court's aversion to
facing the uncertain merits of some unconsidered purposes, more
than any particular rationale, may have inspired this doctrine.
Whatever the Court's reasons for selectively confining itself to actual
purpose, the doctrine itself is subject to several fundamental criticisms. First, most laws, especially state laws, have no recorded legislative history; it would be anomalous to strike these laws down.
Perhaps the doctrine only requires ignoring a purpose where the legislative record clearly shows that the purpose was not considered, but
it is unsafe to infer from a silent record that a purpose was not considered.
Second, even if these evidentiary obstacles can be overcome, the
doctrine is theoretically unsound. It assumes that equal protection
guarantees a legislative process guided by rationality and fairness.
But the actual decision-making process should not be the central
subject of the equal protection clause. Even if legislators do not act
rationally, the Court may impose a limited rationality "requirement"-not to ensure that the process is rational, but to ensure that
the laws it produces are. 178 Ifwe agree that (aside from suspect categories) equal protection primarily ensures that laws operate fairly, it
is difficult to justify the doctrine that a reviewing court should ignore
unconsidered purposes. Thus, while actual purpose has been a limiting principle in some equal protection cases under the Court's current approach, the principal constraint on purpose should be the
requirement, described above, 179 that misfit be evaluated with respect to a "legitimate" goal.
IV.

MISFIT ANALYSIS

The analysis of misfit has been remarkably scanted by courts and
commentators. Its first serious treatment, Tussman and tenBroek's
I am therefore persuaded that this discrimination against a group of males is merely
the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females.
430 U.S. 199, 222-23.
This explanation of the activist approach is incomplete, however. It does not necessarily
follow that simply because a generalization is "archaic," "traditional," or "based on habit" it is
too broad to satisfy equal protection. Surely equal protection does not demand the invalidation
of every statute that is not periodically reconsidered and reenacted. Nevertheless, Stevens'
approach has some advantages, for determining whether a classification is overbroad involves
sensitive and complex judgments that are simplified somewhat by the knowledge that the underlying generalization is "archaic." The deference courts must accord legislatures (sometimes even described as a "presumption ofrationality") is less compelling when the legislative
assumption is of the type that is often adopted without examination. It may then be reasonable to conclude that the assumption was not examined in this particular case and that it is
thus more likely to be overbroad. Nevertheless, the tenuousness of these inferences suggests
that the "archaic generalization" argument should be used cautiously.
178. See text at notes 152-55 supra.
179. See Part Ill.A.I supra.
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influential 1949 article, 180 is almost the only one. 181 This section essays an examination of misfit which goes beyond the vague notion
that a law is unfair which is "too" overinclusive or underinclusive.
The discussion initially describes the minimum rationality constraint; the kinds of differences equal protection minimally demands
to justify different treatment; and the three elements of misfit analysis-harm, cost, and personal interest. This section next distinguishes between misfit in due process and equal protection and
between overinclusion and underinclusion. It also investigates the
special analytical problems posed by laws with multiple goals. The
relationship between misfit analysis and equal protection balancing,
alluded to throughout the following discussion, is considered in detail in the section on balancing.1s2
A. Minimum Rationality Constraint
With some limited exceptions, 183 it is improper to burden one
individual and not another unless the burdened individual is "relevantly" different. An individual is relevantly different only if he belongs to a class which has (1) a greater index of the social harm or
mischief which the burden is designed to control, (2) a lower index of
the personal interest in not being burdened, or (3) a lower index of
administrative cost in applying the burden. 184 More succinctly, unless one class, on the average, is more dangerous than another class,
less interested in avoiding the burden, or less costly to identify or to
apply the law to, then burdening the first class and not the second is
a denial of equal protection.
Consider, for example, the hypothetical law which reduced air
pollution by denying drivers' licenses to left-handed people. This
classification would violate the minimum rationality constraint, absent evidence that the left-handed drive "dirtier'' cars, that they have
a weaker interest in driving, or that the administrative cost of applying the law to the right-handed is much higher. If the individuals in
each class posed the same average danger, it would violate the minimum rationality constraint to burden one class simply because that
class was responsible for a larger proportion of the total mischief
than the other. This is why it violates the constraint to keep only
left-handed drivers off the road to reduce pollution, even though
180. See Tussman & tenBroek, note 27 supra.
181. See also P. BREST, supra note 116, at 558-75.
182. Part VI infra.
183. See Part V infra.
184. This Note singles out these three factors because each represents an element of "social
utility'' (broadly conceived) which may vary among individuals and which thus may help explain and justify differential treatment. By contrast, social interests as to which all persons are
equal, such as a total cost constraint in a program in which the cost per individual is constant,
are not relevant in evaluating misfit. See Part V.B infra (discussion of "neutral goals").
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most drivers are right-handed. Minimum rationality prevents the
state from attacking the larger part of a "mischievous" class unless
the members of that part are also more mischievous.
This constraint is both intuitively satisfying and rationally sound.
If the state has decided that there is net social utility in denying
licenses to left-handed drivers to reduce pollution, then it must have
concluded that the benefit of the incremental reduction in pollution
outweighs the dual costs of the expense of administering t:b.e law and
the infringement of people's interest in driving. But since, by hypothesis, the incremental harm, .administrative cost, and interest in
driving are precisely the same for the right-handed and left-handed,
the social utility in keeping each right-handed or left-handed person
off the road is precisely the same. Burdening only one class is thus
irrational on the legislature's own terms. 185
The minimum rationality constraint, importantly, draws attention to the kind of misfit equal protection prohibits. As we shall
see, 186 the simple overinclusion/underinclusion terminology can be
seriously misleading. The crucial inquiry is not how much misfit is
created in any absolute sense, but rather how d!fferent the groups are
that the law treats differently.
Of course, the minimum rationality constraint only begins misfit
analysis, for satisfaction of the requirement is neither necessary nor
sufficient to satisfy the equal protection guarantee. The constraint is
not a necessary condition because it contains a number of exceptions, discussed subsequently. 187 It is not a sufficient condition
because after it is satisfied, t~e law still must be subjected to a balancing test. 188 The constraint does identify which elements-harm,
administrative cost, and personal interest-are to be balanced.
Although the minimum rationality constraint is not a radical
concept, its role has often been overlooked because of the misconception that misfit analysis need evaluate only the absolute amount
of overinclusion and underinclusion. Tussman and tenBroek's
graphic representation of misfit is probably a principal source of the
misconception. After criticizing that representation, this Note proposes a different model, one which illuminates the role of the minimum rationality constraint and which allows due process and equal
protection misfit to be easily distinguished.
185. There are complications, of course. Diminishing returns, a total cost constraint, or a
"satisficing" approach in which the government is content with a certain level of mischiefreduction (or need-alleviation), all indicate that it may be rational to go only "part of the
way." Nevertheless, such a partial solution, since it violates the minimum rationality constraint, is only justifiable as an exception to misfit analysis. See Part V in.fro.
186. Part VI.B.l in.fro.
187. Part V in.fro.
188. See Part VI in.fro.
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Tussman and tenBroek represented the relationship between
classes M and T by a Venn diagram:

M

Overinclusion*

Underinclusion*

*Overinclusion is represented by solid shading and underinclusion by the dotted area.

For example, Tussman and tenBroek would represent the drivingtest hypothetical as follows:

Their model helpfully stresses the following basic relationships:

No intersection of the classes:

Complete congruence:

00

8
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Overinclusion
without underinclusion:

M
Underinclusion
without overinclusion:

However, their model is deficient and misleading since it fails to
identify the more rational cases of partial intersection short of complete congruence and to account for the properly excluded ('\,Mn'\,T)
(represented by the field surrounding the circles). That is, the model
suggests that misfit simply measures the absolute amount of overinclusion and underinclusion. It fails to emphasize that a classification
is at least minimally rational, regardless of the absolute amount of
misfit, if the burdened (T) are likelier than the nonburdened ('vT) to
pose the relevant harm (to intersect with M). In the above example,
there is no clear way to deduce from the graph whether those who
fail the driving test are more likely to be dangerous drivers than
those who pass. Any representation which fails to provide that information is seriously incomplete.
This Note proposes a somewhat different model:

l\,M

T

"'T

A

B

Drivers who
fail test

Drivers who
pass test

Safe
drivers
Dangerous
drivers

MODEL

EXAMPLE
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This model contains all the elements of the Venn diagram, but displays them more meaningfully. 189 The lower trapezoid (C plus D) is
M; the rest of the rectangle is l\.,M. The left rectangle (A plus C) is T;
the right rectangle is l\.,T. The relative size of each region (A, B, C,
and D) is significant, which is not true of the Venn diagram. The
key equal protection inquiry 190 concerns the slope of the dividing
line between Mand l\.,M. The steeper this line (assuming a negative
slope), the greater the difference in the harm posed by members of T
(those burdened or benefitted) than by members of "'T (those not
burdened or not benefitted)-and the more "rational" the classification.
The minimum rationality constraint simply requires that this dividing line have some negative slope, that is, some "downhill" tilt:

T

189. Tussman and tenBroek's model, with analogously labeled regions, is as follows:

M

B

190. This model only describes the state interest (M) and does not include personal interest
or administrative cost. A more complete (four-dimensional!) model could be constructed, but
as a practical matter, it would not greatly aid the analysis: the state interest is often the most
important element of analysis, and it tends to vary more between classes T and"' T than do the
other two elements.
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Thus, the negative tilt in the driving test example graphed above indicates that the classification is minimally rational. If the line has a
slope of zero, then the law is not rational, for those not burdened
("'T) deserve to be burdened just as much as those who are burdened
(T):

T
I\,

"' T

M

M,

For example, the hypothetical pollution control law which precluded
the left-handed from driving would be indicated thus:

T

Safe pollution
levels
Dangerous
pollution
levels

M

Lefthanded
drivers

Right-handed
drivers

If the line has a positive slope, then the law is actually irrational, for

those not burdened deserve to be burdened even more than those
who are burdened:
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"'T

The model indicates overinclusion and underinclusion as follows:

T
'v

"'T

M Overinclusion Proper
exclusion

M
Proper
inclusion

A classification which barely satisfies the ,minimum rationality constraint will have a large amount of absolute misfit. But as the negative slope of the dividing line between M and "'M increases, the
amount of misfit decreases:
'\,T

M

Perfect fit is achieved when the dividing line becomes perfectly vertical, coinciding with the dividing line between T and"' T.
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These diagrams illustrate why the part-of-a-harm rationale, without more, does not justify misfit. Even if a classification attacks the
larger part of the harm, e.g.:

T

I\,

T

M

the classification might not be minimally rational, since (as in the
diagram above) the group burdened might not pose the harm more
acutely.
Of course, although this model represents the important equal
protection relationships more clearly than the older model, it is
mainly a theoretical tool. Courts will rarely have clear proof of the
precise areas of each region or of the exact slope of the dividing line.
But if the model demonstrates the proper focus of misfit analysis, it
will have more than served its purpose.
The remainder of this section describes the three central but
often loosely analyzed elements of misfit analysis-the harm the
state seeks to eliminate, the administrative costs of imposing the burden, and the personal interest in avoiding the burden. Some consequences of the minimum rationality constraint for different kinds of
misfit will also be discussed. The substantive question how misfit is
weighed in the equal protection balance once the minimum rationality constraint is satisfied is deferred. 191

B. Elements of MiJjit Analysis
I. Harm
The harm which the state seeks to eliminate was extensively discussed in the section on purpose, 192 where criteria were proposed for
gauging the minimal level of generality at which the purpose, and
thus the harm, must be expressed if judicial review is to be effective.
A few additional comments may clarify the relationship of harm to
misfit review. A harm may be a discrete quality, such as having
191. See Part VI infra.
192. See Part III.A.I supra.
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committed a crime (one either has committed the crime or has not),
or a continuous one, such as being a dangerous driver (one can be
more or less likely to cause accidents 193 or to terrorize other motorists). In the latter case, we ask not simply how many individuals in
each class threaten the harm, but also how much each threatens.
Thus, the conclusion that one class has a higher average index of
harm than another can mean either that the first contains a greater
proportion of (discretely) harmful individuals or that the mean
harm, obtained by averaging each individual's (continuous) harm, is
greater.1 94
An intermediate characterization of harm is also possible: the
legislature may believe that only individuals who pose a threshold
level of harm should be burdened, even though there may be some
utility in burdening the less mischievous. In our driving example,
for instance, an "intermediate" characterization was implicit: only
those persons reaching a threshold of "dangerousness" need be forbidden to drive. This intermediate characterization can, however,
193. Even though an accident is a discrete event, and though a given person either will or
will not cause one, at the time a law is passed persons are only more or less likely to cause
accidents; we are not omniscient.
194. Self-justifying classifications are analytically related to the distinctions between discrete and continuous harm. Although it is possible to classify "discretely" harmful persons
with perfect rationality by burdening all and only the harmful, it is not possible so to burden
the "continuously" harmful, for the very notion of precisely identifying the "harmful" makes
no sense in this context. Thus, we can always ask whether a classification by continuous
harms is rational; the classification will never be self-justifying.
Line-drawing problems present an interesting analogy to the point that "continuous" classifications are never self-justifying. The legislature must decide "where to draw the line" between the classified (T) from the unclassified (o,T) only when the trait by which members ofT
are identified is a continuous rather than a discrete one. (The mischief itself may or may not be
continuous.) For example, the problem arises when the state establishes a mandatory retirement age, but not when it discriminates on the basis of sex.
Whenever we have a trait which is continuously and positively correlated with a mischief,
it will be "rational" to classify according to any degree of the trait, since the resulting classification will always burden a class that more acutely poses the harm. (Imagine a round target
so shaded that its color is more intense at the bull's-eye and gradually less intense in all directions toward the circumference. Every circle, regardless of size, whose center is the bull's-eye
defines a "rational" classification according to most intense color.) The difficulty arises in
determining when a quantitative difference becomes a qualitative one. Often a result is
clearly permissible at one extreme and prohibited at the other, and it becomes difficult for a
court to justify the point at which it imposes the prohibition.
For example, the Supreme Court has forbidden one-year residency requirements for voting, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), but has permitted residency requirements of 50
days, Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973). Further litigation may fix the limit at, say, 60
days, but the precise point at which the line is drawn cannot be justified by any test. The
balance of interests would be only negligibly different were the limit 61 days, and the most we
can say is that a line must be drawn somewhere. See Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman,
277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The continuity problem arises in similar fashion when we are evaluating the efficacy of a
burden or benefit in reducing a mischief or need. A burden (or benefit), like a trait or mischief, can be discrete or continuous. For example, deciding whether to send a convicted felon
to prison or to a drug rehabilitation program is not a line-drawing problem, since the choices
are not (in any apparent way) part of a single continuum. By contrast, deciding whether to
sentence him to two or to five years is a line-drawing problem.
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be misleading insofar as it suggests that any sub-threshold harm is
nonexistent, for as we shall see, this sub-threshold harm can be important. Unfortunately, many courts do not see misfit in continuous
terms, perhaps because the continuous interpretation is not easily
captured by traditional overinclusion/underinclusion terminology.19s
Jefferson v. Hackney 196 illustrates the tendency to interpret harm
and need as intermediate rather than continuous in order to simplify
equal protection review. The Texas Constitution limits the state's
welfare budget. The Texas legislature, after constructing a need
standard for various categories of welfare recipients, applied reduction factors to keep the total payments within the budget: the aged
received 100 per cent of their "need," the disabled and blind 95 per
cent, and recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) only 75 per cent. 197 Members of the last class sued, alleging, inter alia, that imposing a different reduction factor upon different recipient groups violated equal protection. The Supreme Court
upheld the state's procedure, reasoning:
[T]he State may have concluded that the aged and infirm are the least
able of the categorical grant recipients to bear the hardships of an inadequate standard of living ... [and] that the young are more adaptable than the sick and elderly, especially because the latter have less
hope of improving their situation in the years remaining to them. 198

In effect, the Court assumed that the state had in mind a "severe
need" standard independent of the actual need standard upon which
payment levels were determined. The state's unequal reduction 199
factors belie any motive of maintaining a rough equality between
groups with respect to the original actual need computations.
Rather, the state's method suggests a weighting of the importance of
needs within the original need computations, suggesting "severe
need" thresholds.
The result in Jefferson v. Hackney is probably correct, if only because the aged and disabled suffer such distinct hardships that their
needs may be "discrete." Indeed, a welfare program which served
only their needs (and excluded AFDC recipients entirely) would
probably be constitutional, since determining "need" involves not
just an objective computation of food and housing costs, but also a
judgment about relative "worth," about how much sympathy is
aroused and about which groups seem helpless. The case neverthe195. See Tussman & tenBroek, note 27 supra.
196. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
197. At the time suit was filed, AFDC recipients were receiving only 50% of their standard
of need. 406 U.S. at 537 n.3.
198. 406 U.S. at 549.
199. Notice, for example, that the aged's share is not reduced at all.
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less shows how an "intermediate" characterization of the harm
vitiates the difficulties of review posed by "continuous" characterizations. The Court essentially ends its analysis with the assertion that
the old and disabled are less able to withstand hardship. It does not
ask how much less able they are.
. Since even a discrete characterization was possible in Jejferson v.
Hackney, the intermediate approach is not greatly troubling. But if
a discrete characterization were not possible, perhaps the intermediate approach should be unacceptable. Suppose, for example, that
Texas applied different reduction factors based on the sex of the
AFDC children. Since the discrete discrimination (welfare funds
only for boys or only for girls) is not acceptable here, the intermediate approach may also be unacceptable. A general assertion that
when the going gets rough, boys can be forced to make a greater
sacrifice is simply impermissible. Slight differentials might be sustainable if correlated with proved differences in need, but this would
be a straightforward application of the "continuous" approach. In
short, the intermediate approach should be used cautiously where
the discrete is unavailable.
2. Administrative Cost

Administrative cost is the second major factor in evaluating misfit.
This cost has two components: the costs of identifying to whom the
burden shall apply, and the cost of applying the burden. Courts
typically speak of administrative "convenience" (which is essentially
the reduction of identification cost and administrative discretion) as
merely one of several goals a legislature might or might not pursue.
Despite the courts' usual analysis, administrative cost is central in
equal protection analysis.
Identification cost is a basic element of the minimum rationality
constraint and of general equal protection balancing because almost
any classification can be made more precise at some cost. In other
words, harm and identification cost are closely interrelated,200 for if
the state has satisfied the minimum rationality constraint, then the
200. If class A has a greater average harm than class B and if the classes can be distinguished at little administrative cost, then we could describe a classification burdening A as
rational either because A has a greater index ofhann than does B or because it costs more (per
class member) to pick out harmful members of B than to pick out such members from A.
Simply by burdening A and not B we have made a cheap and reasonably efficient selection,
and it will be more expensive to find a subclass ofB which is as harmful (on the average) as the
class A.
The "higher cost of discriminating" explanation of a law's rationality refers, of course, to
average, not aggregate, cost. For example, if X represents the class of jaywalkers and Y represents the class of jaywalkers minus redheads, then it is irrational to prosecute only class Y
rather than the larger class X. Although prosecuting Y rather than X saves money in the
aggregate, the average administrative cost of prosecuting a member of either group is presumably the same. Assuming there is no difference in "harm" or "personal interest" indices between X and Y, the prosecution violates the minimum rationality constraint. A law
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unburdened will usually pose a lower average harm; to identify those
underincluded from that class will generally cost more than it has
already cost to separate the burdened from the unburdened. 201
For example, consider the lament of a dangerous driver who fails
our driving test but complains that many who passed it were also
dangerous. He claims that he is no more dangerous than many who
are on the road and that therefore even minimum rationality has not
been achieved. He is wrong, for to find the dangerous drivers who
passed the first test, the state would have to pay for a second, better
test. In terms of the constraint, the dangerous drivers who slipped
through the first time have a higher "index" of administrative cost,
and treating them differently than the plaintiff is minimally (though
not conclusively) rationa1.202
By misunderstanding this interrelationship between harm and
cost, the Supreme Court has reasoned imprecisely in several sex discrimination cases. The Court has held that discrimination by
gender must fall if its "only" justification is administrative convenience,203 but that it can stand if the differential treatment is "rational" in terms of the statutory purpose, that is, if the class selected
by the statutory classification is more acutely harmful or needy than
the class not selected. 204 But the Court's distinction is illusory, since
classifications in these cases are minimally rational in terms of both
administrative cost and harm.
In Schlesinger v. Ballard2°5 the Court upheld a sex-based classification which set a longer period of service for female than male naval officers before mandatory discharge for want of promotion. The
Court reasoned that the discrimination was rationally related to the
goal of equitable career advancement since it compensated for lesser
mandating such discriminatory prosecution should only stand if one of the misfit exceptions is
applicable, see Part V infra.
201. In the usual case, this relationship holds because the state will ordinarily try to get at
the most harm at the least cosL But occasionally the state will have made an expensive and
inaccurate "pick," and it may be both cheaper and more accurate to redraw the classification.
Often, though not invariably, it will also be the case that the greater the class difference in
average harm, the greater the difference in average identification cost. Of course, there is
nothing necessary about these relationships.
202. There is admittedly a certain awkwardness in characterizing our dangerous driver as
"more costly" to identify. What is readily meant is that he is a member of a class more
expensive to identify than the class now identified by the law. But the identification cost he
creates is not as unique to him as the mischief he creates.
There is a second kind of administrative cost besides identification cost-the cost of applying the benefit or burden. This kind of cost is analogous to mischief in that individuals create
unique "amounts" of it. See text following note 223 infra.
203. The Court has made similarly broad assertions in many irrebuttable presumption
cases about the constitutional insignificance of administrative cost. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441, 451 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
204. See cases discussed in text at notes 205-11 infra.
205. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
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opportunity for promotion. 206 Reed v. Reed2°7 and Frontiero v.
Richardson,2°8 in which sex-based classifications had been invalidated, were distinguished by the Court as involving classifications
based on administrative convenience "alone"209 and on "archaic and
overbroad generalizations."210 By contrast, the Court characterized
the classification in Schlesinger as one of "complete rationality." 211
In distinguishing the three cases, the Court failed to recognize
that the classifications in Reed and Frontiero might be at least somewhat rational-women might be generally less competent administrators than men (Reed), 212 and wives of servicemen may be more
likely to be dependent upon their spouses than are husbands of servicewomen (Frontiero). 213 Furthermore, in all three cases the classification was overbroad and could have been improved at some
administrative expense-a case-by-case test of competence in Reed
and of dependence in Frontiero 214 would be more "precise," and in
Schlesinger the Navy could evaluate each woman's opportunities for
promotion.215 Yet the Court was not prepared to maintain that, by
not evaluating opportunities individually, the Navy indefensibly relied on "administrative convenience."
This criticism of the Court's attempt to distinguish Schlesinger
from Reed and Frontiero is not meant to suggest that all three
classifications were equally justifiable. While these cases do not
prove that a classification cannot stand if its only justification is "administrative convenience," they do support a more qualified proposition: if the burdened pose only a slightly or questionably greater
harm than those not burdened (or if the benefitted are only slightly
more _needy than the unbenefitted), then the classification might violate equal protection, even though a more "rational" classification
206. Apparently women could not compile records of seagoing service comparable to those
of men because they were precluded by law from most sea duty. 419 U.S. at 508.
207. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
208. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
209. 419 U.S. at 510.
210. 419 U.S. at 507-08.
211. 419 U.S. at 509.
212. The opinion in the state court had so suggested. Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 514,
465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970).
213. This observation is not, of course, meant to imply that this minimal rationality, even
if factually established, should validate the classifications.
214. That is, the test would require servicemen to prove that their spouses were dependent.
The inequality could also be rectified by requiring neither sex to prove dependency, but this
would decrease the overall classificatory accuracy (assuming the purpose is to aid all and only
dependents).
215. However, if a plausible argument can be made that all women in the Navy deserve
compensation for past discrimination, then this redefined purpose clearly does not require a
case-by-case evaluation.
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would be more costly.216 Thus, the Court may have described the
classification in Schlesinger as "completely rational" because it was
much more accurate than the classifications in Frontiero and
Reed-virtually all servicewomen lacked career opportunities available to servicemen, but a significant percentage of women are not
dependent on their husbands in the service or are competent administrators. And the Court may have scoffed at the "cost" rationale in
Reed and Frontiero because there was such a slight gender-based
differential in "harm" that the administrative savings were illusory
(e.g., the cost saved by waiving proof of wives' dependency might
have been less than the cost of benefits paid to nondependent
wives). 217 In short, identification cost or "administrative convenience" is just one factor to be balanced in an equal protection case; it
cannot alone determine whether a classification satisfies the guarantee.
The relationship between identification cost and misfit is such
that attempts to increase classificatory accuracy often increase
identification costs. Identification cost will be lowest when a legislative rule alone defines class membership. When such a rule is facially
overbroad, the overbreadth can be cured at essentially no cost.218
For example, a law punishing both criminals and all redheads can
simply be rewritten. But when greater accuracy requires more than
rewriting a general rule-when, in other words, it is costly to determine who falls within the new rule-then identification cost can be a
serious concem.219
Consider, for example, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia, 220 which tested a statute requiring that all uniformed state
police officers retire at age fifty. The Court upheld the statute, finding that the rule reasonably expressed the general relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to be a good
216. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976): "[P]resumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they may approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that
case-by-case adjudication would show, are permissible ... so long as that lack of precise
equivalence does not exceed the bounds of substantiality tolerated by the applicable level of
scrutiny."
217. The plurality in Frontiero noted that the government had offered no concrete evidence that the differential treatment in fact saved money-a demonstration it said was required to satisfy the demands of strict scrutiny. 411 U.S. 677, 689 (1973). See Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1976), holding that such a strict demonstration is not necessary
under the more relaxed standards of review. See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
219-20 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that because the presumption of dependency
caused the payment of substantial additional benefits, administrative convenience could not
have been the reason for the discrimination).
218. See Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 468-70
(1969) (making an analogous point about first amendment overbreadth).
219. See id at 470 n.31.
220. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
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policeman. Although, as Justice Marshall noted in dissent, 221 Massachusetts could easily have provided that officers be individually
tested-indeed, it did annually test officers who were 40 to 50 years
old-the majority sustained the rule as rational, apparently because
the ease of improving accuracy was irrelevant in the absence of a
fundamental interest or suspect class. The additional cost of tests
may also have influenced the Court.
Murgia illustrates that the crucial inquiry with respect to identification cost is usually not the cost of redefining a general rule, but the
cost of determining whether an individual falls within the terms of
the redefined rule. In arguing for "individualized" testing, Justice
Marshall is asking for a redefined rule-required retirement of those
who fail a medical examination-and the real cost difference lies in
the greater cost ofproving a person's status under the new rule than
under the old. It simply costs more to conduct a physical exam than
to check birth dates.
Moreover, attempts to increase the accuracy of a rule may, depending on the rule's complexity and the discretion with which it is
to be applied, decrease its predictability, thus frustrating the interest
in predictability shared by the state and by persons subject to the
rule. 222 An age limit is simple to administer and permits few disputes about proof. A medical test involves complex judgments
about what constitutes good physical condition and is easily abused
by doctors anxious to keep particular officers on (or ofl) the force.
This loss of predictability is part of a classification's identification
cost.
Finally, "individualized hearings" are not a costly but perfect solution to classificatory inaccuracy. Often, "individualized hearings"
are simply a sensible device for administering a rule which requires
more complex determinations of fact than statutory presumptions
can easily accommodate.223 Nothing about a hearing as such guaran221. 427 U.S. at 325-27.
222. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 782-83 (1975).
223. For example, the Court in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), struck down a general presumption that certain broad categories of applicants for in-state tuition were not bona
fide residents, since some such applicants did "possess many of the indicia of Connecticut
residency, such as year-round Connecticut homes, Connecticut drivers' licenses, car registrations, voter registrations, etc. . . ." 412 U.S. at 448. The Court concluded that Connecticut
should have granted every individual applicant the chance to prove bona fide residence. But
this conclusion only asserts that the rule should be made more precise (at least as to those
disfavored by the presumption), not that every case should be evaluated equitably on its own
facts. Presumably an applicant who lacked a year-round home in a state, a driver's license, or
an automobile or voter registration could still be denied in-state rates, if these indicia are
accurate enough. This would be true whether the proof is presented to an individual hearing
officer or simply mailed to the registrar of the university.
Of course, individualized hearings may serve important functions other than improving
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tees perfect accuracy, for accuracy will often be limited either by the
kinds of proof accepted or by the need to rely on the subjective opinion of the hearing officer. Whet.a.er individualized hearings are required to improve the accuracy of a classification depends upon a
number of factors, including tbe ~~se with which proof requirements
can be satisfied and the desiraS~!ity of allowing hearing officers to
exercise discretion.
Administrative cost includes, in addition to identification cost, the
cost of applying a benefit or burden. It is not obvious how the
courts should deal with differential application cost. May prosecutors refrain from enforcing laws against Orthodox Jews because of
the high cost of providing Kosher diets in prison? May welfare departments cut costs "rationally" by excluding recipients with the
highest benefits? Surely not. Having defined a harm or a need, the
state should save costs by proportional diminution of burdens or
benefits; the actual cost of applying the benefit or burden seems to
bear at best an accidental, and at worst an inverse, relationship to
desert. To be sure, classifying those harmful individuals who can
most easily be identified is also arbitrary in that two equally mischievous individuals might be treated differently simply because one
possessed, and the other lacked, the classificatory trait. But this arbitrariness in identification costs is a necessary evil of legislation; application cost does not seem so indispensable.
Nevertheless, when a difference in application cost results in significant differences in cost-effectiveness, application cost should be
considered in deciding whether the minimum rationality constraint
· has been satisfied. Professor Brest, in an informative discussion of
the problem, maintains that either a difference in cost efficiency between individuals (which he calls criterion 1) or a difference in the
harm posed by different individuals (which he calls criterion 2) will
support a classification's rationality.
Consider, for example, the decision to require the installation of exhaust emission control devices on vehicles. Suppose that vehicle Q
produces 1,000 units of pollutants, and vehicle R produces 500 units;
but for technical reasons, installation of the control device will reduce
Q's output by only 200 units, while the same device will reduce R's
output by 400 units. Requiring R but not Q to install the device
would satisfy criterion 1: the choice would be premised on efficiency-attaining the greatest reduction in pollution per dollar. Requiring Q but not R to install the device would satisfy criterion 2: the
choice here would be premised on the arguable fairness of imposing
classificatory accuracy, such as requiring the state to engage in a personal dialogue with the
plaintiff before acting. See P. BREST, supra note 116, at 691-92; Tribe, Structural IJue Process,
10 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 269 (1975).
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the costs of the regulation on those who impose the greatest pollution
costs on society.224

Brest's analysis is impeccable and as a theoretical matter is irreconcilable with the hypotheticals posed earlier: it clearly is cost-efficient to concentrate resources on catching "low-cost" prisoners who
do not keep Kosher and on helping only the less expensive welfare
recipients. 225 If we have divergent intuitions about pollution devices and Kosher diets, it must be because we have implicitly balanced in each case-e.g., the extra cost of Kosher diets hardly
justifies not prosecuting a suspected felon. Nevertheless, this discussion does indicate that application cost should be an element of the
equal protection balance.
3. Personal Interest

Finally, classes may differ with respect to their personal interest
in avoiding a burden. This differential is rarer than that of cost or
harm, for we commonly assume that people have an equivalent interest in freedom from restriction and that restrictions will burden
that interest equivalently. The guilty value liberty as much as the
innocent. But such differential interests can exist. Classifications
limiting the rights and privileges of children may rest partly on the
sense that the young do not expect equal treatment and are less concerned when burdens are imposed. Similarly, some restrictions on
the rights of aliens seem to be partially justified by their lesser "interest" in full participation in the political community.226
Differential personal interests can often be characterized as differential needs which the state has an interest in recognizing. Thus,
we allow police to exceed speed limits because they have a special
"interest" in chasing suspects, which is simply to say that the state is
pursuing both the goal of crime control and of highway safety.227
Personal interest is more than merely an element of the minimum
rationality constraint. Courts frequently weigh differential harm or
cost according to the personal interest burdened without explicitly
discussing the differential interest in avoiding the burden. Even
224. P. BREST, supra note I 16, at 560.
225. This assumes that meeting the full need of one person is "equivalent" to meeting the
full need of another. But see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), discussed in text at
notes 196-98 supra.
226. Of course, this justification is unconvincing as applied to resident aliens who do all
that is possible to become citizens. But as applied to nonresident aliens and aliens uninterested
in citizenship, the argument has some force. See generally Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right To Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1110-11 (1977).
227. In a more general sense, we can say that the government also has an interest in respecting individual liberty. See P. BREST, supra note 116, at 988 n.l.
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though two classes have nominally the same personal interest, the
nature and strength of that interest has equal protection importance
simply when one class is burdened and the other is not. Dangerous
and safe drivers may have the same interest in driving, but what is
crucial in evaluating misfit is the importance of that interest; less
misfit will be tolerated as the significance of that interest increases.
The fundamental interest branch of strict scrutiny, the "adequate opportunity to present claims" limitation on the indigent's rights in the
criminal appellate process, 228 the apparent limitation of irrebuttable
presumption analysis to important personal liberties,229 and the special protection which the new substantive due process affords privacy
rights230 and family values, 231 all indicate that misfit is more "closely
scrutinized" as the significance of the affected personal interest
grows. A fuller description of how the courts should integrate personal interest into equal protection balancing appears later.232
C.
I.

Types of Misfit

.Due Process vs. Equal Protection

As some commentators have noted, the analysis in substantive
due process cases resembles that in equal protection cases.233 The
irrebuttable presumption doctrine suggests that procedural due process is also related to equal protection. This section attempts to expound the relationships between equal protection and the two forms
of due process by identifying the relationship of misfit to each.
The intimacy of substantive due process and equal protection is
immediately apparent from the fact that the language of the tests
applied is nearly identical. Under either doctrine, if a fundamental
personal interest is infringed the state must show that its classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest; otherwise, 234
the classification need only be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. This similarity is deceptive, however. Substantive due
process straightforwardly balances state and personal interests to determine what means the state may employ against anyone (and everyone) to achieve a goal. Equal protection, by contrast, balances
only incidentally, to determine whether a given amount of inequality
228. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
229. See text at notes 90-93 supra.
230. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
231. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
232. Part VI infra.
233. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 2, at 41-43; Linde, supra note 152, at 203-05; Perry,
supra note 68, at 385.
234. Of course, equal protection also applies the strict scrutiny test to suspect categories.
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is justifiable-the premise, always, is that an "equal" deprivation
would be valid.235
Both doctrines require that classes be compared, and to this extent both involve "misfit" analysis. But the classes relevant to each
doctrine are different. Substantive due process speaks only to overbreadth236 and therefore compares only two classes, the properly included and the overincluded.237 Equal protection speaks to
differential harm between the burdened and the unburdened and
therefore compares four classes.238 Put another way, it compares
two broad classes-the burdened and unburdened-and asks
whether the former class threatens more harm than the latter.
A plaintiff can often make both substantive due process and
equal protection arguments. His due process claim is: "the state
may not treat me the same way it treats him, since we are different,"239 and his equal protection claim is: "the state must treat me
235. The details of each kind of balance are described in Parts VI.B and VI.C iefra.
236. As we will see, overinclusion must be specially defined for benefits-it must mean
overinclusion with respect to the "burden" of excluding persons from a benefit. See text accompanying note 273 iefra.
237. See note 37 supra. In terms of the model, substantive due process compares only A to
C:

T

'v T

C

D

"'M

M

238. Equal protection compares the ratio A/C to the ratio B/D.
239. In terms of the model, the substantive due process claim emphasizes the difference in
terms of harm or need. (f represents those who receive a burden or a benefit.)

T

T
'vM
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Him
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M

M

(Burden)
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the same way it treats him, since we are no different." 240 The essence of a due process claim is that equal treatment is unjustified; the
essence of an equal protection claim is that dissimilar treatment is
unjustified.
_
Since different kinds of misfit are involved, a classification that
creates excessive due process misfit does not necessarily create excessive equal protection misfit, and vice versa. A few examples will
illuminate these relationships. A situation presenting excessive due
process misfit but not equal protection misfit is suggested by the "zebra killer" incident in San Francisco.241 Knowing only that a suspected killer was a black man of medium build, the police made
sweeping detentions of blacks. Detaining blacks and not whites was
not "irrational"- i.e. , this is not a case of equal protection misfit-but the broad interference with the freedom of blacks may well
have been too high a price to pay for the chance that one of them
could be identified as the killer.
The case of a misfit which violates equal protection but not due
process is even more common: almost every recent decision that a
law violated equal protection dealt with a law that would have easily
passed due process scrutiny. Consider, for example, gender-based
discriminations in benefit programs.242 Although a presumption of
dependence for one sex and not the other might violate equal protection, surely the state may employ a presumption for both sexes or for
neither. In fact, unless an equal protection violation is based upon a
240. In terms of the model, the equal protection claim emphasizes the similarity in terms of
harm or need. (f again represents those receiving a burden or a benefit.)

"'M

T

'uT

Me

Him

T

'vT

or

M
(Burden)

(Benefit)

241. N.Y. Times, April 26, 1974, at I, col. 6. The police questioned over 600 people during a period of about one week, looking for a black man, in his 20s or 30s, of medium build,
and 5 feet, 9 inches to 6 feet tall. Blacks complained that almost all young black men except
the very tall and very fat were liable to be stopped and questioned. Id at 15, cols. 1-3.
242. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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suspect classification, it would be unwise for a court to rest on equal
protection a decision which could have been decided on substantive
due process, since the state might in good faith respond to the decision by imposing the invalidated restriction uniformly.
Finally, consider the old substantive due process case, Lochner v.
New York, 243 in which the Court discussed both kinds of misfit.
The Court found "irrational" a statute forbidding employment in a
bakery for more than sixty hours a week or ten hours a day. First,
the Court asserted that other occupations were just as "unhealthy" as
the trade of a baker but were not regulated. 244 This is an equal protection argument, though the Court did not so denominate it. Second, the Court in effect argued that the law was overbroad: that an
occupation is not "perfectly healthy" does not justify a sweeping infringement of freedom of contract. 245 This is a due process argument.
Of course, Lochner is not good law, for we now would reject both
the equal protection argument (bakeries probably differ in kind from
law offices, carpentry shops, etc.) and the due process argument
(courts no longer value contract rights so dearly and they are properly quicker to accept legislative evaluations of the significance of
social evils). Nonetheless, the case illustrates the differences between equal protection and substantive due process misfit.
The independence of due process and equal protection misfit
suggests a problem: should a classification that barely satisfies each
type of rationality standard ever be invalidated because of its cumulative "irrationality''? Yes, since each kind of misfit aggravates the
general unfairness of a law. 246 A detailed discussion of Craig v.
243. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
244. 198 U.S. at 59.
245. 198 U.S. at 59-60.
246. Doctrinally, this might seem incorrect, for we would not invalidate a law which only
barely satisfied any other independent constitutional provisions, such as the first amendment
and the privilege against self-incrimination. However, a similar kind of misfit analysis is now
conducted under the due process and equal protection clauses, and that analysis relies more on
general reasoning about the requirements of equality and fairness than on textual exegesis of
the Constitution. It would therefore be odd to ignore cumulative harms for such doctrinal
reasons. q: United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508,517,518, 519 (1973)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (defending the irrebuttable presumption doctrine) (citations omitted):
It is a corollary of (the Equal Protection] requirement that, in order to determine
whether persons are indeed similarly situated, "such procedural protections as the particular situation demands" must be provided . . . . [W]here the private interests affected are
very important and the governmental interest can be promoted without much difficulty by
a well-designed hearing procedure, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to
act on an individualized basis, with general propositions serving only as rebuttable presumptions or other burden-shifting devices.
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.Boren241 demonstrates the value of the cumulative approach.
In Craig, the Supreme Court examined an Oklahoma statute that
prohibited the sale of3.2% beer to males under 21 and females under
18. The state defended the law by arguing that young males were
more likely than young females to drive while drunk. A survey
showed that 2% of males aged 18-20, but only .18% of females of that
age, were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. 248 The
Court nevertheless invalidated the classification: "if maleness is to
serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% must
be considered an unduly tenuous 'fit.' " 249 Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, deplored this use of the statistics, arguing that the only equal
protection issue was whether the 2%/.18% differential justified the
disparate treatment, and concluding that it did. 250 He maintained
that the Court's reference to the 2% correlation was relevant not to
equal protection, but to due process-"whether there are enough
persons in the category who drive while drunk to justify a bar
against purchases by all members of the group." 251 If the Court's
reasoning were correct, he continued, it would entail the absurd consequence that the state could not validly bar 18-20 year olds, male or
female, from purchasing beer, since only 1% (not even 2%) actually
were arrested for driving while drunk. Justice Rehnquist balanced
the state's interest in preventing drunk driving by young adults
This analysis, of course, combines elements traditionally invoked in what are usually
treated as distinct classes of cases, involving due process and equal protection. But the
elements of fairness should not be so rigidly cabined.
247. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
248. In terms of the model, we have:

'vT
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'v M

M

--- - 2%

Boys 18-20

0.18%

-

Girls 18-20

Arrested for
drunk driving

The percentages 2% and 0.18% refer to the percentages ofT and of "'T, respectively.
249. 429 U.S. at 201-02.
250. 429 U.S. at 224, 226.
25 l. 429 U.S. at 226.
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against the injury to personal interests caused by any over- or underinclusiveness and concluded that due process was not violated. 252
Justice Rehnquist's dissent illuminates the distinction between
differential harm (equal protection) and overbreadth (due process)
misfit. 253 His contention that as a due process issue a 1% or 2% fit is
adequate seems correct, given the relative insignificance of the injured personal interests. 254 But Craig might be a case in which a
due process "fit" is satisfactory but is so weak that the classification
must fail because of the cumulative misfit. If the elevenfold differential between men and women were maintained255 but the due process
misfit were reduced-e.g., if 80% of young males were arrested for
driving under the influence and 7 .2% of young females-the Court
would uphold the classification. However, since the degree of equal
protection misfit is unchanged, the difference in result must be due to
the weakness of the due process fit in the actual case. Of course, the
Court in Craig was strongly influenced by the fact that the line was
drawn on the basis of sex, and the Court was remarkably skeptical of
the state's statistical arguments. Nevertheless, the hypothetical suggests that the due process misfit evaluation was necessary to the
Craig result.
Craig illustrates another point: fewer justifications will be available to explain overbreadth in a case presenting both equal protection and due process claims than in a case presenting only a due
process claim. For the equal protection claim, overbreadth misfit
will be evaluated with respect to an equalprotection purpose, that is,
a purpose invoked to justify d!fferentia! treatment and only indirectly
invoked to justify the overinclusion. For the due process claim, the
overbreadth will be evaluated with respect to a purpose that is directly invoked to justify the law. Another look at Craig shows why
this distinction is important. More frequent drunk driving by males
was cited as the equal protection justification for the law. While the
purpose of reducing drunk driving perhaps adequately explained the
differential treatment, the Court in effect invalidated the law because
252. 429 U.S. at 226-27.
253. See 429 U.S. at 225-26.
254. Note that a contrary result might forbid any town from remaining dry, if the rate of
arrests for drunkenness. at all ages were as low as 2%.
255. Of course, one may question whether maintaining the same C/A:D/B ratio is
equivalent to keeping the equal protection differential "constant." Some weight might also be
given to the absolute size of the percentages. Thus, if l % of all boys and .5% of all girls drove
while drunk, and if in another situation 100% of all boys and 50% of all girls caused or posed a
certain mischief, we might find the latter misfit intolerable and not the former, even though the
differential was "constant."
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that purpose inadequately explained the due process overinclusion.
Yet, had the state not been restricted to the kinds of arguments that
would also justify gender-based discriminations, it could have marshalled many additional arguments to justify a uniform age limit for
both sexes. For example, the state could have argued a uniform age
limit is sensible because young people can only handle liquor when
they reach a certain level of maturity; because peer pressures among
the young foster excessive drinking; or because beer-drinking young
people are likely to form boisterous public crowds, litter streets, and
annoy bystanders. Since none of these is likely to justify constitutionally a sex differential-are girls sufficiently more mature than
boys, less subject to peer pressure, or less likely to form public
crowds?-they were unavailable to the state because they would
have negated the equal protection defense.
In short, we should not readily assume (with Justice Rehnquist)
that if a law's overbreadth does not violate substantive due process,
that overbreadth has no equal protection significance. As we have
just seen, an equal protection claim may impel the state to adduce a
justification that defeats that claim but which creates serious due
process problems, even where a good due process justification would
have been available but for the equal protection claim. Moreover,
Justice Rehnquist's conclusion ignores the possibility of a cumulative approach to due process and equal protection misfit.
A final substantive due process issue should be noted. When we
describe a law as overbroad, we usually mean that it burdens the
innocent as well as the guilty or excludes the needy as well as the
undeserving from a benefit. But courts have occasionally asked
whether the burden imposed actually reduces the harm. Even if
overbreadth passes the traditional test-even if the class the legislature chooses to burden is sufficiently harmful to justify treating the
entire class uniformly-the law may still fail if the burden the state
has imposed on the class barely reduces the perceived harm. In
Lochner, for example, the Court made not only the traditional overbreadth argument that there were too few unhealthy workers in bakeries to justify any health regulation. It also made this
"effectiveness" argument: since New York health inspections already
protected the health of bakery workers "so far as possible" the regulation of working hours did not in fact (or intention) reduce health
problems in bakeries.2s6
The Supreme Court has not confined the argument that a burden
is ineffectual to old and discredited substantive due process cases.
In Craig, for example, the Court concluded that forbidding young
256. 198 U.S. 45, 61-62 (1905).
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males to buy beer did not rationally serve the interest in reducing
drunk driving. The Court reasoned that the statute did not forbid
young males from drinking the beer purchased by young female
friends or by older persons257 and that the statistics were generally
"lacking in controls necessary for appraisal of the actual effectiveness of the male 3.2% beer prohibition."258
The effectiveness argument is perhaps the argument implicit in
the test: "Does the means significantly promote the end?" If
"means" only describes how much of the total harm is addressed by
the law259 (in Craig, the proportion of all drunk driving by young
adults that the regulation purported to reach), then the "promotion"
test is incorrect. That males make up only 61 %, or even only 2%, of
all drunk drivers is irrelevant-equal protection only demands that
males be sufficiently more likely than females to drive while
drunk. 260 However, if the "promotion" test simply restates the effec257. 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
258. 429 U.S. at 202 n.14. The concurring opinions of Justices Powell and Stevens make
the same argument. 429 U.S. at 211, 213 n.6.
259. In terms of the model, the shaded portions (regions C and D) represent the total
harm, and C/(C+D) represents the portion of the harm addressed by the law:
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260. In graphic terms, the location of the vertical line dividing T and "'Tis entirely irrele•
vant to equal protection analysis, so long as the proportions C/A and D/B remain constant.
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The percentages represent the proportion of the vertical column that the lower segment consti•
tutes. For example, C is 60% of C+A.
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tiveness argument, then it is conceptually valid under both equal
protection and due process. Had Oklahoma defended its regulation
in Craig by asserting that the law reduced the incidence of rape, the
Court's reaction is easy to imagine. Young males, of course, may
pose the danger almost uniquely, and thus as an abstract matter the
group singled out for special treatment is a proper subject for regulation. But the burden imposed has no apparent relevance to the asserted harm.
Although the effectiveness argument is conceptually sound,
courts should use it sparingly. Where the burden chosen by the
legislature might reasonably reduce the harm, the court should not
ordinarily analyze its actual effectiveness, since that is a consummately legislative task. If a harm exists and if the class selected is a
reasonably good surrogate for that harm, then the method and vigor
of the attack on the harm should usually be left to legislative choice.
This approach respects legislative flexibility where respect is most
warranted.
The Court in Craig paid lip-service to this conception of institutional roles. After noting the shortcomings of the statistical sample
and asserting that neither the judiciary nor state officials should be
expected to be adept in statistical techniques, the Court concluded
that "this merely illustrates that proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in
tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause."261 Underlying this statement is the important truth
that ultimately the Court cannot test the effectiveness of a regulation
or the seriousness of the harm which assertedly necessitates it.
However, courts should not ignore evidence that the legislature's factual assumptions are valid, and the Court is incorrect if its statement
suggests otherwise. On the other hand, the statement is quite right if
it is only insisting that the Court, and not the statistics, ultimately
decide normative equal protection questions. Even if it accepts the
state's statistical proof, as it normally should, the Court must judge
the significance of the facts proved. What personal interests are
burdened by the law, and how much constitutional protection do
they merit? How significant and legitimate are the state interests
asserted? How much differential in harm will defeat an equal protection claim? How much overbreadth violates due process? What
classificatory traits have stigmatizing effects which the Court should
recognize? All these questions are independent of the validity of
statistical proof, and all are questions that only a Court should answer.
The Supreme Court's standard for what procedural process is
261. 429 U.S. at 204.
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"due," like the substantive due process standard, bears a noticeable
similarity to equal protection tests:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of [procedural] due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.262
These factors determine whether a hearing is required, either before
or after the deprivation of liberty or property,263 and how thorough
that hearing should be.264 The substantive deprivation itself, of
course, is not the subject of review.
Procedural due process addresses not what the government may
do, but how it may do it. Because purpose is not directly considered, misfit analysis might seem entirely inapposite. But the distinction between "what" and "how'.' is analogous to the substantive due
process/equal protection distinction between ends and means. In
substantive due process and equal protection the courts are often less
concerned with the state's ends than with whether the means fit
them. Thus, conceptually, procedural due process might be seen as
a lower tier of means-end misfit analysis in which the substantive
"means" are treated as the procedural "end." Misfit analysis in the
lower tier compares the procedural means to the procedural end,
evaluating the extent to which the procedures used accurately select
the class described in the statute. This contrasts with misfit analysis
in the higher tier (of substantive due process/equal protection),
which evaluates the extent to which the statutory class accurately reflects the class that would be picked out if the statute were to achieve
its goal perfectly.26s
262. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
263. See L. TRIBE, supra note 100, at 543-50 (1978).
264. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975).
265. In terms of the model, we may define a third class A, comprising those actually burdened or benefitted by the government. We then simply have two misfit evaluations, one
procedural, the other substantive.
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Procedural due process, like substantive due process and equal
protection, promotes more than accuracy. 266 Besides protecting
classificatory accuracy, equal protection, through the doctrines of
suspect categories and of illicit motivation, proscribes stigmatic and
hostile treatment. 267 Procedural due process allows individuals to
present their claims to state officials and requires those officials to
explain their actions, functions which have value even if they do not
assure fewer erroneous decisions. 268 Nevertheless, both procedural
and substantive misfit are important elements of due process and
equal protection analysis and can, as we have seen, be integrated
into a generalized two-tiered test of classificatory fairness.
Finally, we should briefly note the role misfit plays in the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. Irrebuttable presumptions are usually
substantive due process cases of a special kind, not disguised equal
protection cases. When the Court held that Illinois could not take
away Stanley's motherless children without letting him rebut the
presumption that he was an unfit parent,269 it did so not because
fathers are generally as fit as mothers to be a family's only parent
(they may well not be), but because many fathers will be fit parents.
Whatever the talents of widows, widowers should have the chance to
exercise the important personal interest in child-rearing, since a significant number of men (even if a minority) can exercise it well.
Thus, to the extent that misfit analysis is relevant to the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine, substantive due process overbreadth misfit is
the most apposite kind.
Many irrebuttable presumption cases do resemble equal protection cases. A claim that the state irrebuttably presumed that Stanley
was unlike the average widow sounds like an equal protection argument. As suggested above, however, widows' competence is probably irrelevant to the result in Stanley. The result would have been
the same had the state automatically taken children away from a
surviving parent of either sex. That irrebuttable presumptions are actually due process cases is confirmed by the difficulty of imagining
an irrebuttable presumption describable only in equal protection
terms.
Procedural misfit, like substantive, can take the form of both overinclusion (e.g., a girl is mistakenly "burdened" and not allowed to buy beer, in Craig) and underinclusion (e.g., some 20year-old boys pass for 21).
266. See generally the thoughtful analysis in L. TRIBE, supra note 100, at 501-06.
261. See generally Part I.A supra.
268. See note 223 supra.
269. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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This section concludes with a hypothetical case that illustrates
the characteristics of the various forms of due process and equal protection. Assume that a city police department has a policy of dismissing from the force officers whom it discovers are practicing
homosexuals, and that the plaintiff is dismissed for that reason. The
constitutional arguments available to him will reflect concern with
both legitimacy of purpose and degree of misfit, 270 and can be summarized as follows:
(I) Procedural due process
A hearing is required to determine whether the plaintiff is a practicing homosexual, for existing departmental procedures do not reliably
determine that fact.
(2) Irrebuttable presumption
The departmental policy is obviously designed to ensure public
role-models who share the community's values and, more specifically,
who will not encourage homosexuality. Although the plaintiff is a
practicing homosexual, the department cannot automatically assume
that he is a poor role-model. A hearing is required to determine
whether his private life actually re.fleets upon his ability to uphold
community values in public.
(3) Substantive due process
The departmental policy has an unlawful purpose, namely, prohibiting persons from exercising personal-privacy interests and prohibiting them from expressing those privacy interests in public.
Even if the end served is not illegitimate, the departmental policy is
overbroad, for not all practicing homosexuals are poor role-models.
There is a reasonable, less restrictive alternative: dismissing only those
homosexual policemen who publicize their preferences.
The plaintiff admits being a practicing homosexual. But because
he does not publicize this fact, the departmental policy should be invalidated for its overbroad interference with his privacy.
(4) Equal protection
The departmental policy has an illegitimate purpose. But even if
the end is not illegitimate, it is irrationally served here, for a similar
proportion of nonhomosexuals as homosexuals are poor role-models.
Furthermore, it is easy enough to identify those homosexuals who are
a problem, by prohibiting all homosexuals from publicizing their sexual preferences. Given the availability of this convenient, less restrictive alternative, the doubtful difference in harm posed by homosexuals
compared to nonhomosexuals, and the law's substantial interference
with the plaintiff's privacy, this law should be invalidated.
270. Some of the arguments refer to the availability of less restrictive alternatives, an issue
discussed in Part VI.B i'!fra.

Equal Protection

1978]

2.

843

Overinclusion and Underinclusion; Burdens and Benefits

Courts and commentators occasionally suggest that equal protection should treat overinclusion differently from underinclusion, 271
and benefits differently from burdens.272 In light of the parallels
between due process and equal protection misfit, these suggestions
should be examined with respect to the due process clause as well.
This section contends that no analytic distinction generally need be
made between overinclusion and underinclusion or benefits and burdens when evaluating misfit. The primary exception arises because
of the due process "deprivation" requirement, but the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine helps restore the symmetry.
The following composite diagram may be helpful:

Burden (or
exclusion from
a benefit)

Benefit (or
exclusion from
a burden)

X

Needy
(deserving
benefit)

Harmful
(deserving
burden)
y

As this diagram suggests, we can interdefine burdens and benefits
and overinclusion and underinclusion. Region X represents overinclusion with respect to a burden. But if we describe exclusion from
a benefit as a burden, then X also represents underinclusion with
respect to a benefit. For analogous reasons, Y represents either underinclusion with respect to a burden or overinclusion with respect
to a benefit.273 With these relationships in mind, we can consider in
271. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27, at 348-53; J)evelopments, supra note 1, at
1084-87; note 284 i'!fra.
272. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136
(1977), discussed in note 288 i'!fra.
273. Under these definitions, the labels "harmful" and "needy" are imprecise, and the parenthetical labels "deserving burden" and "deserving benefit" are more accurate.
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more detail first the relationship of overinclusion and underinclusion
to misfit analysis and then the role of burdens and benefits.
One commentator has recommended that courts approach overinclusion and underinclusion (with respect to a burden) with different degrees of tolerance. Overinclusion is more offensive because it
burdens the "innocent" while underinclusion merely fails to burden
the "guilty," and because the need-for-experimentation rationale
that partly justifies underinclusion274 is inapposite to overinclusion.275 The commentator also notes that burden-overinclusion,
while more objectionable when it does arise, is less common than
underinclusion, "since the greater numbers who are adversely affected by the action will bring political pressure to bear on the
lawmakers." 276
This reasoning does not dictate any approach to underinclusion
and overinclusion with respect to a benejit.277 In the case of benefits,
overinclusion may seem less objectionable than underinclusion,
since the latter fails to benefit the deserving, and the former benefits
the undeserving. 278 On the other hand, this "preference" for overinclusion is undercut by the experimentation rationale. Just as the
advantages of legislative flexibility in dealing with the "harmful"
may justify burden-underinclusion, so the wish to deal flexibly with
the "needy" may justify benefit-underinclusion; in each case the
state has decided to extend its efforts to only some of the "deserving." And again, underinclusion with respect to a benefit might be
less likely to occur than overinclusion, since the deserving who are
denied benefits may mobilize political pressure. 279
While there may be some good reasons for different judicial tolerances toward overinclusion and underinclusion (and for differentiating further between benefits and burdens), this Note suggests a
somewhat different analysis, the elements of which have already
been introduced. Under this analysis, the proper judicial approach
274. See text at note 339 infra.
275. Developments, supra note I, at 1086.
276. Id at 1086-87. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
277. See Developments, supra note 1, at 1086 n.47.
278. Which of these is actually less objectionable is a question which can only be answered
intuitively. While it seems clearly preferable to fail to burden a guilty person rather than to
burden an innocent person, the correct preference is less obvious for benefits. It seems "better," though debatably so, to benefit a non-needy person (we are only wasting our money) than
to fail to benefit a needy person (we are allowing the need to continue unabated). In any
event, these broad generalizations are of only limited value, for as will be suggested in the text
at notes 280-87 infra, overinclusion and underinclusion can for the most part be similarly
treated under the equal protection and due process clauses.
279. Of course, as a practical matter, these people may lack political power.
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is essentially as follows. If a court has evaluated a classification in
terms of the minimum rationality constraint and the equal protection
balance, then underinclusion (with respect to either a burden or denial of a benefit) is of no further judicial concern. But the Court's
concern with overinclusion goes beyond this equal protection analysis. Judicial review of overinclusion is complete only when the
classification has also been tested for due process overbreadth.
Benefits and burdens are treated similarly under equal protection except insofar as they affect the significance of the personal interest.280
But under due process, a special problem is posed by benefits in
which the plaintiff does not have a property interest. Overinclusion
analysis cannot, strictly speaking, apply to the denial of such benefits, for those who are overinclusively denied the benefit have no due
process claim to it. Although such claims may be reviewed under
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, they are reviewed more deferentially than claims of overinclusion with respect either to burdens
or to the denial of "property benefits."
This proposed analysis follows directly from the earlier discussion of due process and equal protection misfit. Simply to evaluate
the "amount" of overinclusion or underinclusion is meaningless in
equal protection analysis; the size of these classes is relevant only in
comparison with the "properly fitted" classes of the properly included and properly excluded.281 In equal protection analysis, the
differential misfit approach compares the proportion of the irrcluded
who are harmful to the proportion of the excluded who are harmful
and validates the law if the comparison is both minimally rational
(i.e., if there is some positive differential) and "on balance" fair (i.e.,
if the differential is sufficient in light of the governmental and personal interests involved).282 In contrast, substantive due process
analysis asks whether the class of overincluded is "on balance" too
large compared to the class of properly included.283
Thus, insofar as underinclusion and overinclusion are both probative of differential misfit, courts should scrutinize them with equal
tolerance. But since only overinclusion, not underinclusion, is relevant to substantive due process, we might characterize judicial review of misfit as less tolerant of overinclusion. As long as a
classification creates a sufficient differential in harm, underinclusion
needs no justification. If drivers under age 18 are sufficiently more
likely to be drunk than older drivers, then they can be prohibited
from purchasing alcohol, whether they are 15%, 5%, or only 1% of all
280.
281.
282.
283.

See text at notes 288-96 infra.
See note 260 supra and accompanying text.
The mechanics of equal protection balancing are discussed in Part VI infra.
See Part VI.C infra.
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drunk drivers. This feature of equal protection may have impelled
courts to declare that the state may go "one step at a time" and may
attack only "part of a harm."284 While this declaration is entirely
sound, it should not be confused with the incorrect view that the
state may attack only part of the harm regardless of the relative
acuteness of the harms it has and has not addressed.
It might appear, thus, that courts err in discussing underinclusion
in any substantive due process cases285 and in many equal protection
cases.286 But there is a rational motive for this judicial practice,
though it may not be the actual motive. Underinclusion is indirectly relevant to both types of misfit, for it helps define the significance of the state interest actually served by the law. For example,
if only 5% of all drunk drivers are under 18, then this underinclusiveness suggests that the state interest in "reducing drunk driving"
should be discounted by 95% in any equal protection or substantive
due process balance.287 Of course, a mathematical approach is impractical. Nevertheless, the Court may validly consider, with
284. As the Court has rather broadly put it: "(M]ere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the
validity of a law under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, even if the
law disadvantages an individual or identifiable members of a group." Nixon v. Administrator
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471 n.33 (1977) (citations omitted), See notes 59-65 supra and
accompanying text.
285. For an example of this judicial practice, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977). In arguing that the state interests asserted for a zoning ordinance were at best
"marginally'' served, the plurality specifically pointed to the underinclusiveness of the ordinance (as well as its overinclusiveness). For example, the ordinance was underinclusive in
remedying traffic and parking congestion since some who deserved the burden were not burdened: "the ordinance permits any family consisting only of husband, wife, and unmarried
children to live together, even if the family contains a half dozen licensed drivers, each with his
or her own car." 431 U.S. at 500 (opinion of Powell, J.). The mischief of overcrowding was
also remedied underinclusively, since "(t]he ordinance would permit a grandmother to live
with a single dependent son and children, even if his school-age children number a
dozen. . . ." 431 U.S. at 500.
286. For example, in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), the Court pointed to
both the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of a statutory provision denying benefits to
certain classes of illegitimate children of disabled claimants. 417 U.S. at 637. This Note suggests that underinclusiveness is, strictly speaking, irrelevant. Here, the fact that the burden (of
being denied a benefit) was conferred underinclusively-ie., that some who did not deserve
the benefit obtained it-is irrelevant to the due process overbreadth claim that many "innocent" persons who deserved the benefit failed to obtain it. And it is not directly relevant to the
equal protection claim that the excluded and included classes of illegitimates were equally
deserving, and "the potential for spurious claims [was] exactly the same as to both subclasses,"
417 U.S. at 636, since the number of undeserving recipients is only of equal protection consequence if it affects the extent of the differential in need between the excluded and the included.
If that differential has already been evaluated, then the number of undeserving recipients is
irrelevant. (What this Note describes as "underinclusion" with respect to the denial of a benefit the Court describes as "overinclusion" with respect to a benefit. Though awkward, this
terminology is necessary for a consistent interpretation ofunderinclusion for both benefits and
burdens.)
287. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), for example, the fact that the
congestion and overcrowding problems were underinclusively remedied suggests that in any
equal protection balance the state's interest in reducing these problems should be discounted,
See note 285 supra.
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whatever precision is possible, the extent to which a social interest is
actually being served.
Finally, the treatment of burdens and benefits under equal protection and due process must be explained. Equal protection
presents few problems here, for benefits differ from burdens only to
the extent that they implicate different personal interests, or implicate them to a different degree, in particular cases.288 As a general
288. A few co=ents about the relationship between personal interests and burdens or
benefits are in order. One interesting question is whether an interest should be evaluated
differently if the burden or benefit represents a change from the status quo. Is it worse to
deprive a group of persons of welfare benefits they have been receiving than to exclude them
from a program at its inception? Is it worse to impose a new criminal penalty on group A
than to exempt all but A from an existing penalty? The answer in each case should be yes,
because of the significant difference in personal expectations. Because of past reliance and the
interruption of living patterns, statutes that impose a new burden or withdraw an old benefit
should be subject to special scrutiny.
This argument should not be taken too far, however. It certainly does not follow that
because persons are only excluded from a new benefit, their interests in receiving the benefit
are inconsequential However, the Supreme Court in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977),
seemed to reason in that fashion. In upholding a state welfare program's exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from medical coverage (an exclusion best described as an "exclusion of a
new benefit," since recipients had not been "receiving" it continuously), the Court reasoned in
part:
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers
no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the services she desires.
432 U.S. at 474. But this argument proves too much; we would not say that women suffer "no
disadvantage" if a state welfare program were initiated but its benefits were limited to men.
After all, it is only relative disadvantage that the equal protection clause addresses.
The above discussion does not necessarily imply that benefits and burdens generally require different treatment. Denial of even an existing benefit, e.g., a government transfer payment, might seem less onerous than imposition of a burden, e.g., a criminal sanction. Whether
a benefit is conferred at all is a discretionary matter, while our intuition about burdens seems
to be quite the contrary; we do not feel "privileged" whenever the government fails to punish
our conduct. But to give judicial recognition to this vague intuition would threaten to resurrect the discredited "right/privilege" distinction. See generally Van Alstyne, The .Demise ofthe
Right-Privilege .Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). If there is a
difference between the proper valuation of benefits and burdens, it is that the personal interests
and opportunities threatened by unequal treatment will often be greater for burdens than for
benefits. Generally the burdens imposed by the criminal process are qualitatively more severe
than other affirmative burdens (such as taxes) and than the government's failure to confer a
benefit. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 475:
There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity
and state em;:ouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.
Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by force of
law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), the Court held that the employer's
practice of denying accumulated seniority to a woman who had, as the employer required,
taken a leave of absence during pregnancy violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. V 1975), but that the employer's practice of denying such a woman sick pay did not, per
se, violate that law. The Court emphasized the distinction between benefits and burdens, 434
U.S. at 142. Justice Stevens' concurrence convincingly argues that that distinction does not
provide a meaningful test of discrimination. 434 U.S. at 154 n.4. The test this Note has
suggested could nevertheless achieve the same result that the majority reached. Denying accumulated seniority under the facts of Salty is less tolerable than denying sick pay-but not
because denial of seniority is a "burden" and denial of sick pay is not (how is a woman "bur-
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matter, since equal protection applies to all burdens and benefits, we
can conveniently interdefine them and apply a uniform "underinclusion" analysis to ordinary burdens and to the "burden" of exclusion
from a benefit.
It is more difficult to apply a uniform "overinclusion" analysis
under substantive due process. Overinclusion probably applies to
all affirmative government burdens, such as taxes or criminal penalties, for the due process clause explicitly protects against deprivations
of life, liberty, or property, and "liberty" has always been expansively interpreted.289 But we cannot simply define exclusion from
any government benefit as a burden in order to make the overinclusion analysis complete. A plaintiff who has never received a government benefit he deserves has no obvious substantive due process
claim, for he must have been deprived of a property interest, not simply prevented from obtaining it.290
Of course, substantive due process does protect against arbitrary
or overbroad exclusions from benefits when the plaintiff already has
a property interest in the benefit. Thus, for example, even the property interest of a welfare recipient should be sufficient to raise a substantive due process claim if benefits were arbitrarily terminated or
reduced for all recipients. 291 And, of course, even where a plaintiff
has no property interest, he may have a viable equal protection claim
which would remedy some of the law's unfairness (aside from its
overbreadth). Nevertheless, misfit analysis contains a serious asymmetry: people who have been denied participation in a benefit program in which they do not have a due process "property" interest
cannot complain about overbroad criteria for their exclusion. For
dened" by agreeing to take a job with limited seniority rights?). It is because the first denial is
a more severe intrusion on the woman's employment interest and is less proportionate to any
rational interests of the employer.
Of course, there is a serious definitional problem with the majority's approach: excuse from
any burden can be called a "benefit," and exclusion from any benefit can be called a "burden."
The distinction is at best intuitive-any government action restricting our freedom or pleasure
from what it would "naturally" be is a burden, and any action increasing it is a benefit. But
the concept ofa "natural state" is itself vague. Fortunately, the Court can avoid these concep•
tual problems simply by inquiring whether a personal interest is significantly infringed,
289. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). But see Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215, 228 (1976).
290. One possible argument is that all citizens have a liberty interest in obtaining deserved
government benefits, under the broad liberty definition of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923). See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 588-89 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(discussing procedural, not substantive, due process). However, such an argument seems to
read "liberty'' too broadly, since the argument renders the fifth and fourteenth amendment
language "of property'' superfluous. Justice Marshall's suggestion that a property interest can
be anticipatory-that any applicant for a government job has a property interest in that job,
408 U.S. at 588-has not been endorsed by other members of the Court.
291. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring procedural due process protections before recipients are deprived of their welfare benefits).
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example, although the policemen in Kelley v. Johnson 292 ultimately
lost their due process argument that policemen may not be fired for
having long hair, they could at least get into court. But a policeforce applicant would have no property interest in the denied benefit
of government employment.
Those who treasure conceptual completeness may bemoan this
state of affairs, but they may call upon the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine. That doctrine was earlier described as essentially a substantive due process doctrine under which overbreadth is partially
remedied by affording plaintiff a chance to rebut the presumption of
"desert" of a burden or "nondesert" of a benefit. The presumption
of nondesert of a benefit is subject to this doctrine even if the plaintiff has no property interest in the benefit. For example, Mrs. Salfi
claimed that the Social Security Administration could not irrebuttably presume from her husband's death soon after their marriage
that she married him only to obtain benefits.293 Although the Court
rejected her claim, it did consider its merits, and the opinion does not
foreclose the possibility that a less rational law would fail. While
the Court emphasized that hers was merely a noncontractual claim
to funds from the public treasury, 294 that emphasis goes only to the significance of the personal interest at stake, not to the cognizability
of an irrebuttable presumption claim to benefits in which plaintiff
lacked a property interest.2 9 5
Of course, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine only partially
restores symmetry to misfit analysis, since that doctrine applies only
when a statute clearly purports to test for a quality with respect to
which a plaintiff could offer more convincing proof at a hearing. 296
Nevertheless, it moves the law closer to the ideal of providing a remedy for all forms of classificatory unfairness, whether premised upon
overinclusion or underinclusion, burden or exclusion from a benefit.

D. Multiple Goals
The problem of multiple legislative goals, each importing a distinct mischief or need, deserves separate comment. Legislatures obviously may and do pursue many objectives in a single law, and
therefore a court should not judge classifications according only to
their primary purpose.297 Of course, even if a law has multiple pur292.
293.
294.
295.

425 U.S. 238 (1976).
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 753 (1975).
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975).
But see Note, The Conclusive Presumption .Doctrine: Equal Process or .Due Protection?,
72 MICH. L. REv. 800, 816 (1974) (criticizing the Supreme Court for ignoring the "property" or
"liberty" requirement in irrebuttable presumption cases).
296. See text at notes 96-97 supra.
297. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973). See Sandalow, supra note 7, at
660; Note, supra note 6, at 132-37.
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poses, any given classification within it will often be justifiable in
terms of only one of these purposes. Because of the peculiar
problems it presents for misfit analysis, we will discuss the special
case of a single classification that serves a set of goals. For the sake
of simplicity and without loss of generality we will discuss a classification that serves two purposes.
A classification can serve two goals in two different ways. First,
the law might burden a group that poses two mischiefs (or benefit a
group that has two needs). For example, recidivist felons might be
more severely punished than first-time felons and recividist misdemeanants. Second, the law might excuse from a burden a group
that would otherwise deserve it because the group also deserves a
benefit or, conversely, excuse from a benefit a needy group because
that group also poses a harm. For example, if an ordinance requires
drivers to stop at red lights, but exempts police and firemen, the
combined purpose is reducing the risk of accidents to the extent that
this does not interfere with emergency fire and police services.
The analysis of multiple purpose classifications might seem
straightforward. In each of the cases just described, we could simply
analyze misfit relative to the combined purpose class (the class of
those possessing both mischiefs, or both needs, or the need despite
the mischief, or the mischief despite the need). But why may we
burden those who possess both harms, yet not burden those who possess only one? Justifications for doing so would require more than
this simple misfit evaluation.
In our traffic light hypothetical, for example, in determining the
propriety of burdening only the combined purpose class of those
who both lack a special need for haste and pose the harm of being a
traffic hazard, we cannot simply ask whether the exemption for police and firemen fits these combined goals. That is, it is not sufficient to conclude that enough of those who are burdened possess
both harms-that enough drivers would jeopardize highway safety
and would have no legitimate interest in speed-and thus that the
misfit is tolerable. We must also ask why the state may exempt from
this particular burden those who need to travel without interruption
rather than excusing them from some other burden or providing
them with some special benefit, such as faster vehicles or special
roads.
That additional inquiry is hardly troubling in this example, since
the ha~ and the need addressed by the law are obviously interrelated-imposing on emergency vehicles the burden of stopping at
red lights directly affects their ability to move rapidly and without
interruption. The kind of interrelationship necessary to satisfy minimum rationality will be discussed below. But possession of com-
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pound mischiefs alone is not a sufficient reason for treating a class
differently from a class which possesses only one mischief. If it were
sufficient, then the "multiple goals" rationale could be subtly used to
evade the minimum rationality constraint. An example should
make this point clearer.
Levy v. Louisiana298 invalidated a statute allowing legitimate but
not illegitimate children to sue for the wrongful death of their
mothers. The Supreme Court reasoned that both classes of children
were similarly situated with respect to the loss and the "wrong" they
suffered at a mother's death. 299 But the statute may have had a second purpose-to encourage the formalization of relationships between parents.300 One commentator301 has suggested that although
neither purpose considered alone is adequately served by the classification, it is rationally related to the following combined purpose:
compensating children for the wrongful death of their mothers to the
extent that such compensation does not encourage relationships that
have never been legally formalized.
This suggestion is intriguing, but it does not explain why the state
may pursue its interest in marriage through the law of wrongful
death. The situation would be different if a law denied illegitimate
children all the rights of legitimate children or if there were a pressing need to formalize relationships that produced illegitimate offspring likely to sue for wrongful death. The absurdity of the latter
possibility perhaps accounts for the Court's casual treatment of the
interest in marriages.
This discussion of the multiple purposes in Levy suggests that
though it may be rational to pursue goal A by burdening class T*
and rational to pursue goal B by burdening class T**, it is not necessarily rational to pursue goals A and B by burdening only those persons common to T* and T**. That invalid syllogism circumvents
the minimum rationality constraint and would, for example, justify
enforcing trespassing laws only against illegitimate children, or stimulating music and shipbuilding by granting tax deductions only to
musicians who buy yachts. 302 In effect, the syllogism rationalizes
298. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
299. 391 U.S. at 72.
300. 391 U.S. at 80 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
301. Note, supra note 6, at 131, 136-37.
302. While the state might decide to subsidize musicians or to spur the yacht industry, the
objectionable feature of this tax deduction is that it does neither fairly. However, the state
could give a deduction to all musicians and a separate deduction to all yacht purchasers. Although musicians who buy yachts now gain the greatest benefit, this is fair since all who deserve either kind of benefit receive it.
A helpful analogy is the problem of how to "count" black women when assessing the success of affirmative action programs designed to increase the numbers of blacks and of women.
If the program is really designed to achieve both goals, then it is improper to double-count
black women toward both the black and the female hiring goals, since under this procedure a
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differential treatment of persons similarly situated with respect to
one harm or need by reference not to that harm or need, but to another harm. Yet differential treatment with respect to the second
harm is justifiable only with reference to the first harm, and we thus
have a vicious circle.303
Despite cases like Levy, classifications by compound mischiefs
can usually be justified. Four such justifications will now be discussed.304
The first such category of classifications consists of those cases in
which the presence of one mischief is associated with a higher degree
of another. For example, while some have questioned the propriety
of selectively prosecuting for tax violations those suspected of other
kinds of criminal activity, it might be contended that such suspects
are more likely to have cheated on their taxes than law-abiding citizens, and that devoting investigative resources to the former class is
more efficient. It would be a different matter if the tax laws were less
effective than ordinary sanctions, or if criminals were less likely to
have cheated.
In a sense, this first category does not involve multiple goals at
all. Vigorous use of the tax laws against criminals could be explained not as serving the twin goals of (1) raising revenue and (2)
pursuing criminals, but as serving the single goal of raising revenue
efficiently, i.e., by concentrating on the class of criminals filing tax
company could hire no black men or white women, but only black women. It is also improper
either to count all black women once as blacks, or to count them once as women, since the
result could again fall short of the goal: if all black women were counted as "black," then the
company would hire more white women and fewer black men than was intended. The correct
procedure, rather, is to establish separate hiring goals for black men, black women, and white
women. Of course, if black women were found to have suffered more severe discrimination
than either black men or white women, then "double-counting" would be more rational. But if
the program has the broader two-fold purpose noted above, the purpose is disserved if only
black women are hired.
303. In Levy, distinguishing between legitimately and illegitimately conceived wrongfuldeath plaintiffs is justified in terms of the state's interest in formalizing marriage relationships.
However, distinguishing between penalizing illegitimate wrongful-death complainants and
failing to penalize most other illegitimates (or their parents) is justifiable, if at all, only in terms
ofan interest such as the interest in discouraging wrongful-death suits. But we need an explanation for burdening only illegitimates to serve that interest-the circle is complete.
304. This Note does not disapprove of all multiple-goal justifications. In particular, it does
not subscribe to the disturbing "divide and conquer'' technique which the Supreme Court has
occasionally used to invalidate classification. Under this technique, the Court simply evaluates misfit with respect to each of several goals in tum. Because when it is evaluating one goal
it is ignoring the other goals, the Court inevitably finds the classification irrational with respect
to each goal. For example, in Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931), the Court invalidated a
highway bond requirement that applied to all commercial carriers except agricultural or seafood carriers. The Court found the law irrational because the exempted carriers posed the
same danger to public safety as other carriers. Other plausible purposes, such as a desire to
subsidize the exempted industries or to encourage their use of the roads (see note 306 infta),
were simply ignored by the Court. See Ely, supra note 26, at 1225-26. This technique was
also used in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), a use effectively criticized in Note, supra
note 6, at 124-28.
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returns. In other words, the second goal need not be referred to at
all if the burdened class more acutely poses the first harm. _Almost
every law could be seen as having "multiple goals" in some trivial
sense-e.g., we forbid the young from driving not because they are
likely to be worse drivers, but because we are pursuing the goals of
keeping unsafe drivers off the road and of restricting some privileges
to the mature. Obviously, the first explanation is more realistic and
more convincing.305
In the second category of cases, multiple goals can be justified
because the pursuit of one goal inevitably affects the pursuit of another. Such goals are interdependent rather than independent.
When goals are interdependent, the first goal will be furthered to a
d!,fferent degree when the second goal is not pursued at all, than if
the second goal is pursued fully, without exemptions. Some examples should make this distinction clearer.
Cases presenting interdependent goals usually involve a goal
which inhibits, rather than aids, the pursuit of another. An example
of such a tradeoffhas already been discussed: permitting firemen and
police to ignore traffice lights is rational because the state can only
pursue its interest in fire and police protection at the expense of some
loss in traffic safety. This tradeoff rationale is entirely distinct from
the first justification for pursuing multiple goals (that a high degree
of one harm implies a higher [or lower] degree of another), since the
validity of the traffic light exemption does not depend on the possibility that firemen and policemen are less hazardous than other motorists who ignore traffic signals.306
305. At first glance the "multiple goals" problem appears to be trivial, for ifwe define Mas
M* and T as M**, then the question whether the state may pursue two goals (M* and M**)
simultaneously seems identical to the question whether the classification contains too much
misfit (between M and T). However, T refers to those who are in fact burdened; it should be
compared to the class that should be burdened, which in the present context is the intersection
of the two goals, M* and M**, and not simply M*. If indeed there is a legitimate state interest
in simply burdening or benefitting members ofT, then this state interest will justify the classification, and there is no need to engage in subtler "multiple goals" analysis. For example, our
driving test hypothetical could be forced into the "multiple goals" mold by asserting that the
state is pursuing both the goal of driver safety (M or M*) and the goal of burdening persons
who fail driving tests (T or M**). But the second "goal" is artificial; if it were legitimate, then
there would be no need even to refer to the first goal.
306. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931), might be another example of interdependent
goals. The Supreme Court invalidated a highway bond requirement that exempted only carriers of agricultural goods and certain seafoods, perhaps because it assumed that the law's only
purpose was to improve traffic safety or perhaps because it considered highway bonds an inappropriate means through which to favor agriculture. See Note, supra note 6, at 134; Ely, supra
note 26, at 1225-26. Indeed, under the interdependence analysis suggested in the text, such a
compound purpose would be insufficient to justify the law. But if the state has a defensible
interest in encouraging agricultural carriers to use the roads rather than other means of transportation, e.g., to prevent products from perishing, then the classification might be justifiable,
for the pursuit of this goal inevitably inhibits the goal of highway safety. In other words, the
state should be permitted to make this tradeoff, since the two goals are interdependent.
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This Note has also presented examples of purported tradeoffs
which in fact do not involve interdependence. A law prohibiting
only illegitimate children from maintaining wrongful death suits is
described in "tradeofl'' terms if the purpose is said to be to compensate children for the loss of a parent "to the extent that" this does not
condone nonformalized relationships between the parents. However, these goals are independent, and the tradeoff is artificial, since
the need for compensation is unrelated to any need for formal marriage. More precisely, it would not affect the state's formalization
interest if all children could sue for wrongful death, or if none could.
By contrast, strict enforcement of traffic laws would inhibit the goal
of efficient fire and police protection more than lax enforcement
would.307
If multiple goals are interdependent, then the state need not defend its decision to pursue both goals simultaneously or to pursue
one goal at the expense of the other. Such decisions about the
proper tradeoff between legitimate goals are classically the responsibility of the legislature.308 They require a balancing of incommensurables, a battle between competing values, and a court should
therefore accede to the legislature's solution. Of course, a court still
must evaluate the degree of fit between the combined-purpose class
and the class actually burdened. For example, if a traffic signal exemption for firemen is justified by their need for haste, then others
with such a need-ambulances, or private motorists in a medical
emergency-might assert that they are similarly situated with respect
to the tradeoff between traffic safety and emergency needs. But the
question whether the tradeoff itself is unwise or unfair (i.e., whether
the need for safety outweighs the need for any exemptions) is for the
legislature.
The. third category in which classification by compound mischiefs
is permissible consists of those instances in which one can infer, from
the combination of mischiefs, a single need or harm properly served
by the law. Of course, this combined purpose must be legitimate
and the classification must satisfy the minimum rationality constraint. In this third category, the intersection of M* and M** defines a class that is different in kind from both M* and M**. For
307. Although it is less common for the pursuit of one goal inevitably to further another
goal than for it to inhibit the second, some examples might be noted. If both a chronic food
shortage (M*) and serious unemployment (M**) exist, the state might decide to offer public
subsidies to agricultural workers. Neither goal is being pursued fully, since non-agricultural
employment still exists and other means of aiding agriculture (besides a worker subsidy) are
available. But one justification for this choice of multiple goals is that remedying unemployment here inevitably helps remedy the food shortage.
By contrast, a prohibition of jaywalking by illegitimates exemplifies independent, rather
than interdependent, "harms." (Again, these goals are at best mutually supportive, not mutually inhibiting.) Discouraging illegitimacy has nothing to do with discouraging jaywalking.
308. See Ely, supra note 26, at 1240 n.110.
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example, an affirmative action program giving blacks preference in
admission to medical school might be characterized as serving the
twin goals of compensating for past discrimination against blacks
generally and making health care more accessible to blacks. If these
two goals are interdependent, then the state is justified in combining
them (assuming that they are legitimate goals); it is no objection that
the law benefits no black victims of discrimination other than wouldbe doctors, or that it benefits no white medical students who would
treat blacks.309 But an even more straightforward justification than
"interdependence" is the argument that encouraging blacks to become doctors is itself a legitimate goal. To succeed, this argument
must show that blacks have a sufficiently unique social experience
and that doctors' social roles sufficiently differ from those of lawyers,
businessmen, and others, that the goal differs in kind from the separate goals.
This form of argument can be abused- e.g., one could argue
that the classification in Levy is justified by the state's special desire
to discourage illegitimate children from filing wrongful death claims.
But this potential danger is not unique to classifications involving
multiple goals and can be avoided simply by enforcing the requirement that the goal be legitimate.
Finally, classifying by compound mischiefs may be rational
when it is part of a general policy of attacking one of the mischiefs in
many or most of its manifestations. Thus, as suggested earlier,310
the classification in Levy might have been rational were preventing
illegitimates from bringing wrongful death suits just one part of a
general scheme to deny illegitimates the rights generally accorded
legitimate children. Similarly, another possible justification for using the tax laws against criminals is that there appears to be a general policy of burdening criminals in any way possible. The more
general the policy, the less the "misfit" between felons who fill out
tax forms and felons who do not, or (in the case of a law excluding
felons from certain occupations) between felons who would have
pursued a now-prohibited line of work and those who still may pursue their chosen occupation.311 Of course, under this fourth justification for pursuing multiple goals, the "general policy" in question
309. These two objections may be relevant to whether the law would satisfy equal protection. Although they are irrelevant to the propriety of pursuing the two goals together, these
objections are quite relevant to the ultimate question whether T and M are sufficiently close
fitting, for the latter inquiry will also consider the availability of less restrictive alternatives.
310. See text after note 298 supra.
311. It may be objected that a preference for a "more general" policy simply resurrects the
impermissible "part of the harm" approach, see text at notes 59-65 supra. Strictly speaking,
that objection is correct. However, this Note de.fines "general policy" to mean an attempt to
get at a harm by whatever means are available. On this view, a "general policy'' approach
satisfies the minimum rationality constraint (particularly its cost element). That is, there may
be no feasible way to address the "harm" of non.filing felons who have illegal income, and it is
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must still be legitimate. (It is unlikely that the purpose of either of
the above hypotheticals is legitimate.)
To conclude, classifications according to multiple legislative
goals can ordinarily be justified under one of at least four arguments:
that possession of one harm implies a higher degree of another; that
pursuit of one goal inevitably aids or inhibits pursuit of a second;
that a single legitimate purpose can be inferred from the several purposes; or that the classification represents part of a general policy of
attacking one of the harms. Especially when the personal interest is
less than fundamental and the benefitted or burdened class is not a
suspect one, courts should construe these available justifications liberally. But a bare compound mischief rationale is unsatisfactory; it
is the classic argument that proves too much. It would justify conferring any benefit on any class on the ground that to do so would
encourage persons to join the class or would reward its members.
Similarly, imposing any burden would discourage persons from joining or remaining in the class or would penalize its members. 312 Such
reasoning would defeat the purpose of the minimum rationality constraint.
A final cautionary note: satisfying one of the four justifications
for pursuing multiple goals does not by itself satisfy the equal protection clause. This section has been exclusively concerned with the
circumstances in which a state may burden those posing two harms
without also burdening those posing only one of those harms. If the
state may burden this "compound mischief' class exclusively, then
that class should be designated as "M" and treated like any other
single-purpose class-that is, it must satisfy the minimum rationality
constraint, and it must fit class T adequately. The present section, in
other words, simply defines the permissible contours of Min the context of multiple legislative purposes.
·
V.

EXCEPTIONS TO MISFIT ANALYSIS

Misfit analysis cannot be applied to those legislative goals that
inevitably describe the purpose class M only ambiguously. 313 Such
thus reasonable to pursue the filers. By contrast, there are many feasible (and more efficient)
alternative means of subsidizing musicians besides tax deductions for purchases of yachts.
312. See Examining Bd. of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), in which the
Court invalidated a Puerto Rican statute making American citizenship a prerequisite for a civil
engineer's license. The Court rejected the justification that the law would raise the prevailing
standard of living, reasoning, "To uphold the statute on the basis of broad economic justification of this kind would permit any State to bar the employment of aliens in any lawful occupations." 426 U.S. at 605-06.
313. If a goal is "legitimate," then it is unnecessary, rather than impossible, to analyze that
goal's misfit with respect to a more general goal. Thus, although they are also "exceptions" to
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goals are arbitrary in that different legislatures might reach different
yet equally supportable conclusions as to which classification best
served a given objective. Of course, even nonarbitrary goals may be
equally well served by a number of different classifications that create the same amount of misfit but impose the statutory burden or
confer the statutory benefit on different persons. But with respect to
arbitrary goals it is impossible to evaluate the legislature's claim that
the means chosen furthers the goal as well as or better than any other
means. For example, any number of different zoning plans "enhance
the scenic beauty of a community" to significant, though incommensurable, degrees.
Such inevitably arbitrary classifications raise a number of
problems. What kinds of classifications are "inevitably arbitrary"?
Can the amount of "misfit" created by such classifications be sensibly measured? Do any considerations prescribe which of several
equally arbitrary alternatives the state may choose?
A taxonomy of "inevitably arbitrary" equal protection goals divides them into (1) inherently imprecise goals, e.g., matters of taste,
and (2) "neutral" goals, which are served as well by classifying one
group as another, e.g., draft lotteries or budget reductions. 314 By
fleshing out each of these categories, we may determine the appromisfit analysis, legitimate goals are exceptions of a very different kind from the goals discussed
in this Part.
Misfit analysis is unnecessary for legitimate goals because, by definition, such goals limit
the size of M. If a goal (say, encouraging farming) is legitimate, then no plaintiff outside M can
make a cognizable equal protection claim (an oilman cannot complain that the state is not
encouraging oil production). Suppose, for example, there were a subsidy to small farms (T).
Large farm members (T*) could complain, if we assume that encouraging small farms is not a
legitimate goal, while encouraging all farms is. But oilmen (f**) who argued that the "real"
purpose was to aid the economy could not complain, for "encouraging farming" is legitimate.
Thus any misfit must occur with respect to classes T and T*. The purpose class, M, simply does
not extend to T**:

T
"'M

T*
I\,

T**

M

M

(fhe diagram realistically assumes that the law is overinclusive, i.e., that some farmers who
receive the subsidy do not need encouragement.)
314. While these two categories are fairly comprehensive, they are by no means mutually
exclusive.
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priate equal protection standard for each.315 Such a determination
is important, for if some constraints are not placed upon these categories of goals, they would undermine equal protection review. 316
315. The analysis developed in the text departs significantly from Professor Ely's discussion ofnonrational goals, supra note 26, at 1228-49. Ely explored this problem in the context
of a general analysis of legislative motivation in constitutional law. Essentially he argues that
a court should not look at motivation when the "disadvantageous distinction model" applies,
i.e., when the simple fact that the law creates a distinction is enough to trigger the government's burden of justification. Id at 1228-30. But where that model is inapplicable-in situations requiring discretionary, random, or partly random choice (in other words, where the
choice is nonrational}-j:>roof of unconstitutional motivation would be required. Examples of
random choice situations are the selection ofjurors or draftees and the setting of voting district
boundary lines. Discretionary choice situations are of two types:
The first is the situation where the Court is prepared to credit as acceptable, along wit/1
other relatively precise goals, one goal-such as the promotion of "good taste"-whose
relation to various choices cannot be evaluated by a calculus of "rationality" and "irrationality." The second is the situation where the Court is unprepared to restrict an area's
class of acceptable goals to anything more precise than the promotion of the general welfare.
Id at 1237 (emphasis original). Aesthetic distinctions in a dress code are an example of the
first situation. Decisions as to which industry to favor under the tax code, and how to vary
punishment among crimes, exemplify goals that promote the "general welfare."
The analysis in the main text clearly draws from Ely's categories, but it alters them in
crucial respects. Ely's "random" choices will be discussed in this Note's category two, his "discretionary'' "nonrational goal" will be discussed in category one, and his "discretionary" "general welfare" choices have been discussed in the section on legitimate goals, Part III.A.I supra.
More important than differences in categorization is the fact that Ely's only constraint on nonrational choices is the prohibition against unconstitutional motives. This Note's analysis, by
contrast, attempts to indicate additional constraints appropriate to each category of nonrational goals.
For further criticism of Ely's approach, see Brest, supra note 26, at 135-46.
316. Another possible category of nonrational goals consists of those goals purporting to
benefit or burden anyone a given process designates as deserving. We determine whether an
individual has been "properly" treated not by reference to his actual characteristics, but only
by reference to the fairness of the process leading to his selection. For example, a discretionary decision to prosecute is fair unless the method of selection is "deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Oyler v. Boles,
368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). The defendant's characteristics are irrelevant, except for his membership in the large class of bona fide criminal suspects. Other examples of discretionary
process goals might be the judge's choice of a criminal sentence within the statutory range, a
municipality's decision as to the location of a new public facility, and a school board's choice
of curriculum. See Ely, supra note 26, at 1245. Of course, such choices also may involve
"aesthetic" goals, thus complicating judicial review.
Since discretionary-process goals cannot be evaluated in terms of the class which the process ultimately burdens, a strict misfit analysis is impossible. On the other hand, principles of
administrative law do apply, for discretion may only be exercised in pursuit of goals which
further the general purposes for which discretion was delegated. For instance, prosecutorial
discretion exercised against farmers, or mothers, or tennis players would presumably be subject to review; we may assume that the legislature intended that the prosecutor have the flexibility of selective enforcement based on such factors as the seriousness of the offense, public
concern over a particular type of crime, and the like, but that strengthening the industrial
sector (at the expense of agriculture) and discouraging births were not understood to be relevant factors. A court's judgment will necessarily be impressionistic and deferential, but at
least something like a weak "misfit" approach is appropriate. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); discussion of it in L. TRIBE, supra note 100, at 286. In short,
although a discretionary choice can be justified by any of a broad range of goals, it remains
subject to judicial review when the goals are apparently irrelevant to the general purposes of
the scheme or when the choice is relevant to none of the goals.
A curious objection may be raised to this analysis. Since the legislature itself exercises the
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A. Inherently Imprecise Goals
The objectives of some classifications are inherently imprecise.
If retribution is a proper aim of punishment, then the state may "rationally" prescribe longer sentences for rapists than armed robbers,
or vice versa. 317 This is not because we accept such classifications as
legitimate or because we know what "immorality" is but cannot
measure it. 318 Rather, our concept of "immorality" is so imprecise
that we do not even know whether a legislature's classification is
"correct."
Because of this imprecision, a legislature may be able to define
social mischiefs as to which almost any specific regulation would be
"rational." For example, in McGowan v. Mary!and, 319 the Supreme
Court upheld Sunday closing laws against claims that their numerous exceptions violated equal protection.32o Among the items which
discretion to choose between acceptable goals, ,:e., goals furthering the general welfare, is not
any resulting piece oflegislation beyond judicial review? Is not the only question whether the
process was fair? If the law serves a goal which furthers the general welfare and was not
prompted by an illicit motive, is it not valid?
This objection is not frivolous, but it can be answered. First, as a general matter existing
political institutions are not examples of "pure procedural justice" in which an outcome is
automatically accepted as fair simply because it is the result of a properly followed procedure.
See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 86-89, 198 (1971). The equal protection clause would be
largely gratuitous if we entertained such a conception of our political processes. Second, the
rationale for accepting limited discretion does not extend to all situations. We allow a prosecutor to choose freely among several goals because we think flexibility is a value in itself and
because his freedom is constrained by the terms and purposes of the statutes. By contrast, the
constraint of "pursuing the general welfare" is hardly a constraint at all. And the desirability
of allowing a rule to be flexibly enforced in accordance with one of its purposes has no counterpart in the general legislative process.
317. See Ely, supra note 26, at 1243-44; Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 586 (1958)
(nothing in the Constitution "require[s] a State to fix or impose any particular penalty for any
crime it may define or to impose the same or 'proportionate' sentences for separate and independent crimes").
318. This problem of uncertainty born of ignorance could be discussed as an independen!
exception to misfit analysis. Sometimes, in other words, misfit analysis is impossible not because the subject matter lacks precise standards, but because we are ignorant of the dimensions
of the class actually picked out by those standards (even though those standards are theoretically clear). For example, the government may surely ban cancer-causing drugs, but in any
given case it may be unclear whether, or to what degree, a drug is in fact carcinogenic. In a
word, the problem to be remedied is of uncertain scope. (For a discussion of the distinct
question whether the remedy chosen will actually be effective in alleviating the evil, see text at
notes 256-61 supra.)
Of course, many classifications are in some sense grounded upon ignorance; if a legislature
knew precisely how to pick out M, it would not create the presumptive classification T. Since
M will generally have a rough and ambiguous boundary, courts should be tolerant. The legislature can usually be trusted not to shoot in the dark against a culprit whom no one believes is
there. The problem ofuncertainty born ofignorance is inherent in legislation and seems to be
of controllable dimensions.
319. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
320. The equal protection claim was unanimously and su=arily rejected by the Court,
366 U.S. at 425-28. The more difficult issue was whether Sunday closing laws violated the
establishment clause of the first amendment, 366 U.S. at 429-53.
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could be sold despite the general prohibition were tobacco, confectionaries, milk, bread, fruits, gasoline, and newspapers and periodicals. In one county, beaches, bathhouses, dancing saloons, and
amusement parks could remain open and sell their usual merchandise. In the Court's words,
a legislature could reasonably find that the Sunday sale of the exempted commodities was necessary . . . for the enhancement of the
recreational atmosphere of the day-that a family which takes a Sunday ride into the country will need gasoline for the automobile and
may find pleasant a soft drink or fresh fruit; that those who go to the
beach may wish ice cream or some other item normally sold there; that
some people will prefer alcoholic beverages or games of chance to add
to their relaxation. . . _321

If "enhancing the recreational atmosphere of the day" is the goal, a
judgment as to rationality is no judgment at all. 322 Prohibiting rather
than allowing the sale of gasoline would also serve that goal by allowing gas station attendants a day off and encouraging families to
stay home and engage in more private forms of recreation. Similarly, many of the items plaintiffs were actually convicted for selling-a loose-leaf binder, a stapler, and a toy submarine-could
rationally have been exempted.
The inherently imprecise category of arbitrary goals is difficult to
constrain. Courts might refuse to accept such goals as justifications
for statutory classifications. But surely a court cannot simply dismiss all goals involving judgments of aesthetics,323 morality,324
"good taste," 325 and so forth, because it cannot determine whether
they have been rationally served. A later section326 will discuss one
plausible constraint, namely, that infringement of significant personal interests must be justified by correspondingly significant state
interests. Thus, a zoning law seriously restricting the associational
rights of college students327 might demand a more persuasive justification than that aggregations of young people are offensive, even
321. 366 U.S. at 426.
322. The Court does purport to use the rationality standard in stating, after the quoted
paragraph, that the "record is barren of any indication that this apparently reasonable basis
does not exist . . . ." 366 U.S. at 426. But one cannot take this argument seriously; the
record is "barren" because recreational preferences are not subject to proof. How could plaintiffs demonstrate that families taking a Sunday drive do not find soft drinks and fresh fruit
"pleasant"?
323. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
324. See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). As the dissent notes, the majority
opinion barely discusses the "rationality" of the classification in promoting family life.
325. See Ely, supra note 26, at 1239-40, 1242-45; cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976)
(upholding regulation of policeman's hair length and style, since similarity in appearance of
police officers is desirable to facilitate public recognition or to inculcate esprit de corps within
the police force).
326. Part VI infra.
327. But see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974).
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though the justification cannot by its own terms be refuted. Students could not prove themselves less "offensive" than groups which
are allowed to live together.
A second method of constraining this category of goals is to find
the goal impermissible. While this method will usually be unavailable, in a significant number of cases the goal might be impermissible
in the sense that it must be rejected by the courts as a justification.
Inculcating anti-homosexuality or enforcing a grooming standard for
employees328 are examples of arbitrary goals within the inherently
imprecise category that might be illegitimate.
These two constraints apply to all goals, of course, but they apply
with special force to inherently imprecise ones. Because this category
of goals is difficult to evaluate under a rationality standard, the
significance and permissibility of the goal should be meticulously
scrutinized. Impermissible purposes are too easily redefined in
more appealing, but imprecise, terms. Enforcing uniformity in hair
length becomes encouraging esprit de corps.329 Thwarting young
people's privacy right of access to contraceptives becomes expressing
state disapproval of sexual promiscuity by the young. 330 To be sure,
the state cannot be forbidden from pursuing certain goals simply l;>ecause they are imprecise; such reasoning might necessitate the invalidation of most of our criminal laws and many of our zoning
ordinances. Nevertheless, courts should be sensitive in reviewing
these goals to ensure that their imprecision does not conceal their
unfairness.
B.

Neutral Goals

The second category of arbitrary goals consists of those goals
whose purpose is achieved by burdening or benefitting a limited
class of persons indistinguishable from a larger331 class. Burdening
one person within the broad class serves the goal as well as burdening another. Because it is a matter of indifference which individuals
are burdened, goals in this category are "neutral." Draft lotteries
and jury selection procedures fall within this category, since the implicit purpose is to draft a certain number of able-bodied men or to
impanel a certain number of adult, unbiased jurors. Bona fide social experiments are also within this category, for their purpose is to
328. But see Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
329. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248 (1976).
330. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977), where the Court refused to
uphold such an interest.
33 l. A goal is within this category even if the class ultimately burdened is drawn from a
subclass of humanity, so long as it is a matter of indifference which members of the subclass
are chosen. A draft lottery is still random even though women, children, and the aged are
excluded from the "venire."
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burden or benefit an experimental group identical in all relevant332
respects to a control group. Less obviously within this category are
purposes such as reducing total administrative or program costs; excluding one person from the program presumably reduces its cost as
much as excluding another. 333
When the state invokes a neutral goal, the demand for rationality
is often inapposite. But the opinion in Reed v. Reed334 suggests that
the Supreme Court has not always recognized this. The statute in
Reed established a preference for men rather than women in administering an estate when competing claimants were otherwise
equally qualified. Although the Court conceded that "the objective
of reducing the workload on probate courts by eliminating one class
of contestants is not without legitimacy," it reasoned that "[t]o give a
mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the
other . . . is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause."335 The Court failed to
realize that if this purpose is legitimate, it demands an arbitrary
choice; the point of the scheme is to avoid the expense and time of
making rational distinctions between claimants. 336 The result in
Reed is surely correct but requires a more sophisticated analysis
than the argument that neutral goals are invalid because they are
arbitrary.
Neutral goals present two important questions. First, when may
the state pursue neutral goals? That is, when may it simply exclude
some admittedly similarly situated persons from a benefit, rather
than either proportionally diminish the benefit for all members of
the class or seek rational distinctions among class members? Second, assuming the state may pursue a neutral goal, what criterion
may be used to limit the class of persons which the law will burden
332. That is, the groups are identical with respect to those factors (other than the experimental variable) which might affect the experimental result. I am assuming that the experiment itself artificially imposes a variable condition. If it merely examines the behavior of two
groups, only one of which "naturally" (i.e., without government intervention) possesses this
condition, then the "experiment" is merely a social study and creates no special equal protection problems.
333. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (dictum) (a state cannot reduce
expenditures for education by banning indigents from attending school). In some circumstances, however, it would be permissible to exclude only the more expensive recipients. See
text at notes 223-24 supra, discussing application cost.
334. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
335. 404 U.S. at 76.
336. The Court also discussed as a purpose the goal of avoiding intrafamily controversy,
but it denied that the choice could "lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex." 404 U.S.
at 77. But again, since that value is served only by avoiding a factual examination of the
competence of spouses competing t(! be administrators, only an arbitrary choice furthers the
goal. Thus, the mere fact that the classification was arbitrary cannot invalidate it; either the
goal is never permissible, or there is something obnoxious about this kind of arbitrary choice
(i.e., one based upon gender). The latter rationale is probably the more accurate, since the
scheme would not be unconstitutional if the final candidates simply flipped a coin.
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or benefit? More concretely, the first question asks when, for example, government benefits may be eliminated for half the recipients
instead of either being diminished by half for all the recipients337 or
"rationally" allocated to the more deserving half of recipients. The
second issue is whether a random method must be used to reduce the
class. These two problems will be discussed in turn.
The question whether the state can pursue a neutral goal can be
answered only after considering the applicability of the minimum
rationality constraint to this class of goals. Classifications furthering
neutral goals neither satisfy nor fail to satisfy the constraint,338 for
they extend a benefit to persons who deserve it no more and no less
than persons not receiving it (since the two classes are, by hypothesis,
similarly situated). This characteristic of neutral goals might seem
to suggest that they should be evaluated like any classification that
barely satisfies the minimum rationality constraint- i.e., as the following section of this Note outlines, a court would evaluate the fairness of the law in terms of the closeness of fit and the comparative
significance of state and personal interests, and it would investigate
reasonable alternatives. But if this suggestion were correct, the state
could seldom justify a neutral goal. Since the "closeness of fit" for
neutral goals is always minimal, the state would suffer a built-in disadvantage in any equal protection balance and would always lose
whenever the personal interest was significant or alternatives were
available.
The better approach is to recognize that neutral goals often present a new kind of state interest, a special interest that can only be
achieved by pursuing a goal "neutrally" rather than "rationally".
This interest should be weighed along with the state's traditional,
underlying interest in alleviating the harm. The extra weight may
compensate for the loss of closeness of fit on the state's side of the
equal protection balance.
Bona fide social experiments339 are the best example of a special
337. Of course, the example is oversimplified. Because of administrative overhead,
neither excluding half the recipients nor reducing all benefit levels by one half would reduce
costs by exactly half.
338. In terms of the model presented in text preceding note 189 supra, the dividing line
between M and 'vM has a slope of zero, and the law is neither "rational" nor "irrational".
339. This is not to say that anything a legislature denominates a social experiment is one,
nor that bona fide experiments are entirely immune from equal protection review. For reasons
already noted, the broad view of experiments-that the state may always attack "part of a
harm"-is unacceptable. However, bona fide social experiments can be appropriately defined
without extending the "experimentation" rationale to every case of underinclusion. If experiment is bona fide, then the state's independent interest in gaining knowledge can properly
be weighed in the equal protection balance.
Even minimal requirements to ensure the legitimacy of social experiments should keep
most underinclusive classifications exposed to judicial review. Such requirements might include a reasonable time limit; clearly designated control and experimental groups; a significant
potential not simply of deriving knowledge for its own sake, but also of applying the experi-
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state interest in pursuing a goal neutrally. Although one purpose of
mental treatment to all within the relevant class; and, perhaps most important, a limitation on
the differences in treatment between the control and experimental groups. In some areas,
especially criminal justice, we might even require that the experimental treatment not, in the
broadest sense, be "worse" than the treatment of the control group. See Morris, lmpedime11/s
lo Penal Reform, 33 U. CHI. L. Rev. 627, 647-48 (1966) (suggesting a "less severity" principle
as an ethical safeguard on experiments in the criminal justice field). The courts may justifiably acknowledge that the burden of a harsher experimental treatment is usually a greater personal deprivation than the burden of excluding many persons from an experimental benefit.
See note 288 supra.·
Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974),
appears to be the only case examining whether a social experiment violates the equal protection clause. The case involved a New York work-relief plan which imposed on welfare recipients in selected counties certain conditions inconsistent with applicable federal standards. (The
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare approved the plan by waiving normal standards.) The court found that the differential treatment did not violate equal protection.
Whatever the propriety of the result, the court's reasoning is disappointing. Chief Judge
Friendly stated that determining how to impose the welfare system is as "legitimate" as any
purpose can be and that social and economic experimentation is an acceptable means to that
end. Citing a Brandeis dissent to the effect that due process should not prevent state experimentation, he concluded that, by analogy, equal protection should not prevent experimentation by a state on less than a statewide basis. 473 F.2d at 1109. This analogy, of course, is
imperfect, for to say that a policy can be imposed across a state is not to say that partial
imposition comports with equal protection. Capron, Social Experimentation and the Law, in
ETHICAL AND LEGAL Issues OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 127, 156-57 (A. Rivlin & P.
Timpane eds. 1975).
The court continued by rejecting Justice Jackson's argument against underinclusion (see
note 276 supra) as
inapposite to the selection, on a random but rational basis, of certain areas of the state to
try out a program for the very purpose of determining whether it, or some variation of it
should be made applicable to all. The Equal Protection clause does not place a state in a
vise where its only choices in dealing with the problems of welfare are to do nothing or
plunge into statewide action.
473 F.2d at 1109-10. What is curious about the court's reasoning is that it sounds as if it were
discussing and legitimizing any case ofunderinclusion. The very special nature of the instant
government action-to wit, a carefully controlled bona fide social experiment-is only hinted
at ("random but rational") by the court. Thus, the opinion offers no guidelines as to the
permissible limits of social experiments.
Social experiments should be subject to firm constraints. But forbidding less constrained
forms of experimentation will not put the legislature to the uncomfortable "all-or-nothing"
choice between an imperfect present and an uncertain future, see lJevelopmenls, supra note 1,
at 1084-86. Governments can and do draw upon a vital source of "experimental" data other
than their own projects-namely, the experience of other governments: "It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Of course, as Justice Brandeis' opinion assumes, interstate differences cannot be challenged
under the equal protection clause (unless those differences are dictated by a federal program).
Similarly, local governments (to whom the state has delegated legislative powers) may differ in
their treatment of their own citizens; it is only intrastate variations imposed by a single sovereign, the state, that must be justified. The Supreme Court, however, seems not to have clearly
understood the proposition that one sovereignty may treat its citizens differently from another
sovereignty but must justify differential treatment of its own citizens. See Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954), and Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879), each of which upholds
without serious examination intrastate variations imposed not by local sovereignties, but by
the state.
The Court in Salsburg argued that equal protection demands equality between persons, not
places, 346 U.S. at 551-a claim which fails to address the question whether a given discrimination between persons in different places is justifiable. More sophisticated is the argument
that since the state could grant each county home rule under which local option might create
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an experiment is the usual state interest in attacking a social harm,
another substantive purpose is to study the extent of social problems
and the efficacy of various solutions. That study is impossible if all
who pose the harm, or those who pose it most acutely, must be similarly burdened, for most experiments need a similarly situated control group. Of course, not every bona fide social experiment satisfies
the equal protection guarantee. For example, a court might not allow an experiment which forbad a randomly chosen group to consume alcohol, even though a general prohibition is permissible; the
experiment's possible informational benefits pale in comparison with
the unfairness of imposing this significant burden on only a few
drinkers. Insofar as the state is simply pursuing its traditional interest, ie., attempting to reduce the evils of drinking, it should do so
either "rationally," by penalizing the most problematic drinkers
(e.g., drunk drivers), or "proportionally," by burdening all drinkers
similarly.
There are examples other than experiments of an independent
state interest in pursuing a goal neutrally. Consider a draft lottery
or a jury selection procedure. Like social experiments, these classifications may evidence a substantive purpose other than numerically
diminishing a larger class-namely, placing a cross section of the
community in the jury box or on the battlefield. Although "rational" distinctions would be possible-the draft could be limited
(more than it has been) to the physically fittest, and the jury to the
brightest and most conscientious-such distinctions would less effectively promote citizenship than the neutral, cross-sectional scheme.
Here, as in the case of experiments, the independent interest deserves
special weight in the equal protection balance, since it is an interest
which the alternative of rational classification will not further. 340
variation, the state can impose variant conditions directly. 346 U.S. at 552. Even this argument is troublesome without some showing of rational differences between the counties, as
would be the analogous argument for different federal regulations for different states.
340. Note, however, that the independent state interests in draft and jury classifications
sometimes can be served by a proportional diminution of the benefit or burden. Although the
"cross-sectional" interest is not furthered by rational classification, it is served by a proportional diminution; if more persons enter military service or jury duty for a shorter time, the
inculcation of citizenship values might be even more effective. Social experiments, by contrast, demand not simply a nonrational classification, but also a nonproportional approach,
since in either case there can be no control group.
The question naturally arises in this kind of case whether the state must burden proportionally when it can do so without sacrificing an independent state interest. There is no simple
answer. Since proportional diminution is fairer than random or semi-random exclusion, it
will often be a reasonable, less-restrictive alternative, especially since its use does not compromise the independent state interest. Of course, proportional diminution might entail considerably more administrative expense-compare the costs of training 100,000 soldiers for two
years of duty with the costs of training 200,000 for one year. Whether proportional diminution is required will thus depend on the details of the equal protection balance in any given
case.
A comparable problem arises with respect to neutral goals that do not serve an independ-
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However, not all neutral goals serve special interests of this sort.
Attempts to reduce a program's costs and decisions that only part of
a harm is worth alleviating, for instance, both reflect neutral goals.
If it costs about as much to benefit or burden one individual as another,341 and if the program's budget must be cut by a certain percentage, then the state might simply exclude that percentage of the
class from the program. But there is no independent state interest in
excluding rather than rationally classifying here. Although it might
well be cheaper to exclude beneficiaries randomly than to search for
and apply a "rational" criterion (recall the procedure at issue in
Reed), cost savings are not the kind of independent state interest
previously described. Rather, they are already an element of the
minimum rationality constraint and equal protection balance and
will thus be considered by a court in any event.
Classifications with neutral goals which do not further independent substantive state interests are especially vulnerable to equal protection criticism. If the classification imposes a discrete burden that
cannot be proportionally expanded or diminished, the state will
nonetheless have to show that a rational distribution of the burden
or benefit would be difficult or costly, especially if the personal interest is of any significance, or if the classifying trait is stigmatizing. In
Reed, for example, the benefit of being appointed an administrator
is "discrete"-only one person can effectively hold the position-yet
the classification is invalid because the possible cost saved by automatically preferring men does not justify stigmatizing women and
imposing a financial burden on the losing claimant. By contrast, a
court would rarely overturn a city's decision as to where to begin
installing a sewer line (a discrete benefit, since the city cannot begin
everywhere), for the decision probably stigmatizes no one and burdens no significant personal interest.
ent state interest and whose burdens or benefits can be proportionally diminished. See discussion in text at notes 342-44 infra.
341. If individual A costs more to benefit than does individual B, but A also has higher
needs, is it more "rational" to exclude A from the program or to exclude Bl In theory, the
answer would seem to depend on the cost-efficiency of benefitting each. Thus, if A has S
"units" of need and costs $10 to benefit, while B has 3 "units" of need and costs $9 to benefit,
the state should exclude B, despite his lower total cost (unless of course there is only $9 left to
spend in the entire program). However, there are obvious practical and theoretical problems
with this approach. A meaningful utilitarian calculus is often impossible because of the difficulties of measurement; a ''unit" of need is only a social scientist's dream. Even the concept of
need is disturbingly slippery. For example, if the state has $100 to spend, it might prefer
benefitting 11 Bs to benefitting 10As, even though fewer ''units" of need were alleviated (only
33 units, rather than SO), on the ground that it is more important to benefit more people than to
alleviate a greater "amount" of need.
If the benefits can be proportionally diminished, these complexities are multiplied, for one
naturally asks, Proportional to what? To cost, or to need? If to need, how is need defined?
For an interesting example of these problems, see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. S3S (1972),
discussed in text at notes 196-99 supra.
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If the classification does not further an independent state interest,
but its benefit is such that it can be proportionally expanded or diminished,342 then equal protection demands that it be conferred
upon all persons whom the legislature has determined deserve it.
Arbitrary exclusion, even by lot, is impermissible. 343 By the state's
own admission, these persons are similarly situated with respect to
desert and must therefore be treated similarly. 344
To summarize, some persons may be excluded from a burden or
benefit even though those included are similarly situated, provided
that the "neutral" classification furthers a substantive purpose (other
than the mere numerical diminution of a larger class) which would
not be served by rationally excluding some members of the class. If
no such purpose exists, then the classification will be vulnerable to
the criticism that a rational criterion of exclusion should have been
342. The proportional-diminution problem is more general than first appears, for it also
arises whenever a program is instituted or expanded. That is, funds for programs are often
separately authorized and appropriated, and thus can either be insufficient or more than originally planned, necessitating a proportional diminution or expansion. (The term "diminution"
has been used for the sake of simplicity.) Moreover, con.ceptually identical "diminution"
problems occur when, instead of entirely extinguishing the burden or benefit for part of a class
(i.e., "excluding" them), the state merely diminishes the burden or benefit for that part. See
discussion of Jefferson v. Hackney in text at notes 196-99 supra.
343. See Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 291 (1971) (dictum) ("a State's interest in
preserving the fiscal integrity of its welfare system by economically allocating limited AFDC
resources may not be protected by the device of adopting eligibility requirements restricting
the class of children made eligible by federal standards. That interest may be protected by the
State's 'undisputed power to set the level of benefits. . . .' ") (citation omitted).
See also dictum in Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 493
(1977), implying that if "rational" exclusion were not possible, random exclusion might raise
an equal protection concern. The issue was whether workers whose unemployment was
caused by labor disputes other than lockouts could be denied unemployment compensation
benefits.
It is clear that protection of the fiscal integrity of the fund is a legitimate concern of the
State. We need not consider whether it would be "rational" for the State to protect the
fund through a random means, such as elimination from coverage of all persons with an
odd number of letters in their surnames. Here, the limitation of liability tracks the reasons found rational above [namely, increasing employer contributions only when he locks
employees out, and allowing pressure on the employer to settle only in that situation], and
the need for such limitations unquestionably provides the legitimate state interest required by the equal protection equation.
344. If the "random exclusion" approach were fully accepted, it would simply resurrect the
"part of a harm" rationale for misfit criticized earlier and would violate the minimum rationality constraint. True, the problem as now stated is slightly different, since here a budgetary
constraint is explicit, and the exclusion method is random. But the situation is not significantly different from that in which a legislature simply does not "choose" to attack all of a
harm and uses a fairly neutral trait to limit the burdened class.
In a sense, of course, limiting the class rather than diminishing the burden does comport
with the principle of equal treatment for the similarly situated, for when the class is limited by
lot, all are "treated equally" with respect to their chance to win the lottery. See Breit &
Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Altitudes Toward Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86 HAR.v. L.
REv. 693, 707-08 (1973). But by similar reasoning, any law might be upheld as fair on the
ground that all groups have a chance to win in the legislative halls. The proper approach is to
define the fairness of treatment "rationally," that is, in terms of desert of the benefit or burden.
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used. In addition, if the burden or benefit is not discrete, it must be
proportionally diminished.
Assuming that a neutral goal can be pursued and that the burden
or benefit is discrete, we confront our second problem: what criterion
may be used to limit the class of persons? Since the purpose in neutral goal cases is served by benefitting or burdening a limited class of
persons indistinguishable from a larger class, a random selection
process is the most acceptable method. The most straightforward
random selection method would be a lottery that selected in a single
drawing recipients of the particular burden or benefit.
A "natural" lottery might also be used which allocated burdens
and benefits according to some adventitious characteristic randomly
distributed across the entire population345-perhaps hair color or
month ofbirth.346 A natural lottery is troublesome, however, for the
public might improperly associate any personal trait, even a randomly distributed one, with desert of the burden or benefit, and the
''winners" of the lottery might be stigmatized because of their selection. Even if the trait did not promote a suspicion that the legislature intended to stigmatize an unrepresented minority, a natural
lottery might have this undesirable e.ffect,347 especially were the trait
objectively observable and socially significant. 34 8
Although ideally a "pure" lottery should be imposed on all neutral legislative classifications involving discrete burdens or benefits,
the cost would often be prohibitive. A rough balancing approach
should be applied-departures from the ideal become more justifiable as the burden or benefit becomes less significant-but the courts
should be alert to stigmatizing effects, particularly where the deprivations imposed are great. Thus, filling the draft rolls with redheads
should not be allowed. On the other hand, a court would sensibly
ignore a complaint by a person with a high ZIP code number that
the Postal Service first sorts letters with low ZIP code numbers instead of sorting by lot.
345. Sandalow, supra note 7, at 669 n.49.
346. It is difficult to find a natural characteristic that is distributed across the population
entirely randomly. Many natural traits, such as hair or eye color, height, and race, are influenced, if not determined, by characteristics of the biological parents. Others, such as lefthandedness or date of birth, are controllable to some extent, at least in the long term, and
could therefore only be used on a short-term basis.
347. The danger oflegislative oppression of minorities is a significant reason for preferring
a "non-natural" lottery, but stigma is an independent reason. Arguably an actual random
selection of one of a large number of "natural" adventitious characteristics-"redheads,"
''women," "crooked noses," "ear-wigglers," and so forth-should still be considered suspect,
especially when the burden or benefit to be conferred is significant. See text following note
348 i'!fra.
348. The trait is likely to have social significance when it is employed in a number of
different classifications, for it then poses the risk of imposing cumulative disabilities. See San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973).
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A. Introduction
Although only a few justices describe their analysis in such
terms, 349 the Supreme Court does "balance" in equal protection
cases. For example, the Court balances at the margin where fundamental interests are only indirectly burdened,350 in analyzing irrebuttable presumption doctrine cases, and when it selects one of the
three different tests employed in different equal protection cases.
However,. this section neither demonstrates that the Court balances,
nor justifies the basic propriety of doing so. Rather, it explores the
relationship of misfit analysis to equal protection balancing and
identifies some problems that a balancing test must address.
As described by the commentators, the structure of a balancing
test is basically the same whether the balance involves equal protection, substantive due process, or the first amendment. 351 Traditionally, four elements are balanced, two on the individual's side and
two on the government's. On the individual's side are the personal
interest (I) that is burdened by the regulation and the extent to which
that interest is burdened (B); on the state's side are the governmental
interest served by the regulation (G) and the extent to which that
interest is served, ie., the means-end "fit" (F). 352 Thus, a regulation
fails the balancing test if the individual's interest, represented by I X
349. See the dissenting opinions of Justice Marshall discussed in note 66 supra; the concurring opinion of Justice White in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,456 (1973); the concurrence of
Justice Douglas to Justice Marshall's dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 70 (1973); and the concurrence of Justice Brennan to Justice Marshall's
dissent in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970). It is unclear from his mystical
declaration that "[t]here is only one Equal Protection Clause" whether Justice Stevens subscribes to a flexible balancing approach. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976). And see
429 U.S. at 210 n.l, where Justice Powell concedes that "[t]here are valid reasons for dissatisfaction with the 'two-tier' approach."
350. See text at notes 79-80 supra.
351. See, e.g., P. BREST, supra note 116, at 988-90; Perry, supra note 68, at 388; Simson,
supra note 5, at 678-81; Note, supra note 218, at 466-68.
352. In terms of the traditional model, "fit" is generally considered to be represented by
either the ratio C/(C+D) or the ratio (B+C)/(A+B+C+D). Equal protection "fit," by contrast, is indicated by the ratio A/C: B/D.
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B, "outweighs" the governmental, represented by G X F, that is, if

Ix B>G x F. Focussing on fit, F, we see that misfit is more tolerable
(F can be less) the greater the governmental interest, G, and the
lesser the individual interest, I, or the extent to which it is burdened,
B.3s3
Despite the surface plausibility of this model, it obscures several
important elements of equal protection balancing. These elements
may be isolated by examining the three tests the Court currently employs. In reviewing a classification, the Court asks whether it is
(1) Rationally related to a legitimate state interest;
(2) Substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives; or
(3) Necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.
The third test applies to fundamental interests and suspect categories;354 the second to gender-based classifications355 (and perhaps to
laws based on illegitimacy);356 the first, purportedly, to all other classifications.357
These three tests diverge from the simplified balancing model in
several ways. To be sure, the progression from the first test to the
third parallels the model in requiring closer fit and a greater government interest as the personal interest becomes more fundamental.
But the three levels of review differ in more than the closeness of the
fit they demand. The first test asks for rationality, that is, at least a
minimal relevant difference between those who are and are not burdened by the law. The second test asks for "substantiality," which
presumably includes rationality. But what must be substantial-the
differential in harm between those who are and are not burdened, or
the "accuracy" of the classification in selecting all and only those
who are harmful? If the former, then substantiality is an equal protection standard; if the latter, then substantiality is essentially a substantive due process standard. These standards are of course quite
different. The state interest is not "substantially served" in the due
353. P. BREST, supra note 116, at 988.
354. See .Developments, supra note I, at 1087-104.
355. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
356. The intermediate test has not been explicitly applied to classifications based on illegitimacy. However, the Supreme Court has stressed that such classifications, while not judged
under the strict scrutiny standard, are not judged under a "toothless" standard, Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976). A classification based on illegitimacy is examined to see
whether it broadly discriminates between legitimates and illegitimates or is instead carefully
tuned to alternative considerations. 427 U.S. at 513. Where "[t]he reach of the statute extends well beyond the asserted purposes,'' the statute may be invalidated. Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 772-73 (1977).
351. See .Developments, supra note I, at 1077-87.
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process sense if a law allows girls but not boys to buy beer when very
few boys are drunk drivers. On the other hand, the interest is not
"substantially" served in the equal protection sense if, although quite
a few boys are drunk drivers, a similar proportion of girls are also
drunk drivers. In short, the balancing model (and the test applied in
Craig) is ambiguous as to the kind of fit that must be "close."
A second problem with the model is suggested by the third standard of review (that where fundamental interests are involved, the
means must be "necessary" to the end). "Necessity" denotes an absence of alternatives; it does not imply closeness of :fit.358 As we will
see, there may be no alternatives to a loosely fitting law. Yet the
"strict scrutiny" test simply assumes that "necessity" implies greater
precision, and the traditional balancing model simply ignores the
availability of alternatives.359
With these two 360 criticisms of the model in mind, we can more
carefully analyze the relevance of "balancing" to the fairness of a
law. 361 The next two sections discuss separately equal protection
and substantive due process balancing. A separate discussion is crucial, for both the traditional balancing model (comparing I and B to
G and F) and the tripartite equal protection standard applied by the
courts are misleadingly phrased and conceal the distinct functions of
equal protection and substantive due process analysis.
B.

Equal Protection Balancing

The first requirement of equal protection is that the minimum
rationality constraint be satisfied.362 A law which satisfies this test
should be subject to a second "balancing" test. This balancing process assesses the relative importance of the various elements of the
358. See P. BREST, supra note 116, at 990-93.
359. The distinction between closeness of fit and availability of alternatives is obscured in
the formulation given by Simson, supra note 5, at 679-80, in which he characterizes the meansend fit as "necessary, significant, insignificant, or non-existent." Since a "necessary" relation
may nevertheless create a considerable misfit, Simson's test might too easily validate overinclusive or underinclusive laws.
360. A third problem with the model is its potentially misleading treatment of the interplay
between the factors on either side of the balance. The model is usually understood to mean
that even a "perfectly rational" law may be invalid if the government interest is insubstantial
in comparison with the significance of the personal interest (and the extent to which that interest is burdened). Analogously, a law may be valid even though the personal interest is "completely" burdened, that is, extinguished, if that interest is insubstantial in comparison with the
government interest (and the- extent to which it is achieved). See Part VI.B.3 infra.
361. The first amendment overbreadth test, interestingly enough, is quite similar to the
equal protection and due process balancing tests. A law may be invalidated for first amendment overbreadth because the means-end "fit" is inadequate, because there are less restrictive
alternatives despite close "fit," or because (whatever the alternative means) the state interest is
insufficient to justify the restriction upon speech. Israel, E!fbrandt v. Russell· The .Demise ofthe
Oath?, 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 193, 217-18; see w. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 819-22 (4th ed. 1975).
362. See Part IV.A supra.
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minimum rationality constraint. Three inquiries are relevant in this
process. How different must the burdened and the unburdened be
in the extent to which they pose the harm? When must the state
seek less restrictive "reasonable" alternatives? When is perfect fit
itself not enough? After a preliminary comment, these three questions will be examined in tum.
Critics of equal protection balancing might argue that the minimum rationality constraint, supplemented by substantive due process balancing, guarantees all the "fairness" the equal protection
clause demands. 363 This argument has some force, for a stronger
interpretation of substantive due process does mitigate the need for
an equal protection scrutiny beyond "minimum rationality," and the
Supreme Court's reluctance to invoke substantive due process after
the Lochner debacle has certainly spurred the development of equal
protection "strict scrutiny."364
This argument is ultimately unconvincing, however. A classification may satisfy both the minimum rationality constraint and substantive due process and yet on balance be unfair, as where a large
difference in treatment turns upon a trivial difference in social harm.
For example, had the statistics in Craig indicated that 1.9% of girls
drove drunk as compared to 2.0% of boys, the Court could have invalidated the law despite its "rationality" and despite its satisfaction
of substantive due process (the interest in purchasing beer is hardly
fundamental). 365 What is fair on balance depends, as we will see,
upon the extent of the differential in harm and the availability of
alternatives in light of the competing state and personal interests.
1. The Extent of the .D!lferentia! in Harm
A court's first task in equal protection balancing is to assess the
extent of the differential in harm according to the significance of the
personal and governmental interests, the severity of the burden, and
the extent to which the government interest is served. The absolute
amounts of overinclusion and underinclusion should not affect this
balance (except insofar as they reflect the degree of differential
harm). Of course, a case of perfect fit describes the greatest possible
differential in harm, and in this sense equal protection balancing favors an absolute reduction in misfit. But the balance may validate a
lesser differential in harm, and then it is unsatisfactory simply to
363. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 226-28 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), Although
Justice Rehnquist does not explicitly endorse a substantive due process approach, he concedes
that the irrebuttable presumption/due process question "call[s] for a balance of the State's
interest against the harm resulting from any overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness." 429
U.S. at 226. Thus, Justice Rehnquist's approach is similar to the argument presented in the
text.
364. See .Developments, supra note I, at I 131-32.
365. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 227 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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point to the absolute amounts of misfit to demonstrate the "irrationality" (or insufficient rationality) of a law.
Turner v. Fouche 366 illustrates the distinction between the absolute amount of misfit and the differential in harm. The Supreme
Court in Turner held that a statute limiting county school board
membership to property owners failed even the weakest equal protection test.
It cannot be seriously urged that a citizen in all other respects qualified to sit on a school board must also own real property if he is to
participate responsibly in educational decisions, without regard to
whether he is a parent with children in the local schools, a lessee who
effectively pays the property taxes of his lessor as part of his rent, or a
state and federal taxpayer contributing to the . . . annual school
budget.367

This argument only points to the underinclusiveness of the classification. It does not demonstrate that there is no greater likelihood that
property owners, as a class, will participate responsibly in educational decisions than nonproperty owners. In the portion of the
opinion concerning the state's interest in ensuring that board members have an "attachment to the community and its educational values," the Court more usefully describes its reasoning:
However reasonable the assumption that those who own realty do
possess such an attachment, Georgia may not rationally presume that
that quality is necessarily wanting in all citizens of the county whose
estates are less than freehold. Whatever objectives Georgia seeks to
obtain by its "freeholder'' requirement must be secured, in this instance at least, by means more finely tailored to achieve the desired
goal.368

Here the Court concedes a possible differential in "harm" and thus
must be implicitly balancing what it perceives to be a small differential against the interest of nonfreeholders in school board membership.
Determining how great the differential must be between the burdened and the unburdened requires that the personal interest and
the extent to which it is burdened be balanced against the government interest and the extent to which it is served. But this balance
should occur only at the margin:369 the question is not whether the
personal interest at issue is in the abstract more important than the
state interest, but whether a particular law's infringement of personal
liberty outweighs its utility in serving its social end. Measuring the
actual infringement is conceptually simple-a court merely asks how
many persons have been burdened and what interests are to what
366.
367.
368.
369.

396 U.S. 346 (1970).
396 U.S. at 363-64.
396 U.S. at 364 (footnotes omitted).
See Note, supra note 218, at 467-68.
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extent impaired. Evaluating how well the classification serves the
social end is more complicated. Of course, the social end is not to
eradicate the social harm, since a law usually diminishes only part of
a harm. In Craig, for example, the government's side of the balance
cannot contain the undifferentiated interest in eliminating drunk
driving by eighteen- to twenty-year-olds. The interest relates only
to eighteen- to twenty-year-old males and reducing their drunk driving, since the regulation will not be fully effective. The Court
should weigh only that portion of the harm which the law actually
alleviates.370 However wise it may be to presume that a law usually
achieves what it purports to, 371 evidence that the burden is inefficacious should be weighed in the equal protection balance. 372 Thus,
the Court in Craig was properly influenced by· the fact that boys
could easily obtain beer despite the regulation.
Unfortunately, scholarly discussion of the extent to which means
serve ends has often missed the distinction between absolute amount
of misfit and differential harm. Professor Gunther, for example, has
spoken generally about the need to scrutinize the means-end fit in
equal protection cases, and he seems to assume that simply adding
the absolute amounts of overinclusion and underinclusion tells us
whether the fit is justifiable.373 But the issue should not be whether,
370. One benefit of this analysis is that it makes narrowly contrived purposes self-defeating. A narrow purpose reduces misfit only at the expense of narrowing the state interest in
imposing the burden. Conversely, a more general purpose has a greater social value but results in a greater degree of misfit. A natural equilibrium is achieved in which the stale is
allowed significant leeway in defining purposes but is forced to accept the natural consequences of that definition.
For instance, if the purpose of the prohibition against carriers advertising the wares of
others in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), was to minimize traffic
hazards, as the Court hypothesized, this significant public interest would be included in a
calculus of misfit which would probably show that the classification was both grossly overinclusive and underinclusive. If, instead, the purpose was merely to protect existing carriers
against an influx of carriers supported by large advertisers, a more precisely tailored classification would be accomplished at the expense of a lesser (or less obviously permissible) stale
interest. Of course, if economic discriminations are to be afforded minimal review, the
classification might withstand analysis under either interpretation. The example nevertheless
illustrates that this approach lessens the problem of the state reducing the effective degree of
scrutiny by narrowly articulating its purpose.
371. See text accompanying notes 256-61 supra. Although the effectualness argument is
discussed there in terms of due process, the discussion applies to equal protection as well.
372. If a burden is ineffective, both the state interest in imposing the burden and the personal interest in avoiding it are less than they would be if the burden were completely effective.
Thus, the Court in Craig might have observed that the ease with which the prohibition could
be circumvented made plaintiffs' complaint less appealing. Whether these effects cancel each
other perfectly in an equal protection balance is an intriguing question. (Arguably equal protection complainants suffer some injury simply in being targeted as members of a class appropriately burdened, even if the arrows go astray. But a parallel argument can be offered for the
state: many laws have a symbolic or "propaganda" value even if they are not enforced. See
text at notes 149-50 supra.)
373. Gunther, supra note 2, at 47-48. In add{tion, see Simson, supra note 5, at 679-80,
who apparently makes the same assumption.
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in the abstract, some persons who are included should be left out or
whether some persons who are left out should be included.374
Rather, it is whether those who are included are "sufficiently" different from those who are left out, where sufficiency is judged according to the weight of the personal interests actually infringed and the
weight of the social harm that the law actually alleviates.
2. Prima Facie Fairness and Reasonable Alternatives

This section asks when a court should concern itself with possible
alternative means of accomplishing a law's purp!)se, and how the
reasonableness of alternatives should be determined. In balancing
with respect to differential harm, a court should make a prima facie
determination of fairness before considering alternatives. The court
may find that a certain differential is, "on balance," either fair or
unfair regardless of the existence of reasonable alternatives. The
driving test illustration employed in this Note is probably an example of a law that is fair irrespective of alternatives, if we can assume
that the classification presents some differential in harm. Even if
every other state in the nation had a less costly, more accurate test
for screening dangerous drivers, no court would invalidate this
state's test, given the relative unimportance of the individual interest
in driving and the significance of the social interest in safe highways.
In contrast, while denying food stamps to members of unrelated
households might be the only feasible safeguard against households
formed only to obtain them, 375 a court could well find the law "on
balance" unfair. 376
A court which concludes that a law's fairness can be judged without evaluating alternatives has in effect concluded that the law
presents an extreme case under the balancing test. That is, it has
found the law unmistakably fair or unfair. Greater precision as to
the standards for "prima facie fairness" is probably unattainable, for
374. The Supreme Court often analyzes misfit in these terms and infers irrationality from
the mere fact that the classification creates some overinclusion or underinclusion, without
pausing to examine the degree of differential between T and "'T(equal protection misfit) or of
due process overbreadth. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974), and
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966) (equal protection); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (plurality opinion) (due process).
375. See United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
376. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), in which the Court struck down a legislative attempt to reduce drunk driving by means of an alcohol purchase limitation-even
though there may be "no apparent way to single out persons likely to drink and drive," 429
U.S. at 227 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In one sense, of course, United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973),
and Craig are not laws which are unfair "regardless" of alternatives, but cases in which the
Court will only accept the "alternative" of invalidation. But this is not a sensible characterization; the Court is holding that it is unsatisfied with the fairness of the law, not that it is satisfied
with the reasonableness of the alternative.
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those standards will reflect the premises with which a court approaches balancing.
A court which cannot make a prima facie judgment about a law's
fairness must examine the reasonableness of its possible alternatives.
The Supreme Court purports to look at alternatives only under the
compelling state interest test, 377 but its analyses under the irrebuttable presumption doctrine and rational basis test reveal its interest
in alternatives. The Court nominally considers only those alternatives that are at least equally effective in achieving the state's goal378
(and also, of course, less restrictive). Nevertheless, under the compelling state interest test the Court does not in fact demand "equal
e.ffectiveness,"379 and under the irrebuttable presumption doctrine it
is openly undisturbed by the additional administrative costs of the
alternative it imposes.380 This divergence between theory and practice can be cured by formulating an explicit standard for evaluating
alternatives under equal protection balancing. Simply stated, the
reasonableness of an alternative should depend on the prima facie
fairness of the law, on the social costs of the alternative, and on how
much less.restrictive the alternative is. This standard requires some
elaboration.
The strict scrutiny "necessity" requirement has classically meant
that there must be (a) no less restrictive means which (b) serves the
government interest equally well. 381 The second element of this
definition must be treated skeptically, for few alternative means
serve an end just as well as the existing means. As Professor Brest
has remarked, 382 the presence of such an alternative would demonstrate that the law was not Pareto optimal3 83 and thus that its restrictiveness could be alleviated at no cost384 even though the law was
377.- See JJevelopments, supra note 1, at 1102-03, 1122.
378. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (''the Constitution does not require the
State to choose ineffectual means to achieve its aims"); American Party ofTexas v. White, 415
U.S. 767, 781 (1974).
379. For example, in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), the Court stressed that more

precise tests were available to determine the bona fide residency of servicemen and servicewomen who moved to the state, and it invalidated the broad denial of the right to vote to
all such residents. It is obvious, however, that some additional administrative costs would be
incurred by replacing the presumption with the more precise tests.
380. See cases cited in note 203 supra.
381. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-35, 637 (1969). The second element of
the requirement, equal effectiveness, is often stated less explicitly than the first. See note 378
supra.
382. P. BREST, supra note 116, at 991-92.
383. The Pareto criterion states: "Any change which harms no one and which makes some
people better off (in their own estimation) must be considered to be an improvement." W.
BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 527 (4th ed. 1977). Here, if the
alternative means is just as effective as the existing means and burdens personal interests less,
then the existing means is not Pareto optimal, since a change in the alternative would not
undermine the state interest (it would "harm no one") and would make some people better off.
384. See also Note, supra note 218, at 469.
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"rational" in the sense of satisfying the minimum rationality constraint. Only a government with a bizarre or Spartan desire to minimize the happiness of its citizens, or, more plausibly, a government
hostile to those citizens burdened by the law under review, 385 would
fail to seek Pareto optimality. No court should give any weight to
these government interests. Even if thoughtlessness or ignorance
rather than malice motivated the irrationality, courts should require
the "efficient" solution.
The Court applies, as it must, the "less restrictive means" test
even where the state interest is less well served by the alternative
means. Of course, the effectiveness of the available alternatives
should be considered, but they need not be as effective as the challenged means. Before turning to the question of how "reasonable"
the alternative means must be, we should briefly consider the other
element of the classic test-the "less restrictive" requirement.
A ''less restrictive" means is an alternative that either creates less
misfit or imposes a lighter burden, or both. The "less misfit" interpretation is relatively uncomplicated.386 It is the approach in irrebuttable presumption cases, in which the Court allows the
legislature to confer the same benefits as the law under attack, but
requires that they be conferred on a larger class. It is also the approach most often used in fundamental interest cases, in which the
385. See id. at 469 n.27; Nimmer, Tire Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First
Amendment, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 29, 41-42 (1973).
386. The kind of misfit which a less drastic alternative reduces is usually overinclusion (or,
in the case of a benefit, underinclusion), for that kind of alternative directly aids the plaintiff;
he will no longer be burdened despite his innocence or excluded from the benefit despite his
need. But a means which creates less underinclusion with respect to a burden (or
overinclusion with respect to a benefit) might also be considered less restrictive. For example,
if in Craig the state could have easily reduced drunk driving by the alternative means of education and stronger penalties, then the law's underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness might
have been lessened: girls who could buy beer previously and would have been drunk drivers
would be discouraged from driving wljle drunk, and boys who were safe drivers before but
could not buy beer could do so.
But reducing the burden-underinclusiveness (or benefit-overinclusiveness) of a law is less
restrictive only in the sense that the alternative is fairer than the original, not in the sense that
the alternative burdens personal interests less severely. (In the above example, boys would
not be more lightly burdened simply because the girls who posed a harm under the original
law would not under the alternative.) Courts usually employ "less restrictive alternative" in
its second sense, possibly because the phrase "less restrictive" suggests the meaning "burdening plaintiffs less" or because a trivial alternative can always be found which is less restrictive
in the first sense. (In Craig, girls would be forbidden from purchasing beer.) Nevertheless, to
the extent that an alternative reduces underinclusion courts should consider it less restrictive,
since if it were adopted, the plaintiff would be less "burdened" in the sense of having a weaker
equal protection claim: he has less reason to complain that the similarly situated are not
treated equally.
It might be objected that in an equal protection case, courts should never characterize a less
overinclusive alternative as less restrictive, since overinclusion (with respect to a burden) is
essentially a due process problem. But the objection fails to note that a less overinclusive
classification will necessarily produce a greater differential in harm and thus a lesser equal
protection misfit. It also fails to note that a less overinclusive alternative burdens personal
interests less, thus increasing the state's comparative position in the equal protection balance.
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Court often notes how easily the legislature could achieve its goals
by better fitting means.387
The lesser burden388 interpretation of "less drastic means" appears less often. Its rationale is clear enough: even if an alternative
means burdens the same class of persons, the means may be less restrictive if the burden it imposes on those persons is lighter, for the
burden may implicate different and less important personal interests
or may infringe the same interests less seriously. For example, one
justification offered for the welfare residency requirement in Shapiro
v. Thompson 389 was that it would prevent the fraudulent receipt of
benefits from more than one state. But the Court noted: "Since
double payments can be prevented by a letter or a telephone call, it
is unreasonable to accomplish this objective by the blunderbuss
method of denying assistance to all indigent newcomers for an entire
year."390 That is, the alternative would have imposed only a mild
"burden," namely, a check on whether they received welfare benefits
from another state. Although the same class of persons-all welfare
recipients who arrived in the state within a year-would be burdened by this alternative, the enormous reduction in burden would
make it much less restrictive.
With these explanations of "less restrictive" and "equally effective" in mind, we may tum to the merits of the problem: how do we
determine whether an alternative is "reasonable"? "Reasonableness," of course, is not a static notion. If a law is almost prima facie
unfair regardless of alternatives, then even the presence of a somewhat costlier alternative might invalidate the law. If the law was
almost invalid even had there been no other means to achieve the
end, then it would be anomalous to uphold the law simply because
the alternative that does exist imposes more than nominal costs. In
the converse situation, in which the law is almost prima facie fair, an
alternative that imposes almost any significant costs on the state may
be "unreasonable," for similar reasons.
The "reasonableness" of an alternative should depend not only
on the prima facie fairness of the law, but also on the social costs of
the alternative and how much less restrictive the alternative is. That
is, the more ''unfair'' the law, the less restrictive the alternative, and
the less the costs imposed by that alternative, the more willing courts
387. See note 379 supra.
388. "Burden" also refers to denial of a benefit. The "lesser burden" interpretation, as
applied to benefits, means that the alternative does not completely deny benefits to underincluded would-be recipients; it gives a lesser benefit, or the same benefit subject to conditions
not applied to other recipients. The remedy ordered in an irrebuttable presumption case is
generally less restrictive in this sense, since it does not grant the benefit to plaintiff, but only
allows him to rebut the presumption that he does not deserve it.
389. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
390. 394 U.S. at 637.
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should be to invalidate the law for failing to employ a less drastic
means. In essence, we are simply comparing the general fairness of
the law with the general fairness of an alternative391 and asking
whether the additional fairness achieved by the latter justifies some
increase in social costs.
The social costs incurred by an alternative will mainly be of two
kinds. One cost may be the decreased effectiveness of the alternative means. Vlandis v. K!ine, 392 though nominally an irrebuttable
presumption case, illustrates such a cost. 393 The Court found constitutionally infirm the statutory irrebuttable presumption that certain
applicants for in-state tuition at a university were nonresidents. Specifically, married students who had legally resided outside the state
when they had applied and unmarried students who had lived
outside the state during the preceding year were deemed to be "nonresidents" for their stay at the university. The Court believed that a
more refined test of residence was practicable. The Court carefully
noted that it was not forbidding reasonable durational residence requirements that could be met while one was a student.394 The alternative of, say, a one-year residence test, 395 even if it used the same
presumptions as the statute in V!qndis, might increase social costs.
Although the original four-year presumption was too overinclusive,
it did screen out some nonresidents who would not have been
screened out by a one-year presumption (assuming that after a year
students can more easily qualify as residents). The alternative of a
one-year presumption therefore alleviates somewhat less effectively
the perceived "harm" of granting in-state tuition to nonresidents.
A second social cost an alternative can incur is its additional administrative cost. In Vlandis the alternative of requiring hearings at
which individuals could rebut the presumption of nonresidence
would not be significantly less effective in limiting in-state rates to
bona fide residents. The state in Vlandis objected to this alternative
mainly because of the second kind of social cost: the hearings mandated by the Court were more expensive than the presumption.396
39 l. The term "general" is significant, for the less restrictive alternative approach should
not require the state to choose alternative B over existing means A if A and B are "equally"
restrictive, even if the actual plaintiff is burdened by means A but not by means B. Giving
this plaintiff a remedy would only create a new and equivalently "burdened" class of persons
discriminated against.
392. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
393. Similar principles apply to "necessity'' problems in equal protection and in due process/irrebuttable presumption cases; the only difference is in the kind of misfit to be remedied
(i.e., differential harm vs. overbreadth).
394. 412 U.S. at 452.
395. See Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), ajfd mem., 401 U.S. 985
(1971).
396. The two kinds of social cost created by an alternative are often interrelated, for an
alternative that less effectively promotes the state's goal can usually be made more precise if
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(This, of course, is the usual objection to the alternative of allowing a
presumption to be rebutted.) As was suggested earlier,397 the cost of
hearings can be significant and should not be dismissed as blithely as
it has been in many sex discrimination and irrebuttable presumption
cases.398
Alternatives, it is clear, are not easily evaluated. Simple standards for evaluating alternatives that lower courts could readily and
correctly apply are elusive (though this is a problem endemic to any
refined, case-sensitive balancing test).399 And such standards are
necessarily difficult to apply because the actual effectiveness of alternatives can usually not be predicted. When a court evaluates the
prima facie fairness of a law, it may have a legislative record, or at
least detailed justifications by government counsel, describing the
law's probable effect. In some cases the court may even have evidence of the law's actual effectiveness. But evaluations of alternatives that the court may have conceived sua sponte and that may
never have been evaluated in the legislature must often rest on unwarranted factual assumptions. In these cases the dangers of judicial
legislation loom large.
Nevertheless, a court which doubts its competence to judge alternatives and which fears it is arrogating the legislative function may
rest its decisions simply on the prima facie fairness or unfairness of
the law without engaging in a more detailed balancing. Moreover,
some ·difficulties may be eased by shifting burdens of proof. One
commentator has suggested that critics of a government regulation
have the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that a
less restrictive alternative exists.400 In sharp contrast, the fundathe state is willing to shoulder the extra administrative cost. Of course, this relationship does
not invariably hold; the state may sometimes be forced to accept a less effective classification
even when it cannot be made more precise. In other words, sometimes the state just may not
have the second alternative of retaining the classification's level of effectiveness by increasing
administrative cost.
397. See Part IV.B.2 supra.
398. Administrative cost includes not only the additional out-of-pocket expenses-hiring
hearing examiners, evaluating more detailed and "individualized" categories of proof-but
also less tangible costs-loss of predictability, possible delay in imposing the benefit or burden,
and greater opportunity for abuse of discretion-which jeopardize both classificatory accuracy
and individual freedom. Where a hearing is already provided to some and the alternative
only requires that it be more complete or detailed or that it be extended to others, the burden
to the government is not as great as when new administrative machinery must be established.
These and other factors affect the significance which should be attached to the administrative
cost of conducting hearings.
399. Consider, for example, the unhappy experience under the fifth amendment "voluntariness" test for confessions, a test ultimately rejected in favor of the per se rule of Miranda v,
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See w. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J, CHOPER, CONSTITU•
TIONAL LAW 655-57 (4th ed. 1975).
400. Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Altemative Principle and Economic .Due Process, 80
HARV. L. R.Ev. 1463, 1471 (1967). For a general discussion of burdens of proof under the
minimum rationality standard, see P. BREST, supra note 116, at 1005-10.

Equal P-rotection

1978]

881

mental interest test apparently requires the government to prove that
there are no less restrictive means.401 This approach cannot be
taken too literally since a party cannot reasonably be asked to anticipate and refute every possible challenge to its position. But if the
government is asked only to disprove plausible alternatives proffered
by the plaintiff or the court, burden of proof will have been reasonably allocated in cases where an important personal interest is
significantly infringed or where the classification is almost prima
facie unfair. Where lesser personal interests are infringed, it is sensible to require plaintiffs to prove that a less restrictive alternative ,
exists.
3.

When Peifect Fit Is Not Enough

Under an equal protection balancing test with "bite," perfect fit
might not be enough to validate a law if the state interest "perfectly"
served is insufficiently important compared to the burden on personal interests. The Supreme Court's existing tests do appear to
transcend perfect fit, for while most classifications need only relate to
a "legitimate" state interest, a gender-based classification must serve
an "important" goal, and classifications touching fundamental interests (or employing suspect traits) must be necessitated by a "compelling" interest, irrespective of fit with a lesser goal. A good example
of this ''transcendental" technique was the Court's decision that once
a state grants criminal defendants an appeal as of right, it must also
appoint counsel for the indigent to ensure that the poor as well as the
rich may have a meaningful appeal.402 The state could have argued403 that its failure to furnish free counsel was "perfectly" related
to the interest of having defendants pay their own way in the criminal justice system. But such an interest is too slight to justify differential treatment with respect to the important personal right at issue,
namely, the meaningful chance to avoid the severe consequences of
conviction.404
The view that perfect fit with respect to a non-compelling interest
may not be enough to satisfy equal protection has been criticized as a
401. See .Developments, supra note 1, at 1122.
402. Douglas v, California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
403. There is no indication in the opinion that this argument was in fact made. But a
similar argument was propounded by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384
U.S. 305, 311 (1966). The majority had held that a state could not recoup the cost of trial
transcripts furnished to indigent incarcerated prisoners yet decline to seek such reimbursement
from indigents who are not imprisoned. Harlan reasoned in dissent:
Surely the State might reasonably choose to reimburse itself for such transcript costs out
of prison allowances, but deem it not worth the added time and trouble, or even advisable,
to attempt to extract such charges from a convict not in prison who must support himself
on his own resources.
384 U.S. at 311 (emphasis added).
404. See Simson, supra note 5, at 691-94.
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barely disguised return to substantive due process.405 This criticism
is not strictly accurate, since equal protection may properly employ
this transcendental method, but it is true that that method is usually
more appropriate in due process cases. A sensitive understanding of
substantive due process, of equal protection balancing, and of the
definition of "legitimate" discriminations, makes less necessary any
resort to the radical notion that "perfect fit is not enough."
An insufficiently developed equal protection balancing test partly
accounts for the hierarchy of purposes-from legitimate, to important, to compelling-in the current equal protection tests. Almost all
classifications create some misfit under the model presented in this
Note. That is, most laws are not, on their face, self-justifying. Further analysis is required to find a classificatory purpose that is "legitimate," and there will then ordinarily be some misfit to evaluate.
The question whether that misfit is justifiable is, as we have seen,
answered through a balancing test that weighs the differential in
harm between the included and the excluded according to the
strength of the government and personal interests.406 Thus, when
the government's interest is insignificant, the differential in harm
may be insufficient to validate the law, and there may be no need to
move up the hierarchy and examine misfit only with respect to a
more important purpose.
One important reason why the Court has used this "more than
perfect fit" approach is that the Court misconceives saving administrative costs as the same kind of government interest as the substantive purpose of the statute. If saving cost is described as the purpose
of a classification, then it is easy to describe "the purpose" as
insignificant irrespective of the closeness of the fit. Yet laws are usually not passed in order to save money but in order to do something,
subject to a cost constraint. Cost constraints are not unimportant,
but every law costs something, and costs will always affect the evaluation of the reasonableness of alternatives. Perhaps the Court requires an "important" interest in gender-based classifications to
underscore its view that administrative cost is an insufficient rationale. But all of the gender cases reaching the Supreme Court have
involved concededly inaccurate generalizations with respect to the
substantive goal of the statute; since the means invariably did not
perfectly fit the goal, the "more than perfect fit" approach in these
cases has been unnecessary.
As this discussion suggests, courts may also have resorted to
"more than perfect fit" because of their tendency to ascribe a narrow
and not "legitimate" purpose to a statute. In .Douglas, for example, if
405. See lJevelopments, supra note 1, at 1132.
406. Also relevant, of course, are the extent to which the government interest is served and
the extent to which the personal interest is burdened.
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the purpose is described as the desire to save the money that providing free counsel would cost, the purpose is not legitimate.407 The
Court must reach a higher or more generalized level of purpose
before evaluating misfit-not because "perfect fit is not enough" at
this level, but simply because there is no reason to credit a purpose
that is not obviously legitimate. (It would not be proper to define
the purpose of our driving test as screening from the road people
who fail driving tests and then to analyze that purpose as insignificant.) In short, the requirement that misfit be evaluated only with
respect to legitimate goals largely serves the function courts believe
the "perfect fit" approach performs.
Despite these observations, the "more than perfect fit" approach
is significant when even a legitimate purpose is too insubstantial.
This approach is also important when the goal is "inevitably arbitrary" in the special sense discussed above,408 for such goals by definition cannot sensibly be evaluated under a balancing test, one of
whose elements is misfit-their misfit cannot even be measured.
Thus, such goals should be treated as though the classificatory fit
were perfect and should be invalidated only when perfect fit is not
enough.409 If, for example, a school principal decided that physical
segregation of student protesters wearing black armbands410 was aesthetically pleasing, this inevitably arbitrary discrimination could
only be invalidated on the ground that the speech and privacy interests of the students required that a more important interest be invoked. It would be futile to dispute the aesthetic pleasure the
principal derived from the scheme; the closeness of fit is unmeasurable.
When equal protection demands more than perfect fit, the balance resembles straightforward substantive due process balancing.
But, in theory and occasionally in practice, the tests are distinct.
They diverge when an equal burdening of a fundamental or important interest does not quite violate substantive due process, but a differential burden does violate equal protection. For example, the
Supreme Court in .Douglas only held that an indigent should have
the same "meaningful" access to the courts that the state afforded a
wealthy defendant. It did not hold that "meaningful" access is a
407. The purpose is not legitimate because it does not explain why the costs of an indigent's appeal should be imposed on the indigent rather than on society generally.
408. See Part V supra.
409. In the case of laws with neutral goals (such as social experiments), this statement
should be qualified: the law should be invalidated only when the combination of perfect fit
toward the substantive goal and the independent state interest in classifying neutrally (e.g., the
interest in obtaining knowledge from an experiment) are insufficient to outweigh the individual's side of the equal protection balance. See text at notes 339-42 supra.
410. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Co=unity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(recognizing free speech right of high school students to wear black armbands in nondisruptive
antiwar protest).
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substantive requirement, and it thus apparently did not forbid the
state to deny the use of transcripts on appeal to rich and poor
alik.e.411 Similarly, in Shapiro v. Thompson 412 the Court purported
to strike down a residency requirement for welfare benefits only because the fundamental right to travel was d!fferentially infringed.
The Court presumably would have upheld the requirement had the
state also imposed qualitatively similar burdens on new residents
other than potential welfare applicants.413
As these cases illustrate, the theoretical distinction between equal
protection and substantive due process in this area often lacks practical substance. A more equal infringement of the right to travel than
occurred in Shapiro would probably not be constitutional. And the
Court's frequent assertion that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction414 can probably not be taken at face value.
Even if that assertion is correct, a state which has granted an appeal
as of right may probably not encumber it to the extent of denying
defendants the use of trial transcripts. But in some areas, such as
voting rights, the due process/equal protection distinction415 does
seem to have practical as well as theoretical meaning. Many state
offices can be appointive, but once the state makes them elective it
may not restrict any group's interest in voting in elections for those
offices, absent a compelling state interest.416
Despite these objections, the notion that equal protection may
require more than perfect fit is sometimes of practical consequence.
How should this notion be expressed in an actual balancing test?
One possibility would be to establish a finely graded continuum in
411. Support for this observation is perhaps to be found in Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404
U.S. 189 (1971), which required that an indigent defendant be furnished with a sufficiently
complete trial record to permit proper consideration of his claims even though the conviction
was punishable by fine only-and even though the right to counsel (a substantive right) has
not yet been extended to such convictions. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)
(noting that the question has yet to be decided).
412. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
413. Although these cases did not involve perfect fit, the Court's analysis in effect assumed
that the fit was perfect.
414. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 606 (1974), citing with approval McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
415. The distinction might be further refined to the following: substantive rights/due process/equal protection. Even though a citizen may have no substantive right (e.g., under the
first or sixth amendment) to obtain a certain benefit, it might be a denial of (substantive) due
process or equal protection to condition the grant of the benefit in certain ways, for instance by
invading substantive due process interests or by distinguishing on the basis of race or wealth.
Notice that substantive due process can sometimes be the source of a right to the particular
benefit as well as the source of a right not to have the benefit conditioned upon the nonassertion of protected interests. For example, as just noted, due process might plausibly support both a constitutional right to a criminal appeal and a constitutional right not to be penalized for the assertion of a statutory appeal right, see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,
725 (1969) (''vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial").
416. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628-30 (1969).
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which any increase in the significance of the personal interest (or the
extent to which it is burdened) would require a more significant
"threshold" state interest below which even perfect fit would not validate the law. Of course such a continuum would not be judicially
manageable, and the Court should require only a small number of
intervals. (The present test has three intervals,417 "legitimate," "important," and "compelling," though the middle interval is applied
not to intermediate-level interests but to an intermediately "suspect"
classificatory trait, sex.) A two-, three-, or four-tiered test is perhaps
appropriate here-but unlike the present tiers, these tiers would describe only the importance of the requisite government interest and
not the required closeness of fit or the availability of alternatives.
Within any single tier, a careful means-end analysis would still be
necessary.
In establishing these thresholds, care should be taken not to require too compelling a purpose at the upper tier lest equal protection
mandate pervasive equality. Under the present strict scrutiny test,
for example, the compelling state interest requirement is nearly impossible to satisfy.418 The state must treat similarly all who are exercising their fundamental interests in voting, travelling, seeking access
to the criminal justice process, entering marriage, and perhaps
procreating, and it may not draw merely "rational" distinctions
based on wealth or other criteria. Such enforced equality differs
from the most invigorated rational basis test; it requires that, in addition to all its other goals, the government attempt to ensure that
everyone realizes fundamental interests equally. As this approach
more absolutely protects certain rights, it not only increasingly resembles a due process approach, but eventually approximates the degree of scrutiny accorded explicit substantive constitutional
provisions such as the first amendment.
In sum, courts should employ the equal protection "perfect fit is
not enough" approach cautiously. There are probably few interests
unimportant enough that they may constitutionally be infringed
equally yet important enough that unequal infringement violates
equal protection regardless of the rationality of the classification in
other respects. Courts should be more willing to use either substantive due process or a rational basis test which evaluates misfit to invalidate classifications they now strike down on "fundamental
interest" grounds. This franker technique would probably not pro417. Simson, supra note 5, at 679, also suggests a three-tiered test, one which distinguishes
between compelling, significant, and insignificant state interests. His fourth category of state
interest, "unlawful," is not really a fourth ''tier," for it describes a tier at which the individual
always wins. Id at 680 n.95.
418. The compelling interest requirement has been satisfied only in two cases, each of
which involved wartime necessity: Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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duce greatly different results, since a court more closely scrutinizing
purposes by the method suggested above will almost invariably find
some misfit to weigh against the purported governmental purpose.
This technique would also encourage meaningful case-by-case review. Under current equal protection analysis, the Court is sometimes paralyzed when it feels it cannot accept the consequences of
another "fundamental interest" baptism,419 and it has been embarrassed by its resort to tortured reasoning to sustain laws that affect
fundamental interests indirectly.420 Under the proposed balancing
test, perfectly tailored classifications would seldom be invalidated
solely because they infringe important personal interests. The test
provides a sensitive and logically consistent solution to the problem
of protecting lesser personal liberties against discriminatory encroachment.
C. Substantive JJue Process Balancing
A reasonable formula for substantive due process balancing may
be inferred from the preceding section. Due process balances the
personal interests implicated and the extent to which they are burdened, against the state interest actually served by the means employed. The balance is that expressed by the equation earlier
noted.421 It is a direct balance in which differential harm, or indeed
any reference to an unclassified group, is irrelevant.422
Many of the same concepts used to analyze ~qual protection differential treatment apply directly to due process overbreadth. Similarly, under substantive due process as well as under equal
protection, "perfect fit" may not be enough to validate a law. Indeed,
419. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
420. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974);
Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
421. See text at note 353 supra.
422. Such a reference is relevant to a limited extent, namely, to determine how much of the
state interest is actually served by the means employed (C/(C + D), which is equivalent to
C/M):

M

See text at notes 369-71 supra.
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requiring more than perfect fit is more often a sensible mode of analysis in the former case than in the latter.423
Due process overbreadth analytically resembles equal protection
differential treatment. First, a court evaluates the extent of the overbreadth and estimates its legitimacy in light of the personal interests
burdened and the state interests achieved. At the "extremes" of legitimacy, the law is either upheld or invalidated, whatever the possible alternatives. Between those extremes, the court investigates
reasonable alternatives, testing reasonableness according to the
prima facie fairness 424 of the law, the social costs of its alternatives,
and the restrictiveness of the alternatives.
Despite these formal similarities between equal protection and
due process balancing, weights assigned the balanced interests may
differ in the two cases, since the consequence of a due process violation is more severe than that of an equal protection violation.
Ceteris paribus425 the personal interest should have to be more important (or more heavily burdened) in a due process than in an equal
protection case to constitute a violation. By the same token, the
state interest should have to be more compelling (or better furthered)
in a due process than in an equal protection case to justify what
would otherwise be a violation. Were this not so, the equal protection clause would be gratuitous, since a liberal due process clause
would invalidate even a uniform infringement of a right, and there
would be no need to examine differential infringement. But precision as to how different the weighting of the interests should be in the
two kinds of balance is elusive; the difference ultimately depends
upon the relative strength with which the Court wishes to read the
due process and equal protection clauses. Nevertheless, the Court
needs to be sensitive to these relationships between due process and
equal protection and the different functions which they perform.
Finally, as the last section suggests, in due process even more
than in equal protection perfect fit might not be enough-in due
process personal interests of a given level of significance must be justified in terms of state interests of a corresponding threshold significance, even if a lesser state interest is adequately, even perfectly,
423. Strictly speaking, "perfect fit" has a different meaning in the two cases. In due process, it only means the absence of any overbreadth, regardless of the amount of underinclusion. In equal protection, it means the greatest possible differential in harm between the burdened and those not burdened. This amounts to "perfect fit" as normally understood, for all
and only the harmful are burdened, and there is no overinclusion or underinclusion.
424. In due process cases, a law is prima facie fair if the degree of overbreadth is not
excessive; in equal protection cases, if the degree of differential harm is sufficient.
425. Of course, "comparing" the degree of overbreadth with the degree of differential
harm is difficult. But the intuitive idea is that if these are roughly equivalent, then the relationships stated in the text i,!fra should hold.
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served. This straightforward balancing makes more sense under
due process than under equal protection, for due process tends to
protect personal interests more absolutely. Indeed, the uneven continuum of equal protection, substantive due process, and explicit
constitutional guarantees such as the first amendment,426 suggests
that a direct balance of the relevant interests is more justifiable as the
personal interest comes to deserve more absolute protection. An infringement of anyone's free speech rights demands an extraordinary
justification. An intrusion into the autonomy of the family, by contrast, might be valid if the state could adduce a compelling interest,
but it is otherwise invalid, even if there is no overbreadth.427 An
invasion of a mere equal protection interest, such as the right to procreate, deserves little absolute protection; the plaintiff probably has
to show that the invasion was accomplished discriminatorily.428
Because due process demands more than perfect fit much more
often than equal protection, misfit analysis is often less important in
a substantive due process case. The Court will demand a "compelling" justification and will ignore less substantial state interests or
will be more critical of the misfit created by lesser interests than
under equal protection. Thus, to the extent that the Note's emphasis
on misfit analysis suggests that due process invariably requires a
judgment about overbreadth, this Note is misleading.429 Nevertheless, a more active use of the due process clause to protect lesser
personal interests would require a much closer attention to overbreadth analysis.430 Both because of this possibility and because due
process misfit analysis offers an instructive contrast to equal protection, overbreadth analysis is valuable.
426. See the taxonomy in P. BREST, supra note 116, at 805-06. This Note would interpose
a substantive due process tier between his category 1 ("substantive constitutional rights") and
his category 2 ("rights to fair and rational treatment"), which recognizes certain substantive
rights of lesser constitutional significance than many of his category 1 rights, but of greater
significance than his category 2 rights.
427. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating such a law by
a simple analysis of overbreadth). Significantly, the Court did not find any compelling state
interest to justify the discrimination.
428. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a maximum grant limitation on welfare benefits irrespective of family size, even though effect of statute may have been
to deter procreation); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating a compulsory
sterilization law which arbitrarily distinguished between, inter a/ia, larceners and embezzlers;
but upholding the general constitutionality of compulsory sterilization by its approving reference to Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973)
(citing Buck in support of the proposition that one does not have "an unlimited right to do
with one's body as one pleases").
429. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is a good example of a substantive due process case
in which overbreadth analysis was irrelevant. The crucial analysis involved a direct balancing
of interests to determine when each interest became "compelling" enough to outweigh the
others. 410 U.S. at 162-64.
430. The irrebuttable presumption doctrine is, of course, an example of such activism.
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CONCLUSION: THE JUDICIAL ROLE

This Note does not address in any detail the judiciary's proper
role in enforcing the equal protection guarantee. This Note does
attempt to construct a general analytic framework for a moderately
activist court, a framework amenable to a broad spectrum of judicial
views. The Note's "balancing" terminology should not be misinterpreted as requiring an activist approach to equal protection; it is
meant to explain what the existing tests actually do and to further
conceptual coherence. Courts may differ as to which interests deserve special solicitude and as to how much solicitude they deserve.431 Courts may differ as to the relative usefulness and propriety
of equal protection and substantive due process rationality tests.
They may differ as to the propriety (or necessity) of examining a
legislature's motive. They may differ, most fundamentally, as to the
relative importance of "hostile" and "unfair'' discriminations. But
the proposed model should be able to accommodate these differences.
"Closer scrutiny" is not reducible to a simple formula. A court
which is seriously evaluating the fairness of a law must assess the
differences between classes with respect to the harm posed, the interests aggrieved, and the costs incurred. The courts cannot hope for
mathematical nicety432 in these judgments, especially where classifications legitimately and inevitably reflect arbitrary choices. Nevertheless, the judgment can be a judgment rather than an idle
invocation of slogans.
A revivified case-by-case approach to equal protection promises
more genuine review; it also poses a danger of unprincipled decisions. This danger is often overdrawn, however. More exacting
equal protection review should inspire not ad hoc decisions, but a
body of standards applicable to different legislative subjects, personal interests, and classificatory traits-standards formulated in
light of the considerations this Note has set forth. For example, discrimination against women is now treated under an "intermediate"
standard: the classification must be "substantially" related to achieving "important" government objectives.433 Such a standard, unless
431. Compare the majority opinion with Justice Marshall's dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973). Commentators differ as to the
central values to be protected under the equal protection clause. See e.g., Karst, The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91
HARV. L. Rev. I (1977); Perry, supra note 68 (distinguishing several forms of fairness rooted in
"conventional morality"); Sandalow, supra note 7, at 670 (one such value is "to facilitate each
individual's opportunity to pursue a personal conception of the good life"); Wilkinson, supra
note 3, at 954-56 (distinguishing rights of political participation, equality of opportunity, and
economic equality).
432. See note 55 supra.
433. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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rigidly and unthinkingly applied, is not inconsistent with the view
that there is in principle only one equal protection standard,434 since
the Court has concluded that sex discriminations are as a rule so
unreliable that they must be justified by more than a merely conceivable set of facts. 435 And finally, however difficult it may be to fash-·
ion equal protection rules that are not only principled but also plain
and workable, the present two-tiered test can no longer be retained-the methods it prescribes are not those the Court actually
uses.436
The nagging concern that the equal protection clause raises questions courts are ill-equipped to answer perhaps explains why existing
equal protection tests are mechanical and result-oriented. This concern has also been overdrawn. The Court's most important task is
not to gauge numerical misfit; it is to estimate misfit roughly according to the Court's sense of how important or contrived the competing
interests are. The Court can defer to the fact-finding competence of
the legislature, and it can assign the plaintiff the burden of showing
that a social ill does not exist, or would not be effectively remedied
by the means chosen, or could be effectively remedied by a less restrictive alternative. And thus courts can answer the objection that
judicial review of a law's fairness substitutes a court's understanding
of the costs and benefits of social issues for the legislature's.437
Uneasiness about judicial legislation has also been fueled by the
fear that judicial review will hamper legislative flexibility and freedom. That fear is hardly confined to the equal protection clause but
may be particularly discomfiting in relation to it, since the values to
be "protected equally" are not described in the fourteenth amendment.438 But a principled theory for determining those values439 is
surely preferable to judicial abdication.
Moreover, the concern for legislative flexibility will be exaggerated if the limits of equal protection balancing are not appreciated.
A court employing this Note's framework would usually defer to the
state's finding that an evil exists and that the state's means alleviates
it.440 A state is entirely free to pursue any "legitimate,, goals441 except in those rare cases in which the law infringes an important per434. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
435. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("(a) statutory discrimination
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it").
436. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
437. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 784 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
438. See Professor Sandalow's discussion of "material principles," supra note 7, at 654-63.
439. See Sandalow, supra note 7, at 660-63.
440. See text at notes 256-61 supra.
441. See Part 111.A.1 supra.
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sonal liberty and must therefore be justified by a significant goal. 442
And if the goal is legitimate, the state may deploy any of the means
of reaching that goal which are "accurate" enough to satisfy the appropriate level of scrutiny. Finally, as Justice Jackson wrote, equal
protection does not prevent the government fro.m acting but only requires that its actions be even-handed.443 Though the statute may
have been partly intended to avoid even-handedness, Justice Jackson
does remind us that equal protection interferes with substantive legislative choices less than due process and many more explicit constitutional constraints do, since it examines only the justification for
unequally pursuing a goal.
Reasonable persons differ over the question whether the equal
protection clause prohibits only totally "irrational" classifications
and discrimination against suspect groups. But if the Court wishes to
subject laws to closer scrutiny than the traditional rational basis test
requires, there are principled and practical ways of doing so. The
Court's own decisions indicate its interest in a strengthened standard. There is no reason not to proceed.
442. See Parts VI.B.3 and VI.C supra.
443. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).

